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2ABSTRACT
The early 1930fs, or "Kiangsi soviet" period in the history 
of the Chinese Communist Party (COP), is one of the most obscure 
in the entire development of the communist movement* The major 
significance of the two National Congresses of 1931 and 1934 is 
that using them as a focal-point for analysis provides new 
information on the inter-related themes of political processes 
and power-relations during this period*
In 1930, the COP leader Li Li-san attempted to convene the 
First Congress. The attempt proved abortive when Li fell from 
power in November 1930* The "Returned Student groupn, as the new 
Party leadership, continued to press for a Congress in order to 
assert their authority over that of Mao Tse-tung in the soviet 
areas. Many of the new leaders moved to the soviet areas from 
Shanghai prior to the First Congress of November 1931> but 
although they were successful- in gaining control of the COP 
organisation in the soviet areas, the Congress, and the governmental 
apparatus produced by it, remained under the control of the Maoists.
Mao did little during 1931 to provide an efficient governmental 
administrative apparatus for the soviet areas, preferring to use 
military organisations, a situation which was rectified by the 
"Returned Students" after the First Congress. By 1933? they had 
asserted their dominance over Mao in the military sphere, and by
the summer of that year, they had sufficiently eroded his influence 
in the governmental sphere to permit them to convene the Second 
Congress of January 1934, which formalised their authority in the 
government. The "Returned Student group" then controlled all three 
power structures in the soviet areas - Party, army and government. 
Mao and his followers, in order to retain some Influence, publicly 
agreed with what they considered to be the incorrect policies of 
the "Returned Student" leaders*
In spite of a lack of success in mobilising the support of 
the local population, the establishment of a formal government of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic institutionalised the shift of COP 
operations from the cities to the countryside, and in addition, 
created a potential national government, which was a victory for 
the communists in their drive to represent an "alternative way" 
to that of the Kuomintang.
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INTRODUCTION
9Up until 1927, the official Stalinist line for the Chinese 
Communist Party (COP) was based on the aim of infiltrating and 
controlling Chiang Kai-shek!s Kuomintang (KMT), and thereby 
accomplishing the bourgeois-democratic revolution in China. The 
anti-communist coup launched by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 
ended all possibility of achieving this aim. The policy had 
failed partially because Stalin did not control the KMT army, 
and partially because of the policy of the Communist International 
(Comintern) itself, whose agent Borodin had organised the KMT. on 
a democratic-centralist basis, thus making it well-nigh invulnerable 
to communist infiltration.-*-
Stalin however, largely because of his domestic conflict with 
Trotsky, refused to acknowledge the incorrectness of his policies, 
and while attacking the right wing of the KMT, adopted a conciliatory 
attitude towards its left faction in Wuhan. It is at this time, 
mid 1927, after the break with the KMT Left in July, that Stalin 
first moots the possibility of soviets in China. The term 
“soviet1 was borrowed directly from Russian experience and 
referred to the kind of representative council of workers, peasants 
and soldiers first set up at the time of the 1905 revolution ^
1
Democratic centralism refers to the election of all leading 
Party organs, the submission of the minority to the majority, and 
the binding force of decisions of higher Party organs on lower 
Party organs.
2 Bravda, July 28, 1927; quoted in Robert C. North, Moscow and 
Chinese Communists, (Second Etdn., Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1965), p. 109*
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and later repeated in 1917. In China it later came to refer more 
generally to any territorial area controlled by the CCP.
China had become a pawn in the Trotsky-Stalin conflict, and 
in mid-1927, with Trotsky claiming that Chiang*s coup d’etat had 
ended the revolutionary situation, Stalin postulated the reverse 
assumption that the revolutionary wave was just climbing towards 
its crest. In order to demonstrate the truth of this assertion, 
he needed revolutionary victories in China, and therefore sent 
an agent, Bominadze, who organised the short-lived and unsuccessful 
Hanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927.
As was becoming customary in the international communist 
movement, Stalin blamed the leaders of the local communist parties 
for his own errors. The August 7, 1927 Emergency Conference of 
the CCP marked the dismissal of its long-time leader Ch’en Tu- 
hsiu and the rise of Gh1^  Ch’iu-pai. The Conference confirmed 
the new Comintern line of increased reliance on the peasantry 
(although not to the abandonment of the urban proletariat) and 
called for further armed uprisings in the light of the postulated 
’’rising revolutionary wave”.-*-
It is now time to examine briefly the actions of Mao during 
the year, as the development of his activities was later to become 
the mainstream of the movement. In line with the call for further
I Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and J, K. Pairbank, A 
Documentary History of Chinese Communism. (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1952), pp. 97-102, 118-123. (Hence­
forth referred to as Documentary History). See also Benjamin 
Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao. (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 93-96.
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armed revolts issued by the new CCP leader Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai, Mao 
was sent to Hunan to organise the Autumn Harvest Uprisings of 
August and September* These sporadic risings ended in failure 
and Mao was dismissed from the Politburo* During the Uprisings, 
Mao had prematurely adopted the policy of organising soviets 
which, although as has been mentioned, had been tentatively 
mooted by Stalin as a slogan as early as July, was not actually 
authorised by the Comintern as a policy until the end of September
1927.1
In spite of repeated failures, the November 9 Plenum of the 
CCP Central Committee found no shift in the Comintern line. A 
rising tide was still postulated, with failures said to be due 
"to the Subjective’ inadequacies of those i n v o l v e d ’’.^ Stalin 
needed a victory to prove the correctness of the line, and 
engineered the Canton Commune of December 1927, which however 
suffered the same fate as the Nanchang Uprising. Again the CCP 
paid the price for Moscow’s errors, as Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai was removed
Stuart R. Schram, "On the Nature of Mao Tse-tung's ’Deviation* 
in 1927", China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June, 1964), p. 60. See 
also his article "The ’Military Deviation* of Mao Tse-tung",
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIII, No. 1, (January-Pebruary 1964), 
pp. 51-52. See also John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927- 
1935, (Hoover Institution, Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1966), p. 77* According to Wang Chien-min»Ohung-kuo kung-ch*an- 
tang Shih-kao, (A History of the Chinese Communist Party),(Three 
Volumes, Taiwan: 1965), Vol. II, p. 165, this followed a statement 
by Stalin to the Comintern on September 27. /A*^ future references
to Wang Chien-min refer to Volume II/.
2
Schwartz, op.cit., pp. 103-104*
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from power and replaced by a new G-eneral-Secretary Hsiang Chung-fa, 
although real power was probably with two other Central Committee 
members, Li Li-san and Chou En-lai.
Meanwhile Mao, after the failure of the Autumn Harvest 
Uprisings, had taken refuge in the mountain fastness of Chingkang- 
shan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, where he began to establish 
"soviet areas", fhere were at least 300 of these soviet areas in 
existence at one time or another during the tortuous and complex 
history of the CCP from its foundation in 1921 to the proclamation 
of the People's Republic of China in 1949* fhe soviets sprang 
to life in different provinces of China, lasted for varying periods 
of time, and ranged in nature from a hideout for purely bandit 
guerrilla operations to functioning, viable political entities - 
autonomous enclaves in the heart of China. The so-called "Kiangsi 
soviet period" in the history of the CCP is the early history of
1 Hung-ch'i Jih-pao» (Red Flag Daily), Ho. 52, (October 8, 
1930), p. 1; also, Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) 
ti-i-tz'u ch’tlan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei 
wei-ytlan-hui ch'Han'-t'i hui-i pu-kao, (Proclamation of the Plenum 
of the Central Preparatory Committee for the First Rational 
Congress__of the Chinese Workers1, Peasants* and Soldiers' Meetings 
/Soviets/), printed in Hsiao fso-liang, Power Relations within 
the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-1954^ (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1967), Volume II, the Chinese Documents, p. 82,
I am particularly indebted throughout this dissertation to this 
pioneering work of Professor Hsiao, and also to his earlier volume 
of the same title, consisting of commentaries on the documents. 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961). Henceforth both 
volumes will be referred to simply as either Hsiao I or II.
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the Chinese Soviet Republic which existed in south-central China 
from the spring of 1929 to the autumn of 1934? and was, prior 
to the Long March, the most important of the latter type of 
soviet mentioned above.
following the liquidation of the CCP’s urban power centres 
by the KMT coup d ’etat of April 1927, the remnants of the Party 
had retreated for safety into the rural hinterland. After the 
Autumn Harvest Uprisings of September, Mao withdrew his First
Regiment of the First Division of the First Workers1 and Peasants1
2Red Army to Chingkangshan in October 1927. In November, the 
first soviet was set up by the Red Army at Tsalin (dealing) on 
the Hunan border.5
Mao’s original band that took Chingkangshan numbered only
^ Mao and Chu Teh began operations in the Kiangsi-Fukien area 
at that time. See Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese 
Revolution, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1959")* P• 204. The 
Chinese Soviet Republic was not actually established until 
November 1931, and was only formally abandoned in 1937 on the con­
clusion of an anti-Japanese united front with the KMT.
2 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, (Four Vols., Peking: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1965), I, p. 92; North, op.cit., p. 125.
3 Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, (New York: Grove Press, 
1961), p. 169. Other attempts to set up soviets were being 
carried out at about the same time. One of the most important 
of these early trials was the short-lived Hai-lu-feng soviet of 
1927-1928* For a good description, see the two articles by 
Shihkichi Eto in China Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December, 1961), 
pp. 161-183 and NoV 9," (January-March^1962), pp. 149-181. Other 
early experiments are mentioned by Mao in Selected Works, I, p. 72 
note 8; and in Snow, op.cit., pp. 171-172.
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l pabout 1,000* However, the Party Central had written to Chu Teh
in December 1927, urging him to make contact with Mao and
establish soviets.^ Chu, together with Lin Piao and Ch*en Yi,
leading a number of units that had taken part in the Nanchang
Uprising that August, finally joined Mao in April or May 19284, to
form the Fourth Army of the Workers* and Peasants* Red Army, about
5,000 strong*^ Chu Teh was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and also Commander of the 10th*Division. Mao Tse-tung became
the Party representative and Commander of the 11th. Division* Ch*en
Yi was given command of the ,12th. D i v i s i o n . 6 According to Robert
North, Communist sources estimate that the number of effectively
armed troops did not exceed 2,000.?
1 Snow, op.cit*, p. 169; but Warren Kuo, "The Movement of 
Chinese Communist Soviets", Issues and Studies, Vol. IX, No. 4 
(January 1966), p. 46 says only 600.
2 The term Central (chung-yang) was widely used to describe 
the Party*s leading organs such as the Politburo and the Central 
Committee.
5 Chung-kung chung-yang chih Chu Teh han, (A Letter from 
CCP Central to Chu Teh), dated December 21, 1927; summarised in 
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 180-181.
4 Snow, op.cit., p. 170 says May, as does Wang Chien-min, 
op.cit., p. 182, when he reports that the link-up occurred after 
Chu*s troops were attacked by a strong KMT force, and Mao went to 
help. Mao, in his Selected Works, I, p. 75 and p. 102 note 4, says 
April.
5 Warren Kuo, loc.cit. Communist sources quote much higher 
figures, eg, 10,000. See Kung Yung-kang, "The Revolutionary Bases 
in the Countryside, 1928-1933% People*s China. No. 8, (April 16, 
19,57 ), p. 30. One even cites 20,000 /^Flame on High Mountain. 
(Peking! Foreign Languages Press, 1959), pVvs7
6 Kung Yung-kang, loc.cit.
 ^North, op.cit., p. 125
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In the official Party history, Mao's statement "Why is it 
that Red Political Power can exist in China?"1 is regarded as 
providing, together with his "A Single Spark can start a Prairie
p
Fire", the fundamental basis for his policies which foreshadowed 
the subsequent development of the Chinese communist movement,5 
The crux of these statements was an argument in favour of 
developing a Red Army and establishing rural revolutionary bases 
(soviets)* With specific reference to the Chingkang mountain 
area,^ Mao and Chu pursued a policy of setting up political power 
in the area by organising the peasants, carrying out land re­
distribution and opposing the attacking ICMT^forces^. Inevitably, 
with such a precarious military and economic position, little 
time was left for politics once the needs of military and economic 
survival were taken care of. In many areas there was no political 
organisation at all, and in others it existed only in name. The 
Party had little time to educate and propagandise the peasants 
into political participation and out of their age-long acceptance 
of arbitrary dictation*^
1 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works* I, pp. 65-72.
2 Ibid., pp. 117-128.
3 Hu Chiao-mu, Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China, 
(Peking? Foreign Languages Press7 1959)Y PP* 33-35^
^ These mountains are the middle section of the Lohsiao 
range that runs along the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. 
Selected Works, I, p. 72 note 10. For more detail see ibid*, p. 86.
5 Ibid.» pp. 75-76.
6 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
16
Chu Teh later related to Hym Wales that there were three 
small military campaigns against the CCP on Chingkangshan.^  The 
first was organised by the warlords and troops of Hunan, Kiangsi 
and Kwangtung, with each province sending two armies* The Red 
Army was in a good strategic position on Chingkangshan, being on 
the borders of all three provinces* The tactics used were to 
attack only the Kiangsi troops, because of the existence of 
Communist Party workers among them, who caused the troops to 
defect* The remaining Kiangsi troops were defeated, and the two
p
other provincial armies retired* The two following campaigns were 
also defeated, and it was only when the KMT began a blockade of 
the area that the Red Army was forced to withdraw.-^ During this 
period, Mao and Chu began developing their characteristic methods 
of guerrilla warfare*
This military situation inevitably resulted in economic hard­
ship, and the peasants on Chingkangshan eked out a bare survival 
existence. In the Red Army, the situation was just as bad, each 
man receiving nonly five cents a day for cooking oil, salt, firewood 
and vegetables, and even this", said Mao "is hard to keep up"*4 
Paced with such extreme economic conditions, Mao implemented a land
1 Hym Wales, Hew China* (Calcutta: Eagle Publishers, 1944), 
p. 52 (Reprinted from her book Inside Red China).
2 PP* 52-53*
5 Ibid *, p* 53 (in early 1929).
4 Selected Works, I, p* 82. Wang Chien-min, op.cit* * p. 184, 
reports that the monthly salary of Red Army men dropped from $20 
to $3 per day after they moved to Chingkangshan.
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distribution policy of confiscating the land of the landlords 
and redistributing it to the poor peasants to win their support*
Mao!s relatively moderate policies brought him into conflict 
with the Party leadership, and this intra-Party conflict was a 
continuing factor in the history of the CCP up to, and probably 
beyond, 1935* Mao of course, had been in trouble with the Party 
hierarchy before. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, 
he had been upbraided by the November 1927 Plenum of the Central 
Committee for his “peasant policy" and dismissed from the Politburo 
On Chingkangshan in March 1928, he was criticised by a representative 
of the Southern Hunan Special Committee for his land policy, for 
having done "too little burning and killing"2 and, refusing to 
adopt such policies, he was dubbed "reformist"*^ Because of this, 
Mao*s front Committee was abolished that same month by the Special 
Committee,^ which now reflected the extreme left line adopted by 
the November Plenum of the Central Committee. Prom the standpoint 
of military tactics, Mao opposed "dividing our forces for an
** Nym Wales, Red Bust; Autobiographies of Chinese Communists, 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952), Introduction 
by Robert 0. North, p. 10. See also Rue, op.cit., pp. 80-82; 
Schwartz, op.cit., p. 100; and Snow, op.cit., p. 169.
2 Selected Works, I, p. 98.
3 Snow, op.cit.. p. 170.
 ^Selected Works. I, p. 75 /[""According to Wang Chien-min, 
op.cit., p. 182, the front Committee was only established in May.
No documentation is cited however^/
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adventurous advance",^ and in his article "The Struggle in the 
Chingkang Mountains", (which was a report submitted by him to 
the Central Gommittee of the Party), he criticised "some comrades" 
for advocating not only this tactic, but also for proposing to 
leave the rear undefended by "leaving the defence of extensive 
areas to the Red Guards alone"*2 Mao complained to the Central 
Committee that those comrades such as himself who urged gradual 
military advances, were called "conservative",3 and he blamed 
these "wrong ideas" for the defeats of the Red Army*4
Mao also complained of constant emissaries from the Hunan 
Provincial Committee of the Party arriving in Chingkangshan, all 
with "absolutely correct" but mutually incompatible orders for 
the Red Army*5 on occasions, Mao was able to ignore Party 
commands, but often he was forced to comply.6 Strife over 
economic and political policies between the rural-based Mao and 
the urban Party leadership continued throughout the Chingkangshan 
period. The First Party Congress of the border area (Chingkangshan), 
held at Maop^ng on May 20, 1928, had elected Mao as Secretary of
1 * P* 74.
p
Ibid* The Red Guards were armed peasants, who in.contrast 
to the regular members of the Red Army, carried on with their 
normal occupations. The same criticism was to be levied by Mao 
against the CCP leader Li Li-san, when Li ordered the Red Army 
to attack the cities in the summer of 1930.
3 Ibid., p. 74.
4 Ibid.
3 Ibid.. p. 100 
6 Ibid.
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the 23-man First Special Committee, hut he was replaced in July by 
Yang K'ai-ming, sent by the Hunan Provincial CommitteeMilitary 
defeats followed under Yang's faulty guidance, and in September,
p
Yang "fell ill". At the Second Party Congress of the border area, 
held in October, f a n  Chen-lin, a long-term associate of Mao's, was 
elected Secretary of the new Second Special Committee's Standing 
Committee.^ Mao thus had a supporter in control of the local 
Party organisation, a situation which was repeated in the case of 
the Red Army when Chu Teh was elected Secretary of its Standing 
Committee at the Sixth Party Congress of the Red Army held in 
November.^ Mao also became Secretary of the Front Committee when 
it was re-established that same month.^ Since both the Special 
and Army Committees were subordinate to the Front Committee,^ Mao
^ Ifoifl.» P* 96.
2 Ibid.
 ^Ibid* ~ For detailed analyses of both Mao'ping Conferences, 
see Rue, op.cit., pp. 93-95, and pp. 107-108.
4 Chu Teh may not have supported Mao in all his policies. At 
least one contemporary Red Guard newspaper has criticised Chu for 
opposing Mao's idea of establishing consolidated revolutionary base 
areas, and has attacked him for leading troops to fight in South 
Hunan, where they were defeated. See Tung-fang Hung, (The Fast is 
Red), (February 11, 1967), p. 3. Warren Kuo concludes from verbal 
evidence that Chu "bore a grudge against Mao" because of military 
failures in southern Hunan. / Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 5, 
(February 1966), pp. 40-42_J7.
 ^ Selected Works, I, pp. 96-97.
6 Ibid., p. 96.
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was in undisputed command of the area.
There is obviously good reason for doubting the extent of the 
authority of the Central Committee or the Hunan Provincial 
Committee over Mao during these years. As Schwartz has observed, 
it was inherent in the nature of the circumstances - poor communi­
cation, surrounded by enemy territory, and partisan warfare needing 
on-the-spot decisions based on intimate knowledge of the local 
terrain - that the activities of Mao and Chu could not be based 
on directives from Shanghai or Moscow.^ The Sixth Gongress of 
the CCP, meeting in Moscow in July 1928, had, amongst other 
resolutions, drawn up detailed plans for the formation of Chinese 
soviets.3 The Congress resolutions reached Mao and Chu in the 
winter of 1928, and Mao, when he talked to Edgar Snow, expressed
1 One must not however over-estimate the amount of contact 
between the Central Committee in Shanghai and the Party in the soviet 
areas. Chu Teh told Agnes Smedley that there was no contact between 
the Red Army and the Central Committee before the spring of 1929.
See Agnes Smedley, The G-reat Road; the life and Times of Chu Teh, 
(London: John Calder, 1958), P* 252.
2 Schwartz, op.cit♦, p. 136.
5 Mao did not attend the Congress but was elected in absentia 
to the CCP Central Committee. See Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse- 
tung: the Lacquered Image", China Quarterly. Ho. 16 (October- 
Leeember 1963), p. 18. See also Ho Kan-chih, op.cit., p. 197.
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1his complete agreement with them, hater however, Mao was to 
qualify his remarks, and say that although the line of the Sixth 
Oongress was "basically correct", it had many shortcomings, 
including a lack of the necessary understanding of the importance
o
of rural base areas#
Mao was not entirely independent of the wishes of higher 
Party authorities however# As one scholar has pointed out,
Mao’s land policies were opposed by the Central Committee, whose 
letter to Mao of November 2 included proposals for a more radical 
land policy - proposals which were subsequently incorporated into 
Mao’s December 1928 hand Law.^
Quite clearly, the experience of Chingkangshan was basically 
one of failure, and in early 1929 it effectively ceased to exist 
as a revolutionary base area when Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and their 
followers withdrew under KMT pressure to search for a more suitable 
location# The CCP had failed to win the support of the local 
population because of military pressure and economic deprivation. 
The abject poverty in the soviet areas caused by the KMT blockade 
meant little enthusiasm on the part of the peasants for the CCP's
1 Snow, op.cit*» p. 171•
 ^"Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our 
Party", Selected Works, III, pp. 182-183. This is the official 
Maoist line on the history of the CCP during this period, adopted 
by the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1945* (Hence­
forth referred to as RCQHP).
3 See Rue, op*cit», pp. 111-115, for a translation of the 
December 1928 land Law, and analysis* Also see Stuart R. Schram, 
Mao Tse-tung, (Harmondsworth, Middx.; Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), 
pp# 130-131.
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policies, if only because "people completely occupied by the day- 
to-day task of keeping alive have no surplus of time and energy to 
invest in long-run ventures for betterment through political 
action*" In spite of this, Mao concluded that his policies of 
creating a Red Army, operating out of a rural base area, were 
fundamentally correct* Departure from Chingkangshan meant, not 
a return to the cities, but the establishment of a new soviet 
base, which proved to be a far more enduring and viable political 
entity than any of its forerunners* Chalmers Johnson has aptly 
described the idea of the territorial bases as "a 1rebel infra­
structure1, or 'autonomous government1, •** (providing) food, 
refuge, an area in which military equipment may be manufactured, 
and training bases; and they weaken the status quo power by 
removing territory from the system's productive substructure."2 
It is greatly to be doubted whether the Chingkangshan base met 
such requirements, but it was there that the foundation was laid
for the future Chinese Soviet Republic.
Breaking through the KM! blockade in January 1929,^ Chu and
Seymour Martin Lip set, Political Man, (Hew York: Doubleday,
1965), P. 274.
2 Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System, (Hoover 
Institution Studies Ho. 3; Hoover Institution: Stanford University, 
1964), P* 62.
 ^ Snow, op.cit.» p. 173s however, Hym Wales, Hew China, pp. 54- 
55, and Kung Yung-kang, op.cit., p. 31 speak of the end of 1928.
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Mao, with P'eng Teh-huai^ Fifth Army guarding their rear,’*’ began
2campaigning in Kiangsi and throughout 1929 consolidated their base 
in the south Kiangsi and western Fukien area, with Juichin as its 
centre.^ Although the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of 
the CCP, meeting on July 9, 1929> only stated rather bleakly that 
"certain Soviet areas as well as the Red Army under the command 
of Chu (Teh) and Mao (Tse-tung) are still in existence",4 by the 
end of 1930 nearly the whole of south Kiangsi had fallen to the 
Red Army, and the base of the central soviet regions had been
established*5
The various sources and accounts of the actual soviet territory 
of the different areas in 1930-1931 differ to some extent, no doubt 
due to the fluctuating fortunes of many of the peripheral areas 
which waxed, waned or ceased to exist, depending on the current 
military situation. What is clear is that the soviets were mostly 
in south-central China, especially on the borders of two or more 
provinces, in Kiangsi, Fukien, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangsi, Anhwei, Honan
*■ P1 eng1 s^S th. Red Army had joined Mao and__Chu on Chingkangshan 
in November. / Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 185__/
2 Snow, loc.cit*  ^ According to Chu Teh, the Central Committee 
appointed three places to develop soviets: west Fukien, south Kiangsi, 
and the Tung-kiang (East River) district of ICwangtung (Wales, loc.cit.)
3 Hu Chiao-mu, op.cit.» p. 33.
4 Documentary History, p. 170.
5 Snow, op.cit., p. 174.
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Kwangtung and Szechuan.'*' Two accounts refer to a total of fifteen 
base areas,2 which can be listed as follows: 1/ Hunan-Kiangsi 
(Chingkangshan), 2/ Pukien-Kiangsi, 3/ Pukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi,
4/ Pukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi, 5/ Hunan-Hupeh, 6/ Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi, 
7/ western Hupeh-Hunan, 8/ Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei, 9/ Kiangsi-Pukien- 
Anhwei, 10/ Kwangtung-Kiangsi, 11/ Kwangsi (the Left and Right 
River Soviets), 12/ Kiangsi-Hunaa-Kwangtung, 13/ Kiangsi-Anhwei-* 
Chekiang. Chingkangshan had been retaken by P'eng Teh-huai's 
Pifth Army in June 1929, after its temporary occupation by KMT 
forces.^ In addition, there was a small base in north Shensi,
"j
Chu Teh, "25 Years of the People's Liberation Army", Current 
Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. IV, Ho. 31, (September 13, 1952), 
p. 17- Chu also includes Shensi as a revolutionary base area, 
although there were only sporadic guerrilla activities there at 
that time. /f"Por a discussion of activity in this area, see Mark 
Selden, "The Guerrilla Movement in North WestChina: the origins of 
the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region", China Quarterly, No. 28, 
(October-December 1966), pp. 63-81, and No. 29, (January-March 1967), 
pp. 61-81 __/ Chu does not include the provinces of Pukien or Kwangtung 
in his list. Another source does not include Kwangsi, but does add 
Pukien and Kwangtung. f ~Hsin-ting hsin-ming-tz'u tz'u-tfen,
(Dictionary of New Terms), (New revised edition; Shanghai: Ch'un-ming 
ch'u-pan-she, 1952), p. 3034_/ Szechuan became a soviet area only in 1933*
2 Chu Teh, ibid., and Hsin-ting hsin-ming-tz!u tz'u-tien, ibid.
3 Ch'ih-fei fan-tung wen-chien hui-pien, (A Collection of Red 
Bandit Reactionary Documents), compiled under General Ch'en Ch'eng,
1935; reprinted I960 (Taipei: microfilm), p. 659* (Henceforth 
referred to as CRBRD)• Also, Chung-kung su-oh'tl chung-yang-chd 
t'ung-kao ti-i-hao - su-wei-ai ch'tl-ytl chung-yang-chil ti ch'eng-li 
chi ch1 i ,j en-wu \ (Circular No. 1 of the CCP Central Bureau of the 
Soviet Areas - the Establishment of the Central Bureau and its Tasks), 
January 15, 1931• Shih Sou Collection (henceforth SSC) Microfilm Reel 
14. CRBRD was compiled from this collection.
4 Shih Ch'eng-ohih, Lun chung-kung ti chtin-shih fa-chan, (The 
Development of the Chinese Communist Army),(Hong Kong: Yu-lien 
ch'u-pan-she, 1952), pp. 15-16.
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another near Swatow,^- and yet another that incorporated part of 
Kweichow.2 The most important and stable soviet base was the 
Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi.3 an  the bases were contiguous,
although by 1951 most of them could communicate by radio.4
In line with the demands of the Ninth Plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern (ECCl), held in February 1928, the CCP 
leadership attempted to create a single centralised Red Army from 
bands of roving guerrilla units, in order to carry out the agrarian 
revolution. By 1930 therefore, the stage was set for the protracted 
struggle of the Party leadership to call the First National Soviet 
Congress and thereby help extend their authority over the Red Army 
and the soviet bases. The struggle was to last almost two years*
The following chapters will describe and analyse the continuing 
power struggle, the beginning of which has been summarised in this 
chapter, between the Comintern in Moscow, the official CCP leadership, 
and Mao and his followers in the soviet areas. Focussing on the two
Hu Hua, Chung-kuo ko~ming"Shih chiang-i, (Lectures on the 
History of the Chinese Revolution), (Peking: 1959), p. 247. Also 
see Hu Ohiao-mu. cp.cjt*, p. 57 who refers to bases in Kansu and 
Hainan Island, Kwangtung.
2 Hsil Kuang-ta, Wang Chen and Wang Shang-jung, "Hsiang-o-hsi 
ho Hsiang-o-ch1uan-ch1ien ti wu-chuang tou-cheng”, (Armed Struggle 
in west Hupeh-Hunan and Hupeh-Hunan-Szechuan-Kweichow), Jen-min 
Jih-pao, (February 1, 1962), p. 5.
3 See Chung-kung su-oh!tl chung-yang-chtt fung-kao ti-i-hao,
4 Wales, New China, p. 62. But on p. 63, Chu Teh says that 
in Hsiang-o-hsi in 1932, where the Second Front Army was operating 
with Ho Lung as Commander-in-Chief, there was no radio.
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Rational Soviet Congresses of 1931 and 1934 provides excellent 
points of reference for an analysis of the struggle of the CCP 
leadership in Shanghai to create a soviet government, and to 
examine the major theme of political processes in the soviet 
areas* Use will also be made of this analysis to test some of the 
assumptions concerning the power struggle contained in the 
retrospective Maoist interpretation of this period.1
RCQHP, pp. 177-225* Military differences are also dealt 
with in "Problems of Strategy in China*s Revolutionary War",
Selected Works, I, pp* 179-254 (The article is dated December 1936).
CHAPTER I
THE LI hl-SAU PERIOD
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During 1929, the COP leader Li Li-san was trying, with little 
success, to exercise his mandate to recapture the Party's 
proletarian bases by malting great efforts to organise the Party in 
the cities. In spite of this lack of success, the Comintern 
announced in October 1929 that the trough between the waves was 
ending, that a new revolutionary wave was beginning, and that the 
CCP should "take steps to overthrow the landlord-bourgeois regime 
and set up a dictatorship of peasants and workers of the soviet 
type.
It is in the light of a flood of directives from Moscow 
prophesying an imminent revolutionary wave, coupled with the 
apathy of the urban proletariat, that we must view the development 
of the so-called "Li Li-san Line" during 1930. Both Li and Moscow 
wished to make use of the growing strength of the Red Army in the 
countryside, but without endangering the leading role of the 
proletariat in the cities. Up to and including April 1930, Li's 
idea was to foment uprisings in the cities, which would expand 
towards the countryside, where they would be supported by the 
guerrillas.
But the proletariat stubbornly refused to revolt, and in May 
Li's policy began, slowly, to shift. Li hypothesised that if a 
revolutionary wave was present, then there could be no harm in 
allowing the Red Army to ignite the spark of revolution in the 
cities. This policy, the heart of the Li Li-san line, using the
1 Hung Gh'i (Red Flag), No. 16, (February 15, 1930), p. 9.
Quoted in Schwartz, op.cit., p. 134. Also Wang Chien-min, op.cit.. p. 40*
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rural-based Bed Army to attack the urban centres, was sanctioned 
by the Comintern in July, although it was to be nearly twenty 
years before it was successfully put into effect.1
It is against the background of the Li Li-san line in 1930 
that we must see the attempts made by the Party Central in Shanghai 
to bring into closer co-ordination the scattered soviet areas, 
to establish a soviet government, and to affirm the control of 
the Party Central over the guerrilla leaders. Use of the Bed 
Army in conjunction with urban uprisings would obviously require 
close collaboration between the Party Central and the soviet area.: 
leaders, as well as acceptance by the soviet leaders of orders 
from Shanghai.
There had in fact been little contact between the two groups 
from 1928 until the beginning of 1930. It was reported by Chu Teh 
to Agnes Smedley that contact between the Bed Army and the Party 
Central in Shanghai was not made until the spring of 1929.2 Another 
source puts the first contact as late as 1930.^ The Second Plenum
1 Por a good analysis of the "Li Li-san line", see James P. 
Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1930", China Quarterly, 
Ho. 14 (April-June 1963), pp. 178-194, and Ho. 15 (July-September, 
1963), PP. 140-159.
2 Agnes Smedley, The Great Boad. p. 252.
3 Li Kuang, Chung-kuo hsin-chtln-tui, (China1 s Hew Army), (Soviet 
Union: 1936), p. 83; referred to in James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san 
Line and the CCP in 1930", China Quarterly, Ho# 14 (April-June, 1963), 
p. 191.
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of the OOP Central Committee, meeting in Shanghai in June 1929> 
had therefore complained of a lack of positive direction from the
1
CO to the peasant movement and the Red Army in the soviet districts. 
What was required said the Plenum, was that the Party Central should 
lead the guerrilla warfare and transform it into organised, mass»
p
ibased action. The conclusions of the Second Plenum were given 
further authority with the receipt of a Comintern directive in 
October 1929? which spoke of a "new revolutionary tide" in China 
and urged the setting up of a workers and peasants soviet
dictatorship
One of the first steps to implement the resolutions of the 
Second Plenum and the Comintern was the move to unify some of the 
dispersed soviet areas by the creation of the Southwest Kiangsi 
Soviet Government in February 1930.^ This government was probably 
established at the meeting referred to by McLane as "an important 
conference of Party leaders in the Soviet areas...in southern Kiangsi 
(which was)1led by the Central Committee1 and guided by recent
The Resolutions and Spirit of the Second Plenum of the CO, 
(July 9, 1929) in Documentary History, p. 167.
2 Ibid., p. 173.
 ^Hung-C;h*i, No. 16, (February 15 > 1930), p. 10, quoted in 
Schwartz, op.cit., p. 134.
4 Chiang-hsi ti chung-yang su-ch1#, (The Central Soviet Area 
of Kiangsi), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 426, Also see Snow, op.cit., 
pp. 174-175.
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instructions received from the Comintern and from the Party Centre. ”■*■ 
This meeting, although held under Centralfs auspices, appears to 
have been dominated by Mao, for the Land Law passed contained 
policies associated with him, which were severely criticised by 
later conferences held more closely under the control of Li li-san.^
Li’s aim was to convene a National (All-China) Soviet Congress, 
which would formally establish a soviet government to co-ordinate 
all the soviet areas, and would inaugurate a soviet regime as an 
alternative to KMT rule. This would establish his authority in the 
red bases, and the resulting ’’co-ordination” would facilitate the 
execution of the ”Li Li-san line”. Furthermore, the existence of 
an alternative regime within China would be of great propaganda 
value to the CCP.
As a preliminary move towards the establishing of a soviet 
government, Li called for a national Conference of Delegates from 
the Soviet Areas. The call was issued on February 25, 1930 jointly 
by the CCP and the National Labour Federation.^
The chief purpose of the Conference (apart from the long-range 
goal of setting up a soviet regime) was to secure a closer 
connection between partisan actions and the activities of the urban 
proletariat. In communist jargon, this was spoken of as ’’the need
n
Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists. 
1931-1946, (New Xork: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 36-57.
2 For a copy of the Land law, see ORBED, pp. 912-918,
5 Schwartz, op.cit., p. 140; North, op.cit.» p. 134, ft. 42; 
Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 74.
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for a greater amount of proletarian hegemony in the soviet areas”. 
By achieving this hegemony, Li Li-san hoped to arrive at a joint 
programme of uniform tactics for the forthcoming struggle.1 A 
Central Committee circular issued a day after the call for the 
Conference (February 26), spoke of the expansion of the soviet 
areas and successes of the Red Army, and foreshadowed the later 
development of the Li Li-san line by calling for initial victories 
in one or more provinces, centered around Wuhan. The Circular 
criticised Mao and Chu for continuing their old strategy of 
troop dispersion instead of carrying out concentrated attacks.2 
Clearly, central control over the Red Army in the soviet areas had 
to be established if Li!s policies were to be implemented. In 
order therefore to acquaint Mao Tse-tung with his plans and to 
gain his acceptance, or to remove Mao from his position of power 
in the soviet areas, Li urged the soviet leader to come to Shanghai 
to attend the Conference. Central sent two letters with this re­
quest to Mao’s Fourth Front Army, on April 3 and April 26, 1930.^
** Inprecor, X, (1930), p. 509; cited in Harrison, op.cit., 
p. 191. Also Inprecor, (May 22, 1930), pp. 431-432; cited in 
Horth, op.cit.. p. 135.
2 Warren Kuo, ’’The Li Li-san Line in the CCP”, Issues & 
Studies, Vol. II, Ho* 8, (May 1966), pp. 37-38.
3 An English translation of both letters can be found in 
Issues and-Studies. Vol. II, Ho. 5, (February 1966), pp. 49-52.
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In the first letter, the Central Committee reiterated the 
call for initial victories in several provinces centered on 
Wuhan. Soviet leaders were criticised for opposing this policy 
with the idea of occupying border areas of Kwangtung, Fukien and 
Kiangsi, and for proposing to seize political power in the single 
province of Kiangsi. Ihe CC noted that the expansion of the 4th.
Army was slow, and blamed conservatism, the wrong policy of arming 
scattered peasants, and a lack of mass mobilisation to Join the 
Red Army.-*-
In the second letter, Central said that they had not received 
a detailed report on Red Army activities for a long while. At the 
same time, the revolutionary situation was gaining momentum, and 
the instructions which Central wished to give to the Red Army 
during this period could not possibly be contained in one directive 
letter* For these reasons, it was stated, a Rational Conference of 
Delegates from the Soviet Areas was being convened, and Mao Tse- 
tung was assigned to attend it. Furthermore, Mao was urged to come 
to Shanghai even if he missed the Conference. Chu Teh was appointed 
to be general commander of the 3rd., 4th., and 5th. Red Armies 
during Mao's absence, and Mao's post as Secretary of the General
Front Committee was to be filled by a secretary from one of the
three army Front Committees.^
^ » pp• 49-51*
2 Ibid., pp. 51-52. Rue (op.cit., p. 193) says that the General
Front Committee was set up by Id Li-san on April 26, the date of his
second letter. It is clear from the letter however, that the Front
Committee was established by a joint meeting of the 4th., 5th., and
6th. armies, acting on their own initiative, before April 26.
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No evidence can be found that Mao actually went to Shanghai 
to attend the Conference* As he was known to have opposed Li's 
policies at the time, and as Chu Teh does not mention the Shanghai 
meeting in his life-story described to Agnes Smedley, it is 
highly probable that he stayed in the soviet areas, and ignored 
Li1s invi tati on•
The Conference finally convened in Shanghai towards the end 
of May 1 9 3 0 It was attended by 49 delegates from the Party, the 
trade unions, revolutionary organisations, the Red Army and the 
various soviet areas, although who these delegates were is unknown*2 
The major documents approved by the Conference included a temporary
A report by the Riga correspondent of the North China Star 
(dated May 16, 1930), published in that paper on May 17, 1930, cited 
a "Moscow message" which said that the Conference was to be held 
in the soviet areas, but in view of the fact that bodies set up 
by the Conference later decided to move from Shanghai to the soviet 
areas, this is unlikely. Wang Chien-min, op.cit. . p. 277, says 
that a preparatory meeting was held on May 5 followed by a formal 
opening on May 20. But V* A. Yakhontoff /"" The Chinese Soviets.
(New York: Coward-McGann, 1934), p. 130 J  says May 31.
2 One document speaks of Party branches in the Tungchiang and
East Hupeh soviet areas selecting female worker and peasant
delegates. Wu-ytieh kung-tso yft fu-ntl yttn-tung, (April's Work and 
the Women's Movement), General Announcement of Central No. 74,
(April 3, 1930) SSC4.
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Land Law, a Labour Protection Law, and a Declaration on the
n
national political situation and the tasks of the soviet areas*
The Declaration of the Conference^ is probably the Political 
Resolution passed by the Conference* A document entitled the 
"Chinese Soviet Political Programme"^ contains an editorial note 
to the effect that it was extracted from the Political Resolution 
of the Conference, but it. is usually assumed that this latter document 
was not available*4 However, a comparison between the "Chinese 
Soviet Political Programme" and the Declaration indicates that 
they both follow the same general line*
As can be imagined, the Declaration clearly manifested the 
current Li Li-san line, and spoke of the existence in China of 
two different political systems - one the system of the gentry, 
the landlords, the comprador bourgeoisie and the KMT, and the other 
the soviet regime of the workers, peasants, soldiers and toiling masses*
Wang Chien-min, op *cit*, p* 277. The Conference also passed 
(a) plans for enlarging the Red Army and arming the peasants, (b) a 
soviet organisation law, (c) a message to the peasants, (d) a message 
to the workers of the whole country, (e) a message to working women 
and youth, (f) aid to the oppressed people!s of the Bast, (ibid*)
2 Qhftlan~kuo su-wei-ai chfU-yti tai-piao ta-hui hsilan-yen* 
(Declaration of the National Soviet Areas Delegate Conference), 
translated back into Chinese from an un-named Japanese source by
Wang Chien-min, op.cit*, pp* 277-280. This appears to be the same
as the original Chinese document printed, although barely legible, 
in Hsiao, II, op.cit.♦ p. 29.
3 Ohung-kuo su-wei-ai ti cheng-kang, reproduced in Ch!ih-fei 
mi-mi wen-chien hui-pien, (A Collectionof Red Bandit Secret 
Documents), Vol. Ill, leaves 1-2, SSG 20.
4 Hsiao, I, op.cit*, p. 19*
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These two regimes, it was announced, represented the final battle 
between two different classes. The Declaration called for armed 
uprisings and said that the workers1 struggle, peasant uprisings, 
the development of the Red Army and the soviet areas was all pioof
that the ruling classes were on the point of collapse.1
Both the Declaration and the Chinese Soviet Political Programme 
were substantially in line with the Ten Great Demands of the
Chinese Revolution passed by the Sixth Rational Congress of the
CCP in Moscow in September 1928.^ However, the Chinese Soviet 
Political Programme, like the (temporary) Band Law passed by the 
Conference of Delegates from the Soviet Areas both contain Li Li- 
san-ist characteristics such as the call for the nationalisation 
of land, though this is not included in the Declaration, for some 
inexplicable reason. The Declaration also does not call for any 
confiscation of the rich peasants’ land, whereas the Land Law 
speaks of the confiscation of that portion of their land which was 
rented out^ and the Political Programme demands the confiscation 
of the land of the ”counter-revolutionary rich peasants.114 It is 
possible that the Declaration was aimed at a wider audience and 
was therefore designed to be more moderate in tone.
1 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 279*
 ^Documentary History» p. 132.
5 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 360.
4 Article 4.
37
The Declaration also called for the confiscation of the land
owned by landlords and its distribution to the landless and small-
landed peasants. Furthermore, it proposed an eight hour working
day for adults and six for minors, together with a minimum wage and
unemployment insurance. Women were to have eight weeks holiday
*1
on full pay during childbirth. The Labour Protection Law contained 
a clause saying that it would only come into force when approved 
by a National Soviet Congress.^ Since this Congress projected 
by Li Li-san never in fact convened, it is unlikely that the Law 
was put into force before 1931 at the earliest. The Declaration 
and the two Laws had not originated at the Conference - indeed 
they had apparently been published over two months earlier in 
official Comintern organs.^
The Conference appeared to be successful in organising the 
Red Army to carry out the Li Li-san line• Mao later confirmed 
his acceptance of the Conference decisions.^ No doubt he had his 
private disagreements, but he did not voice them at the time.
Assent however, did not necessarily imply obedience, and Mao refused 
to integrate the Red Guards (militia) into the Red Army, for this 
would have meant leaving the soviet areas open to the enemy when
1 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 279.
2 Article 42. The Law is only partially legible in Hsiao,
II, op.cit., p. 30.
5 According to R. C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, 
p. 134, ft. 42.
4 Harrison, op.cit., p. 192.
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the army marched towards the cities.-*-
The Li Li-san line at this time (May 1930) had not yet reached 
the extreme stage of using the Red Army to attack the towns.
Indeed Li himself had written articles during April and May in 
which he said that encircling the cities with the country, or 
relying on the Red Army to take the cities, was sheer nonsense,2 
This was just the policy he was in fact to adopt in a few weeks.
Li*s original policy was that armed uprisings in the cities would 
expand into the countryside, to be supported by the guerrillas.
The prime role of the city would ensure proletarian hegemony. By 
the time of the Conference, it seemed as though a middle position 
between the two was favoured - that the Red Army might be used in 
conjunction with urban uprisings to take the cities.
The first indications that Li was moving towards the position 
of using the Red Army to attack the cities came shortly after the 
Conference in a Politburo Resolution published on June 11, 1 9 3 0 ,3  
In the Resolution, which still decried the "erroneous concept" of 
relying on the Red Army alone to occupy the cities,  ^there are
Snow, op.cit., p. 179.
2 Hung--Ch*i, No. 90, (April 5, 1930), and No. 104, (May 24, 
1930), cited in Schwarts, op.cit,, p. 139. Also see Hsiao, I, 
op.cit., p. 17.
3 Hsin ti ko-ming kao-ct^ao yd i-sheng huo chi-sheng shou- 
hsien sheng-li, (The New Revolutionary High Tide and Preliminary 
Successes in One or More Provinces), printed in Ch’ih-fei mi-mi wen- 
chien hui-pien, op.cit., Vol. Ill, leaves 12-24. Also in Documentary 
History, pp. 184~200.
 ^Documentary History, p. 191.
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references to “powerful assaults by the Bed Army"1 and of using 
the Red Army for "resolute attacks on the major forces of theoiemy, 
(and) assaults on key cities."^
Since the resolution called for armed uprisings in the 
cities coupled with attacks on key cities by the Bed Army, it is 
not surprising that the implication throughout is that a soviet 
government should be set up in an urban area without delay*
Referring to the strategy of the Red Army in winning preliminary 
successes in one or more provinces, the resolution said "the over­
all aim of this task (of the Red Army) is the seizure of political 
power and the establishment of a national revolutionary regime in
■3
coordination with armed uprisings in key cities"* The prime 
target was to be Wuhan.^
This policy was repeated in Moscow by Chou En-lai when he 
addressed the 16th. Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (CPSU) on July 5, 1930. Chou spoke in favour of centralising 
the soviet areas and strengthening the Red Armyfs command, so as to 
develop towards the industrial centres, after the occupation of 
which a central government was to be established to act as a base 
for opposition to the KMT.'*
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid., p • 197.
 ^Ibid., p. 198.
4 Ibid., p, 194.
5 Chung-kuo ko-ming hsin kao-ch'ao ytt chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang, 
(The ROW High Tide of the Chinese Revolution and the CCP), Hsiao,
i1* °P«ci'k«1 p. 138.
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The tactic of siting the proposed soviet government in a 
major industrial centre such as Wuhan, or at least in Ohangsha 
or Hanchang, had been GOP policy as early as the May Conference 
of Delegates from the Soviet Areas.
However, after the Comintern had deliberated on the June 11 
resolution of Li Li-san, it issued a directive which was published 
in China later the following month, on July 23* This directive, 
although it gave general approval to the task of achieving initial 
victories in one or several provinces, nevertheless did not 
sanction the creation of the soviet government in a major 
industrial centre. The Comintern, while it approved of the idea 
of founding such a government, on the tactical question of where 
it was to be sited, said it should be associated with the Red Army, 
and set up in "the most protected areat!.^
Li Li-san was therefore more optimistic than the Comintern 
that his policy of capturing key cities would succeed. Moscow,
^ The available documentation of the May Conference does not 
mention the site for the government, but confines itself to resolutions 
urging its establishment. The allegation about siting it in Wuhan 
was made by Chou En-lai in his Report to the Third Plenum in September.
 ^Chung-kuo wen-t'i chtteh-i-an. (Resolution on the Chinese 
Problemy7~passed by the ECCI Political Secretariat July 23, 1930.
SSC 16. The actual date of the Resolution was late June 1930.
(Stuart R. Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 147.)
 ^Ibid.» P* 16 (Emphasis added). Presumably Chou En-lai in 
favouring Li Li-san*s site for the government in his speech to the 
16th. CPSU Congress, had not read this directive.
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more cautious, urged him to found the government in the revolutionary 
base areas# Nevertheless, Li continued with his plan to take 
Changsha and Nanchang, and then march on Wuhan* On July 27 P'eng 
Teh-huai took Changsha, but found little popular support for the 
CCP and withdrew within a few days, whereupon Mao and Chu Teh made 
a brief attack on Nanchang and failed to break the city's defences* 
Hsiang Chung-fa, writing on August 25 after the brief occupa­
tion of Changsha,by the Red Army, said that he realised that a soviet 
government in Changsha, Nanchang or Wuhan would be of great national 
significance, but that the Party should not wait "mechanically" for 
the occupation of a central city* He pointed out that Lenin, during 
the 1905 uprising on the Black Sea, had proposed to set up a 
government in Odessa, even though Moscow and St* Petersburgmre 
still in the hands of the Tsar*
But notwithstanding the Comintern's directive on the site of 
the government, and the wavering support if not opposition of 
Hsiang Chung-fa, the Li Li-san line continued unchanged* In spite 
of the fact that Changsha had been heavily reinforced with KMT 
troops, Li ordered a second attack on the city, preparatory to a
V/ei chien-li ch'Han-chung-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai cheng- 
ch'ttan erh tou-cheng (struggle for the Establishment of a National 
Central Soviet Regime), Hsiao, II, op.cit * * p. 77# In his commentary, 
Hsiao Tso-liang has misinterpreted this article to mean that Hsiang 
proposed to set up a central government in Wuhan, Changsha or 
Nanchang to the exclusion of any alternative* (Hsiao, I, op.cit*, 
p. 4l). There was a brief mutiny of the Black Sea fleet during 
the 1905 Russian Revolution, and soviets were formed in Moscow and 
St* Petersburg by the Mensheviks, although they received little 
support from Lenin*
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march, on Wuhan. Mao and Ohu Teh carried out orders, but soon 
commanded their troops to withdraw, without however, seeking permission 
from the Central Committee.^
There had of course to be an inquest on these failures of the 
Li Li-san line, and this took place at the Third Plenum of the CC 
OOP, meeting from September 24-28, 1930. Li's main opponents how­
ever, were not the soviet area leaders, but a group of young Chinese 
intellectuals who had returned from Moscow that year after four 
years study in the Soviet Union. The '’Returned Student" group, 
as they were known, were led by Ch'en Shao-yd (Wang Ming), Ch'in 
Pang-hsien (Po Ku), and Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo F u ). They had as their 
mentor and powerful patron one Pavel Mif, the most eminent of 
Stalin's experts on China and Comintern representative in that
country.2
The Third Plenum found no basic errors of line in the actions 
of Li Li-san, except that he had been guilty of errors in tactics,
Schwarts, op.cit., p. 182. It is possible that Chu may not 
have been wholly in agreement with Mao during this period. A 
recent Red Guard newspaper reported that Chu supported Li Li-san, 
and that he strongly advocated the defeating of the cities. Tung- 
fang Hung, (The East is Red), (February 11, 1967), p. 3*
2 The "Returned Student" group were also known as the "28 
Bolsheviks". Whether there were actually 28 of them who studied 
in Moscow at the same time is uncertain, but it is clear that the 
terim. came to be used of all those who supported their faction in 
the Party. Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 100 has a list which is 
alleged to be of the original "28 Bolsheviks."
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for example in his attack on Changsha.1 But from this time on, 
with his policy of armed uprisings in ruins, Li*s authority began 
to wane.
That same summer a former leader of the CGP, Ch'tl Ch'iu-pai, 
was sent back to Shanghai from Moscow, where he attacked Li at 
the Third Plenum. But surprisingly, in spite of the opposition 
of Ch'il, who was anxious to regain his position of leadership, 
and of the ambitious Returned Student group, the Plenum reconfirmed 
Li in power. Li had in fact a strong grip on the Party machine, 
and was staunchly supported by Chou En-lai. Furthermore, it was 
extremely difficult for Ch'ii to criticise the Li Li-san line with­
out criticising the Comintern line, since the two were identical in 
their strategy. Mif was reported to be infuriated with the 
result of the Plenum, claimed that it had been held behind his 
back, and redoubled his efforts to unseat Li and his protegees.2
At the Third Plenum, Chou En-lai (under his alias of Shao 
Shan) reversed his earlier standpoint of July and criticised the 
May Conference of Delegates for insisting that the government be 
located in a major city. "Of course", said Chou, "it is better
Shao Shan pao-kao; san-chung chftlan-hui ts!ai-liao ti chiu- 
hao, (Report of Shao Shan; reference item No. 9 of the Third Plenum 
of the CC CCP /), September 24, 1930, pp. 3-4. (Pamphlet dated 
January 3, 1931)*
2 Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang chung-yang wei-ytlan-hui k fuo-ta- 
hui ti s55U—tz1 u ch^ilan-t1! hui-i chileh-i-an, (Resolution of the 
Enlarged Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP),
January 1931, CRBRD, p. 430. See also Pavel Mif, Heroic China,
(New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937), p. 68.
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to establish it (the provisional central government) in a key city 
rather than a-small city, but this is a question of secondary im­
portance 11 He advocated a government which would ,!advance towards
the key industrial cities11.2
The resolution passed by the Third Plenum accepting the Comint ern*s 
July 23 directive acknowledged that one of th& most.important tasks 
of the Party was to establish a provisional central government in the
most secure area - the soviet )^ses - and also create a strong Red
Army which could, according to political and military circumstances, 
occupy one or several political and industrial centres.  ^ However, in 
spite of this resolution, Id li-san (under his alias of Po Shan) took 
a different line at the Plenum* While admitting that to insist that 
the central regime be linked to victories in one or several provinces 
was a t!meehanical concept1*, as also was the insistence on Wuhan as 
the only suitable place, he nevertheless condemned the idea of 
establishing it in the mountains (shan-shang) as a "joke**, and 
asked why it could not be set up in Kian, Changsha or Nanchang.^
Shao Shan pao-kao, p. 4*
2 Ibid., p. 3 (Emphasis added).
3 Cheng-chih Chuang-kluang ho tang-ti tsung  ^en-wu i-chiieh-an, 
(Resolution on the Political Situation and the Party*s General Tasks), 
Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 179.
 ^Po Shan fa-yen? san-chung ch*iian-hui tsfai-liao ti shih-hao, 
(Statement of Po Shan; reference item No. 10 of the Third Plenum), 
Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 157* On the occupation of Kian by the Red 
Army in October, a Kiangsi provincial soviet government was founded, 
but the communists withdrew from the city in November. See Chiang- 
hsi ti chung-yang su-ch*tt, (The Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi),
Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423.
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It is clear however, that even before the Third Plenum, OOP 
policy was switching from an urban to a more rural orientation.
The second attack of the Red Armies on Changsha in early September 
had been accompanied by a telegram dated September 12 from the 
Plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee, which was then in 
session, declaring that the Red Armies were attacking towards the 
central cities, so as to struggle for a national soviet regime.^
But after the failure of this second attack, CCP policy changed 
emphasis from the urban to the rural areas, when an editorial in 
Hung-ch^i Jih-pao of September 17 said that the Red Army should 
not just concentrate on Changsha, but should pay greater attention 
to the hsien and hsiang soviet areas in Hunan•^  There is no clear 
indication though, following the Third Plenum, of the location of 
the new site for the central government in the revolutionary base 
areas. In none of the issues of the Party newspaper for October^ 
is the place of the proposed government named, although there are 
articles going into great detail concerning the preparations for 
the Rational Soviet Congress. There is only one oblique reference
1 Ch*itan-kuo su-wei-ai ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei-hui ch!dan- 
t'i hui-i wei-lao hung-chdn ti-san, szu, wu, pa, shih-erh chttn tien), 
(Congratulatory Telegram from the Plenary Session of the Central 
Preparatory Committee of the Rational Soviet Congress to the 3rd., 4th., 
5th., 8th. and 12th. Red Armies), Hsiao, II, op.cit.. p. 71. One 
secondary source, published two months after the plenum, said that the 
plenum had decided that the Soviet Congress was to be called in the 
soviet area& £ Li (?), "Support the First All-China Soviet CongressI", 
International Rews.(Hew York), Rovember 12, 1930, p. 4. (Huston 
Collection), Hoover Institution, Stanford University^ In view of 
the wording of the telegram, this was probably incorrect*
2 Hung-chdn wei-kung chang-sha ti chan-ldeh, (The Strategy of the Red 
Army in the Encircling of Changsha), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 72.
5 Of those issues of Hung-ch'i Jih-pao that are available for 
October. (Henceforth abbreviated to HCJP).
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which indicated the policy switch in favour of the soviet areas* 
"You.*.the labouring people*..should elect and send your own 
delegates to participate in the Congress...so that they may see 
with their own eyes what really are the conditions in the soviet 
areas". But the change in CCP policy was too minor to be capable 
of saving Li.
o
The Comintern letter of November 16, 1930, which devastatingly 
attacked Li Li-san for major errors of line, resulted in his resigna­
tion at a Politburo meeting on November 25*^ In addition, Li was 
heavily criticised for not having set up a soviet government* The 
letter said that the significance of setting up such a government 
was that the CCP was working towards armed uprisings in the big 
cities, but that to undertake this task without estimating the environ­
ment, or analysing the balance of forces in the big cities, was 
"blind actionism" and not Leninism.^ The Comintern reiterated 
that the government must be set up in the revolutionary base areas, 
where it could rely on the Red Army.^
In his report to the Presidium of the ECCI, made in Moscow
1 HCJP, No. 53, p. 1.
 ^Kung-ch'an kuo-chi chih-hsing wei-yiian-hui kei chung-kuo 
kung-ch1 an-tang chung-yang wei-yiian-hui ti hsin, (Letter from the 
ECCI to the Central Committee of the CCP), received November 16,
1930j Hsiao, II, op.cit *, pp. 201-204*
5 According to Schwartz, op*cit*, p. 156.
4 Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 202.
 ^Ibid., p. 203.
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the following month, Li confessed that he had not understood the 
Comintern*s policy on the necessity for consolidated bases - bases 
which could become the starting points for developing the revolution 
elsewhere* He also admitted to not understanding the significance 
of. establishing a provisional revolutionary government, and 
confessed that he had erred in deciding to delay this until after 
the big industrial cities had been occupied by the Red Army.1
Other Comintern documents also accused Li of failing to 
establish a soviet government in the base areas, and criticised 
him for his comment (made at the Central Committee*s Third Plenum) 
that this was ,fascend mountainism'1 (shang-shan-chu-i). The 
Comintern said that Li also considered this an annexationist line, 
that only wanted to found a soviet government in areas outside the 
direct influence of the proletariat.2
The differences over the siting of the government which have 
just been analysed did not affect the basic duplicity of the Comintern 
when they attacked Li Li-san*s ,!errors of line". The broad outlines 
of Li*s policies were identical with those of the Comintern. The 
divergence was one of tactic - not of line. Ho one disputed the
1 Li-san Pao-kao, (Li-sanTs Report'), Hsiao, II, op.cit. , p. 210.
2 Kuo-ehi tung-fang-pu kuan-ytt chung-kuo tang san-chung ch’ttan- 
hui ytt Li Li-san t'ung-chih ti ts'o-wu ti pao-kao, (Report of the 
Comintern Eastern Department on the Errors of the CCP Third Plenum 
and of Comrade Li Li-san), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 205.
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general line - that it was imperative to establish, a central 
government - but there were discrepancies in tactics as to where 
to establish it, and the speed with which this could be accomplished, 
Li, in advocating an urban base, was too ambitious, and was caught 
by the failure of the Red Army's attacks on the cities that 
summer. As Ohang Kuo-t'ao later (1950) remarked: Li went beyond 
Moscow*s orders in planning the insurrectionary policy in 1950,
"(he) tended always to be adventurist in those days11.1
On the tactical question of where to locate the proposed 
soviet government, the Comintern was closer to Mao Tse-tung than
-l
Robert 0. North interview with Chang Kuo-t'ao (November 3> 
1950), Hoover Library, Stanford University, 1962. Hsiao Tso~liang 
however, feels that Li was disgraced because he had in fact deviated 
from the Comintern line, as set out in the July 25 directive. The 
key passage in the directive, according to Hsiao, is the command 
to attaok the cities in thefdture, and Hsiao interprets this to 
mean the distant future, rather than the attack on Changsha later 
that month. (Hsiao, I, p. 30. Emphasis my own). But Moscow was 
delighted with the brief capture of Changsha, and later, when Li 
was deposed, the new Returned Student group leaders, whose backer 
was Pavel Mif, the Comintern representative, continued to call for 
attacks on the cities. It is also hard to agree with Hsiao when 
he claims that the July 23 directive "foreshadowed the whole subse­
quent development of the Chinese Gommunist movement”, (p. 28) This 
implies that Moscow possessed a crystal ball that made them tell 
the Party leaders not to attack the cities until the future - the 
future being a quarter of a century ahead in the late 1940's. 
Clearly there were differences of timing and execution between 
Li and Moscow, as in the case discussed of the location of the 
soviet government. Also, the Comintern resolution of July 23 was 
considerably more moderate in tone than Li's statement of June 11. 
(See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 146-7).
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Li Li-san, for Mao, instead of leaning towards the cities, wanted 
to establish "Red political power” in the rural soviet areas.1
In 1945, Mao was to characterise the Li Li-san line as 
"adventurist", and to say that he had never agreed with it. Mao 
complained that his desired policy of consolidating the rural base 
areas had been dismissed by Li Li-san as ’’utterly erroneous...
tt olocalism and conservatism characteristic of peasant mentality. *
One explanation for Mao’s initial compliance with Li’s programme 
is that Mao was not in a strong enough position to defy the Li Li-san 
line until after the assaults on the cities had ended in failure. 
Speaking of this period, Mao later recounted to Edgar Snow that 
"the Li Li-san line dominated the Party then, outside Soviet areas, 
and was sufficiently influential to force acceptance to some extent, 
in the Red Army, against the judgement of its field command.”  ^ This 
looks like a retrospective rationalisation, and Chu Teh sounded a 
truer note when he admitted that although he and Mao were sceptical 
about Li's plans, they realised that they had been isolated for 
years, and therefore had very incomplete information about the 
national situation, and had to accept the analysis of the 00.^
-*■ Mao Tse-tung, "A Single Spark can Start a Prairie Fire", 
Selected Works, 1, pp. 117-128. (hated January 5, 1950). Also see 
his "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War", I, op.cit., 
p. 205*
2 RCQHP, Selected Works, III, p. 134.
5 Snow, op.cit., p. 178.
^ Smedley, The Great Road, p. 275.
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The general collapse of Id's policies of seizing key cities 
did not imply any abandonment of the basic task of establishing a 
central soviet regime and a provisional soviet government* Indeed 
it ms clear from the proceedings of the May Conference of Delegates 
from Soviet Areas that although the immediate aim was to formalise 
contacts between the Red Army and the central organs of the Party 
in Shanghai, the long-term goal was to create a soviet regime that 
would be a "state within a state", from which to conduct operations 
against the EMI. Therefore the failure of the Li Li-san line did 
not initially inhibit the activities of the Central Preparatory 
Committee in its drive to call a National Soviet Congress which 
would formally set up a* soviet government.
Progress Towards a Central G-overnment
Months before Lifs demise, before the first attack of the 
Red Army on Changsha, the Presidium of the National Conference of 
Delegates from the Soviet Areas met on July 7.
The Declaration issued by the Presidium compared the "tottering 
rule" of the Nanking government with the development of the working- 
class struggle in the major cities and the formation of soviet 
regimes in Kiangsi, Hupeh and Pukien# The Declaration also stated 
that it had been decided to call for the National Soviet Congress 
to convene on November 7, 1930, the anniversary of the Russian
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Revolution.Po prepare for this event, it was resolved to invite
delegates of the CGP, the Rational Labour Federation, from the
soviet areas, Red Army units and all revolutionary organisations,
to organise a Central Preparatory Committee* Phis Committee would
have the tasks of holding mass meetings in every factory, workshop,
village, school and street so as to elect delegates to attend the
2
National Soviet Congress*
A provisional Standing Committee of the Central Preparatory 
Committee met in Shanghai on July 25* Delegates were present from 
the Central Committee of the COP and the Communist Youth Corps (CY), 
as well as the National Labour Federation and others*3 Phese 
delegates organised themselves into a Provisional Standing Committee 
with the CCP- Central Committee delegate as chairman and the delegate 
of the National Labour Federation as Secretary-General•^ Both
Hao-chao chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u 
ch’tlan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsdan-yen, (Declaration calling for the 
First National Congress of Chinese Workers’, Peasants* and Soldiers’ 
Meetings /^Soviets_y) Hsiao Pso-liang, II, op*cit*, pp. 74-75* Hsiao 
has added a comment of his own to this document to the effect that the 
date of the Congress was later changed by the Central Preparatory 
Committee's plenary session from November 7 to December 11, 1930.
(ibid*, p. 75) Phis cannot be part of the original document, which 
calls for the organising of such a Preparatory Committee*
2 Ibid*» P* 75*
2 Other delegates came from the Mutual Aid Association, Shanghai 
Labour Federation, Great Freedom Alliance, Great Anti-Imperialist 
Alliance, Social Scientists Association and the Left-Wing Authors 
Association* Wang Chien-min, op.cit* * p. 283*
4;i In addition, the Youth Corps delegate was appointed head of the 
Organisation Department; Left-Wing Authors Association delegate as head 
of the Propaganda Department; Social Scientists Association delegate as 
chief editor of the newspaper, and delegates from the Shanghai Labour 
Federation, Anti-Imperialist Alliance, Freedom Alliance and Mutual Aid 
Association as members of the Editorial Committee.
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committees were firmly under the control of Li li-san* It is not 
recorded that any delegates from the soviet areas attended* A 
work programme was then decided on for the Central Preparatory 
Committee, as well as an organisational outline for a provisional 
Standing Committee, and budget proposals* But the Preparatory 
Committee was not destined to meet in plenary session until 
September, by which time the situation in China had changed con­
siderably* The delay in convening the plenary session was primarily 
due to the fact that Li had to await the outcome of his policy of 
seizing key cities before going ahead to establish a government.
On September 10 the Central Preparatory Committee urged all 
delegates to hurry to a meeting which was originally to have been 
held on August 20, but had had to be postponed because of the 
military situation and the KMT blockade of the soviet areas.■*
The plenary session of the Committee convened on September 12,
2probably in Nanking. In addition to those bodies and organisations 
represented at the Provisional Standing Committee meeting of the
1 Ch*ilan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei- 
ytlan-hui chin-chi t’ung-chih, (Urgent Notice of the Central Preparatory 
Committee for the National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 78* 
The rest of the document only reiterates the demands of the July 7 
Declaration.
2 Yung-hu su-wei-ai chung-yang chun-pei wei-yUan-hui yii chien-li 
ch'ilan-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai cheng-ch1 Han, (Support the Soviet 
Central Preparatory Committee and Establish a National Central Soviet 
Regime), Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit.* p* 79. (This document states 
that it was a meeting of the Standing Committee.) According to 
Hsiao, I, op.cit., p, 42, International Press Correspondence of 
October 23, 1930 said that the plenum took place in Shanghai.
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Preparatory Committee on July 23, there were delegates from other 
trade unions, the soviet areas and the Bed Army.*** The number of 
delegates to the meeting apparently exceeded the originally 
scheduled number by two-thirds.^
The Proclamation issued by the plenum stated that in the 
conditions of having created a 300,000-strong Red Army, and 300 
soviet areas, the current tasks were to link up the scattered 
soviet regimes and centralise their directing organs. This task 
was to be coordinated with armed uprisings in the KMT areas.
The election of a provisional Central Executive Committee of the 
soviet government by a National Congress was spoken of as being 
the most basic and urgent task. Once established, the government 
would unify the regimes of the various soviet areas, and put the 
Red Army under centralised command.^ The Proclamation also
-* One delegate from each of the following: Railway and seamen!s 
trade unions, the general trade unions of Tientsin, Hupeh, Kwangtung 
and Harbin; the soviet areas of Southwest Kiangsi, Northeast Kiangsi, 
West Eukien, North Eukien, Northeast Hupeh, Tung-chiang, Hailufeng, 
Hainan Island, the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, T fung-hai, the Left and 
Right river soviets, West Anhwei, Chih-nan and Yen-chi; the 1st., 2nd,, 
3rd., 4th., 5th., 6th., 7th., 8th., 11th., and 12th* Red Armies; and 
the Shanghai, Peiping and Harbin Revolutionary Student Associations. 
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 283.
 ^Ch'tian-kuo su-wei-ai ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-yUan-hui 
ch'ilan-t*i hui-i ching-kuo, (The Experience of the Plenary Meeting of 
the Central Preparatory Committee for the National Soviet Congress), 
Hsiao, IX, op.cit♦, p. 80.
2 Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-ta'u ch'tian- 
kuo tai-piao ta-hui chung-yang chun-pei wei-ytlan-hui ch'tian-t'i 
hui-i pu-kao, (Proclamation of the Plenum of the Central Preparatory 
Committee for the Eirst National Congress of^Ghinese Workers',
Peasants' and Soldiers' Meetings / Soviets /), Hsiao, II, op.cit., 
pp. 82-83.
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discussed the creation of preparatory committees for the National 
Congress, and urged that three weeks after they had started work, 
that they should convene special region (t^e-ch *&) delegate 
conferences of the special region soviets, so as to send delegates 
to the National Congress* They were urged to try their best to 
hold these conferences before November 7, and also to send 
delegates from the KMT areas*^* All preparatory committees were 
told to make good use of the October 10 revolutionary anniversary 
of the 1911 revolution "to expose the counter-revolutionary KMT
o
evil-doers".
The major task of the Central Preparatory Committee was to 
continue preparatory work towards the convening of the National 
Soviet Congress, which would set up a National Soviet Government 
The Plenum decided to postpone the calling of the First National 
Soviet Congress from November 7 to December 11, the anniversary 
of the Canton Commune* The reason given was the need for pre­
paratory work to be carried out fully.^ The Committee!s Presidium 
proposed that the Committee should move to the red areas (soviet 
areas). This proposal was accepted unanimously, as was a resolution
1 Ibid.« PP* 83-84.
 ^Wei tsu-chih ch1 Han-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u ta-hui hsdan-chti 
ytin-tung t*ung-ling, (Decree on the Organisation of the Electoral 
Movement for the First National Soviet Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., 
pp. 106-107, Also see ibid *, p. 82.
 ^Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 79.
4 Ibid., p. 80.
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to establish a Central Office in the ’’reactionary-ruled areas” to 
manage preparatory work there* According to one source, the move 
to the soviet areas was to be made to south Kiangsi*3- The Plenum 
also passed a series of electoral regulations, and the draft out­
line of a constitution.^
The draft outline of the constitution, or state basic law, of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic was proposed by the CCP Central Committee*3 
The outline stated that in the current conditions of the expanding 
revolutionary war, with the soviet regime not yet set up over the 
whole cf China, it was not possible to lay down detailed concrete 
provisions# However, seven basic principles were enunciated: the 
guarantee of true democracy for the broad masses, and equal treat­
ment without regard to sex, nationality or religion; the realisation 
of the regime of the labouring masses themselves, in which they 
would directly carry out all kinds of administrative affairs, thereby 
eliminating the opposition between government and people found in 
capitalist states; the emancipation of women; self-determination for 
all national minorities; alliance with the Soviet Union, and the 
overthrowing cf the rule of imperialism in China so as to liberate 
China economically and politically; to realise the revolutionary
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 284*
2 Hsiao, XX, loc.cit. The electoral regulations will be dealt 
with in detail later.
 ^Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lcuo-chia ken-pen-fa (hsien- 
fa) ta-lcang ts*ao-an, (Draft Outline of the State Basic Law 
^""Constitution J  of the Chinese Soviet Republic), Hsiao, II, op. 
cit., pp. 96-99*
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democratic-dictatorship of workers and peasants, and in the future 
reach proletarian dictatorship; and finally to support the interests 
of the workers and carry out the land revolution to liquidate all 
feudal remnants.*1*
In addition to the draft outline of the constitution the Plenum 
also considered the Labour Protection Law and draft Land Law 
originally passed by the May Conference of Delegates. The Labour 
Protection Law was passed without change,^ but the Land Law was 
amended, as some of its provisions had come under fire from the 
Comintern for being too radical.^
The agenda for the proposed Pirst National Soviet Congress, 
adopted by the plenary session, consisted of five items. In addition 
to the Labour and Land Laws (about the latter of which the plenum 
said it had made "slight revisions") the agenda included a Political 
Report and Declaration of the Congress, the State Basic Law of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic, and the election of the committee members 
of the provisional central government. The State Basic Law referred 
to the draft constitution approved by the Plenum. The Political 
Report was to put forward a revolutionary political programme, and 
Declaration would call on all "workers, peasants, soldiers and poor
^ Ibid.
2 Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 99-101.
 ^Por example, the Comintern directive of July 23, 1930 criticised 
as premature the prohibition on the buying and selling of land. The 
revised draft Land Law is reprinted in Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 101- 
103.
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people" to mobilise and "firmly strive for the victory of the 
national soviet regime"* Concerning the members of the government, 
the agenda noted only that the National Congress should elect those 
who were most loyal and capable, and who believed in revolutionary 
leadership
Next, the plenum drafted the outline for a network of sub­
ordinate preparatory committees* She tasks of these committees 
were to carry out propaganda for the soviet regime and the National 
Congress; to organise the election movement; to get the mass 
organisations and the Red Army to play an active role in this move­
ment; to put forward the most active and brave revolutionaries 
as candidates for election, or to receive the candidates’ list 
proposed by local revolutionary organisations and recommend them 
to the masses; and to collect opinions and demands brought up at 
the election meetings for transmission to the National Congress.^
Preparatory committees had a different organisation in the 
soviet and non-soviet areas* As already noted, the Central Pre­
paratory Committee itself was to be located in the soviet areas.
In these areas, committees were to be established separately in 
the urban and rural districts, down to the city districts (shih- 
ch’u ) and village levels, and appointed by the executive committee
Ch’iian-kuo ta-hui i-shih jih-ch'eng, (The Agenda of the 
National Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p* 95.
2 Chung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz'u ch'ttan- 
kuo tai-piao ta-hui ko-chi chun-pei wei-yiian-hui tsu-chih ta-kang, 
(Organisational Outline of Preparatory Committees at Various Levels 
for the Pirst National Congress of Chinese Workers1, Peasants' and 
Soldiers' Meetings /"soviets _7), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 104.
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of the local workers1, peasants* and soldiers* soviet.**- The actual 
selection of lists of delegates however, remained largely in the 
hands of the local Party branch, who's job, in addition to proposing 
its own list, was to induce the Youth Corps, trade unions, Red 
Guards, Young Pioneers and Poor Peasant Corps etc. to do the same. 
These lists were to be collected by the preparatory committee, but 
formally published under the leadership of the Party branch.^
It was the Party that directed the preparatory committees to add 
activist non-Party people to the names list, with a single candi­
dates' list for election being proposed jointly by the Party branch 
and the various mass organisations. If the masses opposed indivi­
duals on the list, then Party Central ordered that a replacement 
could be voted on.^ The Red Army in the soviet areas had its own
system down to the battalion level, run by the Army political 
4departments.
An Office of the Central Preparatory Committee was set up 
in Shanghai to control preparatory work in the non-soviet areas.5 
In some provinces (e.g. Manchuria) and hsien (e.g. T'ung-hai), 
special region (t 'e-ch'tl) committees could be formed, based on
Ibid., p. 83.
p
Chia-chin chun-pei ch'tian-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti 
kung-tso, (Step Up the Preparatory Work for the First Rational Soviet 
Congress), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. Ill,
5 Ibid.
4 Ibid., p. 104.
5 Ibid., p. 110.
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•the professional organisations and revolutionary mass organisations
in the area**** Normally however, preparatory committees were to be
set up in the cities and. rural hslen based on the local professional
and mass organisations, which were to act as the subordinate levels
2
of the committees. The executive organs of the professional and 
mass organisations were ordered to undertake the work of the pre­
paratory committees.^ it would therefore appear that in the non­
soviet areas, such communist organisations as were in existence 
were simply appointed to shoulder the tasks of preparations for 
the Congress. These preparatory committees were directed through 
the Party and Youth Corps organisations of Central's North, South 
and Yangtze River Bureaux, and by the Party branches under the pro­
vincial Party committee in Manchuria.^
1 Ibid., p. 105. "Professional organisations*1 refer to factory 
committees, hired peasant unions, handicraft workers and shop assistants 
organisations, poor peasant corps, soldiers committees etc. "Revolu­
tionary mass organisations" encompassed the Anti-imperialist Great 
Alliance, Freedom Alliance, Revolutionary Mutual Aid Association, 
Revolutionary Cultural Association, Revolutionary Students Association, 
CCP and Youth Corps branches etc.
2 it is not clear how this arrangement differed from that of 
the "special regions". Possibly the difference lay in the way 
delegates were to be elected to the National Congress*
5 Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 105-106 (See also Table I.)
4 Ibid., p. 110
60






































Hsiao, II, op*cit*, p. 81 and p. 104*
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In addition, the plenary session voted on a list of candidates 
for election to the Central Preparatory Committee, fhe list was 
proposed by the 5-man Presidium of the plenum, and after discussion,
25 men were elected, with one (un«named) individual being rejected.*** 
Once elected, the Committee could then proceed, in accordance with 
article 6 of the Organisational Outline, to elect its Standing 
Committee of 5-9 members.
According to one source, the Committee elected the following 










Hsiang Chung-fa, who was probably chairman of the Standing 
Committee (being listed first) was a Politburo member ••••:
1 Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 81.
2 Wang Chien-min, op.cit.. p. 284* Under the Standing Committee 
was set up a Secretariat, an' Organisation Department, a Propaganda 
Department, and an Editorial Committee. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 105).
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and Secretary-General of the CGP; Hsiang Ying was possibly a Polit­
buro member at the time and almost certainly a member of the OCP 
Central Committee; Mao was on the Central Committee, as were Ytt Pei, 
HsU Hsi-ken and Ch'en Yti. Little is know of Ytlan Ping-hui, Lin 
Ytt-nan or Lin Ju-lan, but the impressive number of high-ranking 
men on the Committee gave some indication of the top priority that 
the Party assigned to the task of creating a soviet government.
It is particularly interesting that Mao, in spite of his lack 
of co-operation in executing the attack on Changsha, and his 
apparent refusal to attend the May Conference of Delegates, was 
considered to be powerful enough to warrant inclusion on the 
Standing Committee. The fact that the Committee was planning to 
move to the soviet areas must have been instrumental in adding 
Mao's name. Nevertheless, he was heavily outnumbered by Li's 
supporters.
Some two weeks later, the Party leadership called on all 
members to step up preparations for the Congress,2 and the work
^ Wu Hsiang-hsiang (ed.). Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang chih t'ou- 
shih, (Revelations of the CCP), (Taipei: 1962), Vol." Ill, p. 118.
Also China Youth, No. 12, (June 16, 1961).
2 Hsiao, IX, op.cit., pp. 109-112. It is odd that in this 
commentary, Hsiao states that nafter this document nothing has been 
heard of the proposed Soviet congress under the Li Li-san leadership". 
(Vol. I, p. 49) There is considerable evidence of activity relating 
to the Congress up to and indeed after Li's fall on receipt of the 
Comintern's letter of November 16, 1930.
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of preparing for the National Congress was given great emphasis.
She CGP's official daily paper announced that:
“Following the plenary meeting of the Central Pre­
paratory Committee of the Soviet Conference and especially 
since the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, the 
questions concerning the positive preparations for the 
National Soviet Congress and the establishment of a central 
soviet regime have become the current tasks of the revolu­
tionary masses throughout the country...Further still, as 
soon as the 'double tenth* (October 10) comes around this 
year, we should intensify the broad propaganda movement 
across the country in all factories, villages and schools, 
where we should exert all our energies to convene meetings 
of the broad masses.*•(arrange for) the election of 
delegates to attend the Soviet Congress."^
The theme that the movement for a Soviet Congress had to be
a broad movement was often repeated. The groundwork was to be
laid just as thoroughly in the KMT-controlled part of the country
as in the soviet areas, and was to be built on as wide a foundation
of workers and peasants as possible. As the official Party paper
pointed out, "should the movement be confined to the few elements
who are the most advanced, there is no doubt that any superficial
slogan that should thereby be produced would in the end prevent
the development of a true soviet movement.
The Central Preparatory Committee urged the "broad masses" to
taIce part in the election movement, and wherever possible to convene
delegate conferences in all the soviet areas, factory committees,
trade unions, peasant associations, soldiers committees and
^ "Tsen-yang chin-hsing yung-hu su-wei-ai ti ytin-tung?", (How 
are we to advance support for the Soviet Movement?^, HCJP, No. 51, 
(October 7, 1930), p. 1.
2 Ibid.
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revolutionary mass organisations* All areas were requested to 
have convened these conferenc.es before November 7, and to elect 
only "the most sincere and courageous revolutionary elements as 
delegates*
A reading of the OOP propaganda leaves no doubt as to the two 
main overt reasons for the decision to set up a soviet government*
The first reason was the belief that a central soviet government 
would be more effective a fighting force against the Nationalists.
A central government would be able to assist the revolutionary 
masses to "centralise and gather together all the forces for the 
revolution (especially to closely unite the reactionary controlled 
regions with the soviet areas), to activate and moreover organise 
the masses in every kind of struggle and intensify the preparations 
for armed uprisings, resolutely organise the revolutionary war 
to eliminate the warlord battles and overthrow the reactionary 
domination of the imperialist KMT."^
By drawing together the more than 300 scattered soviet areas 
and a Red Army reported to be 300,000 strong^ under a single 
unified administration, Li Li-san thought that the result would be 
a relatively rapid expansion of the soviet areas throughout the
-1
"Chung-yang chun-pei wei-y&an-hui pu-kao", (Central Preparatory 




whole of China. His view was given credence when the Red Army, 
returning after the failure of their second attack on Changsha, 
captured Kian in South Kiangsi on Ootober 4* It was after this 
event that the Central Soviet Area was created and a Kiangsi 
Provincial Soviet Government established*^
The second reason was that a well-run Communist "state1 in the
heart of China would act to offset the authority of KMT rule and 
show up the Nationalist government as the corrupt regime the CCP 
felt it to be* As an editorial in the Party newspaper put its
"The election of the National Soviet Congress is 
clearly totally different from the so-called party rule 
(tang-chih) of the KMT of the gentry, landlords and 
bourgeoisie; and from the so-called National Conference 
of the reorganisationist^ and liquidationist^ cliques. 
(These)...are elected and managed completely by the 
gentry, landlords and bourgeoisie. Moreover the workers, 
peasants, soldiers and all the toiling masses are not only 
excluded from elections and participation in political 
power, but are subjected to extremely cruel oppression. 
Soviet political power however, is the political power of 
the workers, peasants, soldiers and toiling masses. Only 
the labourers, being the overwhelming majority of the 
total population, have the right to elect and be elected, 
and all the exploiting classes and those who regard the 
working class as an enemy are deprived of electoral rights.
1 "Chien-li kung-nung-ping tai-piao hui-i /""su-wei-ai cheng-ch!danJ7" 
(The Establishment of a Worker, Peasant, Soldier Delegate Conference 1
/"Soviet Regime/7), in HCJP, No. 54, (October 11, 1930), p. 1.
 ^Hsiao, II, op.cit*, p. 423. Also, see China Eorum, (January 27, 
1932), p. 4; and Shih-hua, (Tr&e Words), No. 2, (December 9, 1930), p. 4.
3 A neutralist group.
4 The Comintern nickname for the ’Trotskyite1 group under Ch*en Tu- 
hsiu, a former leader of the CCP who fell from power in 1927. They advo­
cated that the CCP should participate in a National Assembly under the 
sponsorship of the KMT.
5 "Je-lieh ti ts 'an-chi a su-wei-ai hsflan-chti", (Enthusiastically 
participate in the soviet -elections), HCJP, No. 52, (October 8, 1930),
p. 1.
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Furthermore, it was expected that the "broad masses" would 
compare conditions in the soviet areas with those under the KMT.
In contrast to the "crnel oppression" of the Nationalists, there 
were the soviet areas, where, it was claimed, the landlords and 
warlords’ land was confiscated and distributed to all, taxes were 
low, education was free, and women had equal rights with men, as 
did soldiers with officers*'*'
In the preparations for the Congress, the task of establishing 
a central government was described as the most important current 
need and central task of the broad mass movement,^ as well as 
being the central task of the Party*^ All mass organisations 
were to be used as propaganda vehicles, and Party branches were to 
be their leadership cores. It was stressed that it was essen­
tial to link propaganda for the Soviet Congress to the every­
day problems of the masses, so that in this way, the struggle to 
create a soviet government would become, via participation in the 
electoral movement, a political struggle against imperialism and 
the KMT.4 The Party branches did their best to carry out these 
directives. For example, at a meeting of the Executive Committee 
of the Shop Assistants General Trades Union, a resolution was
1 "Chung-kuo kung-ch’an-tang chung-yang wei-ydan-hui wei su-wei- 
ai ti-i-tz *u ch’iian-kuo tai-piao ta-hui kao mln-chung shu", (A Message 
to the People from the CCP Central Committee concerning the First 
National Soviet Congress), HCJP, No. 53 (October 9, 1930), p. 1.
2 HCJP, No. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 1*
 ^HCJP* No. 55 (October 12, 1930), p. 1.
4 Ibid.
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passed opposing capitalists who laid off workers during the autumn, 
and calling on all workers to fight against the capitalists. In 
another case, sympathetic strikes were called for. At the same 
meeting, another resolution urged propaganda for the soviet govern™ 
ment to compare life in the soviet areas with that under the KMT?- 
In a further case, the election of delegates to the Congress was 
combined with a call for higher wages and better working conditions.^
The September 12 plenum of the Central Preparatory Committee 
had ordered the creation of a network of subordinate committees at 
lower levels. These were only gradually established, and one month 
later the Party press was still calling upon all levels of govern­
ment in the soviet areas to set up preparatory organs which would 
then organise a soviet conference for that particular area to send 
delegates to the National Congress. Preparatory organs were also 
ordered to be established in the non-soviet areas.5 An apparently 
typical case of the latter variety was the founding of the Tientsin 
Soviet Preparatory Committee, which was l,demanded" by a number of 
organisations, including the Tientsin Municipal Committee of the 
CCP and the Communist Youth League, the Tientsin Revolutionary 
Mutual Aid Association and a number of trade unions. It duly 
convened on September 28 with a meeting of over 30 delegates from 
the above bodies, and also from the railways, textile and cigarette
1 HCJP, Ho. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 3.
2 HCJP. Ho. 61 (October 17, 1930), p. 3.
3 HCJP. Ho. 52 (October 8, 1930), p. 1.
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factories, posts and telegraphs, rickshaw men, dockers, soldiers, 
students, and peasants from neighbouring districts, The delegates 
heard a report from a representative of the Central Preparatory 
Committee,. and then formally established a 17-man Tientsin Soviet 
Preparatory Committee, and urged that lower-level committees be set 
up in every factory, street, soldiers1 camp and school.-*-
Similarly in Peking, the Peiping Municipal Committee of the 
CCP and the Communist Youth League, together with various mass 
organisations, issued a call for a Preparatory Committee, which 
assembled on September 21. Delegates came from Party organisations 
and trade unions, although the total numbers were depleted as no 
soldier delegates were present because of military exercises, the 
Printers Union delegates had been arrested, and the peasants 
and seamen did not arrive due to communication problems. As in 
Tientsin, the meeting decided to set up lower-level preparatory 
committees for agitation and propaganda work* It was further de­
cided that henceforth the main committee would meet only once a 
month, while a Standing Committee was formed, which was to meet 
twice a week. The Peiping CCP delegate was elected as Chairman of 
the Standing Committee.^
1 HCJP, No. 56 (October 13, 1930), p. 2.
2 HCJP, No. 56 (October 13, 1930), p. 2.
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The preamble to the electoral regulations for the Rational
Congress stated that because of the severe KMT "white terror1 in
the cities, and the attacks on the Red Army, the Congress would
most definitely not be a "construction Congress'* (chien-she ti hui-.yi),
but a "struggle Congress" (tou-oheng ti hui~yi). On the one hand,
it had to represent "the millions of struggling revolutionary
masses", and, organisationally, to take account of the military
1situation on the other*
Everyone who was 16 or older, regardless of sex, race, nationality 
or creed, had the right to elect and be elected, provided that they 
fell into one of several broad categories. Generally speaking, those 
who possessed electoral rights were those who lived by productive 
labour (or whose occupation was of "public benefit"); all Red Army 
officers and men; soldiers of warlord armies; those who do not hire 
labour but use their own manpower to manage small commercial firms 
(hsiao-shang-yeh) or handicraft firms, students, and professional 
people such as doctors.^ Those deprived of electoral rights 
included landlords, factory and shop owners, rich peasants employing 
long-term labour, warlords, bureaucrats and gentry; all officials 
of the Public Security Bureau, min-t'uan, and other counter­
revolutionary elements; Buddhist monies^  and nuns,iTaoist:bonzes, and 
other,clergy; opium addicts, lunatics and those convicted and deprived
^ "Ti-i-tz'u ch'dan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hstian-cird t'iao-li", 
(Electoral Regulations of the Eirst Rational Congress), HCJP, Ro. 52, 
(October 8, 1950), p. 2.
 ^Ibid.
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1of their public rights by a Soviet government court.
Different electoral methods were drafted for soviet and KMT 
areas. Precedure in the soviet areas was that delegates to attend 
the Congress were to be elected either at a Special Region (t !e- 
chjtt) Worker, Peasant, and Soldier Conference All-Region Congress, 
or from an All-Region Emergency Delegate Congress. Quite what the 
difference was is not stated, but from the list of Special Regions, 
it appears that it lay in the procedure to be adopted rather than 
different procedures for different kinds of soviet area. Rine 
Special Regions were listed, which covered most of the soviet areas 





5) West Hupeh and West Hunan




Ibid. According to Rue, (op.cit., p. 221) this regulation 
weakened Li Li-san*s Kiangsi Action Committee, because Mao claimed 
that Paoist priests were "among the members of some of its local 
soviet governments.1 Phe priests had therefore to be removed.
p
"Pi-i-ta’u ch'Ran-kuo tai-piao ta-hui hsilan-chil yfian-tse'1, 
(General Principles of Elections to the Pirst Rational Congress), 
HCJP, Ro. 53)(October 9, 1930), p. 2.
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Complex procedures were drafted for the soviet areas under the 
special region*-1- In the rural areas at the grass-roots level, the 
village directly elected 9-21 delegates to the ts fun workers*, 
peasants* and soldiers1 conference. (Soviet )s Hired peasants and 
coolies had to make up 10$ of the total number. Villages having 
less than 30 families had to unite together for electoral purposes.2 
The various ts*un soviets then each elected delegates to attend the 
hsiang conference, on the basis of one delegate to every 100 
residents, up to a maximum of 50, composed of 15$ workers, and the 
remainder peasants.^ At the hsiang conferences, delegates were 
elected to attend the hsien-ch*tl conference, on the basis of one 
delegate to every 500 residents, up to a total of 100, with the 
same class ratio as the ts*un delegations.^ At the hsien-ch*d 
conference, yet another election took place for those representatives 
who would attend the hsien conference, with one delegate being 
permitted for every 3,000 inhabitants. (10-15$ workers, 80-90$
1 Ohung-kuo kung-nung-ping hui-i (su-wei-ai) ti-i-tz *u ch*iian- 
kuo tai-piao ta-hui su-wei-ai ch'tt-ytl hsdan-chtl chan-hsing t*iao-li, 
(Provisional Regulations concerning Elections in the Soviet Areas 
for the First National Soviet Congress of Chinese Workers1, Peasants*
and Soldiers* Meetings /"Soviets_/), Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 89-93.
Separate regulations were passed for cities in the soviet areas 
having over 50,000 industrial workers, but no such cities were 
occupied by the Red Army.
2 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
 ^Ibid., p. 92.
^ Ibid_., p . 91 *
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peasants). Here, at the hsien conference, the hsien-chtR delega­
tions were joined by those from independent chen (market towns 
having over 500 workers). fhe independent chen had initially 
held their own soviet conferences to which delegates had been 
elected from the factory workers1 meetings, trade unions etc.,^ 
and had then sent delegates to the hsien conference on the basis of 
one to every 100 inhabitants, with workers comprising 70-80$ and 
peasants 20-30$*^ Also present at the hsien conference were 
delegates from the Red Army, based on the ratio of one to every
500 men* Delegates from all three sources - hsien-ch ftU independent
4chen and the Red Army - were not to exceed 200.
The penultimate step in sending delegates to the proposed 
National Congress took place at this hsien conference, which sent 
delegates to the Special Region conference. At the hsien conference, 
one delegate was elected for every 100,000 residents, their class 
distribution being 15-20$ worker, 5-10$ Red Army, 60-75$ peasants^ 
and poor people and others, 5$. The total number of delegates to 
the Special Region was not to exceed 250. fhis figure however, 
also included delegates elected from the soviet conferences of 
independent shih(cities having over 5>000 workers).^ fhese delegates 
had initially been elected by factory meetings, and handicraft
** Ibid. t P* 90.
2 Ibid., p. 92.
 ^Ibid., p. 90.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid *, pp. 89-90,
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workers*, shop assistants' and professional workers' meetings, via 
s h i h - c h conferences, to attend the independent shih conference*^
The class ratio from this conference was workers 50-65$, Red Army 
20-55$ and poor people 15-25$^.
Because of the urgency of the situation (presumably referring 
to the constant KMT military depredations), it was stated that the 
number of delegates to the Rational Congress from the special region 
conferences could not be precisely in accordance with population 
statistics and normal electoral methods. Instead, a rough standard 
was laid down that there should be one delegate per 200,000 electors*^
The precise number of delegates, and their class distribution, 
that it was proposed to elect from the nine Special Regions to the 
Rational Congress, can be seen from Table II. From the point of view 
of social composition the delegations were weighted heavily in favour 
of the peasants, who were to make up 75$ of the total, the rest 
being distributed as follows: workers 12*5$, Red Army 10$ and 
poor people 2.5$*4
1 Ibid., p. 91*
2 Ibid., p. 90.
5 Ibid., p. 89. Also HCJP, Ro. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.
4 HCJP, Ro. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2 (See Table II).
Another source gives a slightly different distribution of 15-20$ 
workers, 10-15$ Red Army, 60-70$ peasants, and urban poor and
others 5$. (-Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 89)#
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For election purposes, the non-soviet areas were divided into 
two - large cities on the one hand, and smaller towns and vilLages 
on the other. With reference to the larger cities (ta-ch1eng-shih) 
(such as Shanghai, Wuhan, Tientsin, Canton and Hong Kong) which 
had over 30-50,000 factory workers, there was one procedure for 
the workers, and another for the “generally poor” and their re­
volutionary organisations. Elections in the factories were to be 
under the leadership of the factory committee, or, if none existed, 
the trade union branch. Factories with over 2,000 workers were 
permitted two delegates, 500-2,000 one delegate, and if they had 
under 500 workers they were requested to combine with two or more 
factories to elect one delegate. For the handicraft workers and 
shop assistants, each trade was permitted one delegate, except 
where the numbers exceeded 10,000 in which case two were allowed. 
Elections were to be under the leadership of the trade union. 
Little was said of the “generally poor", except that the Paupers 
Consultation Associations were each to elect one delegate. Other 
revolutionary organisations such as the Anti-Imperialist Alliance, 
and the Freedom Alliance, were allowed one delegate each."*-
After the election was completed in each large city, wherever 
possible there being representation from every factory, industrial 
trade union and revolutionary organisation, a city conference was 
convened to be attended by all the members of the city delegation,
1 HCJP, Ho. 53, (October 9, 1930), p. 2.
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who were to discuss the views of the city, and its problems,
lbefore they went to the National Congress.
In large hsien towns, the handicraft workers and shop 
assistants were allowed three delegates, small hsien towns being 
permitted a single representative. Hsien towns without factory 
workers were to combine with the villages to organise electoral 
districts (ch *il). In the villages, if the Peasants Association 
had over 1,000 members, it was granted one delegate and, if not, 
it was requested to combine with other areas to make up the 
numbers. Finally, "revolutionary soldiers committees11 in the
p
warlord armies could elect delegates according to local circumstances.
The Central Preparatory Committee pointed out that it was 
absolutely prohibited to adopt the method of having delegates 
nominated by organs or a minority of p e o p l e .5 Based on election, 
it was decided that the total number of delegates coming from the 
KMT controlled areas should not exceed 100, composed of 70 workers,
16 peasants, 8 soldiers and 3 each from the poor peoples* and
1 Ibid*
2 HCJP, No. 54, (October 11, 1930), p. 2.
 ^Chih fan-tung t*ung-chih ch!tUytl ko t*uan-tfi kuan-yil hsdan- 
chil ydn-tung kung-han, (An Official Letter to the Various Organisations 
in the Reactionary Ruled Areas concerning the Election Movement),
Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 94. (This document is dated September 21 in 
Hsiao, I, p. 45 - but September 22 in Hsiao, II, p. 94).
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revolutionary organisations, These delegates were therefore to 
be outnumbered by more than two to one by those from the soviet 
areas.
The fact that Id was prepared to countenance such a large 
number of delegates from the soviet areas suggests he was confident 
that his supporters and their network of "action committees" 
could be relied upon to produce "reliable" delegates*
Furthermore, peasants would predominate at the National 
Congress, since they comprised up to 15%> of the soviet area 
delegates and 16% of KMT area delegates* When one considers that 
a majority of the Red Army and the "poor people" would have been 
made up of those of peasant extraction, and that many of the rural 
"workers" would at best be handicraft workers, the gap between 
this revolution and the Marxist model can be clearly seen. In 
order to narrow the gap, the CGP resorted to various subterfuges - 
such as calling peasants a "rural proletariat", or claiming that 
it was a true proletarian revolution because it was led by the 
OOP, which was by definition the "vanguard of the proletariat"*
It is unfortunate that no overall figures are available for the 
success of this electoral campaign, with respect to the total 
number of delegates or their geographical or class distribution.
1 Ibid., p. 94.
2 For an excellent discussion of these points of theory, see
Schwarts, op*cit,, pp. 191-199*
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All that is known is that Preparatory Committees were set up 
in Tientsin1 and Peking2 and that the Seamenfs General Trade Union 
was in the process of electing delegates to the Congress."5
On November 20, 1930 the Central Preparatory Committee 
formally invited the GCP to send delegates to the Congress.
Central was allowed two delegates, and the Party branch ,!in the 
place where the Congress is to be held'* was allowed one*4 As the 
GCP Central was the directing brain behind the Congress, and the 
Central Preparatory Committee was its creation, this could only 
have been a formality. But after this date no more was heard of 
the proposed National Soviet Congress of December 11, 1930.
Clearly, the immediate reason for the sudden lack of interest 
in the Congress was the fall of Li Li-san, who it will be remembered, 
was toppled by the receipt of the Comintern directive on November 16.
*i
"T *ien--chin su-wei-ai chun-pei wei-yilan-hui ch1 eng-li11, 
(Tientsin Soviet Preparatory Committee Established), HCJP, No. 55* 
(October 12, 1930), p. 2.
2 "Pei-p*ing su-wei-ai chun-pei wei-yiian-hui i ch1 eng-li", 
(Peiping Soviet Preparatory Committee Established), HCJP, No. 56, 
(October 13* 1930), p. 2.
3 "Ch^an-kuo hai-ydan tsung-kung-hui chia-chin su-wei-ai 
hsttan-cbil hsttan-chuan", (All-China Seamen!s General Trade Union 
intensifies propaganda work for the soviet elections), HCJP, No* 56, 
(October 14, 1930), p. 4. (Same number but different date to the 
previous issue.)
^ Chih chung-kung chung-yang kung-han, (An Official Letter to 
CCP Central), Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 109*
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This led to his resignation and departure for Moscow. But since 
the policy of Moscow was to set up a central soviet government, and 
this policy remained unchanged with the fall of Li Li-san, the 
cancellation of the December 11 Congress must be sought elsewhere.
Two main reasons for this can be discerned. Firstly, the 
departure of Li for Moscow led to a power struggle within the 
CCP which, until it was resolved in 1931» pre-empted all organisa­
tional matters. The struggle was between the ’‘Returned Student" 
group on the one hand, backed by Pavel Mif, and the faction centered 
around the north China labour leader Ho Meng-hsiung, on the other. 
Factionalism within the Party was further complicated by the 
occurrence of “Li Li-san-ism without Li Li-san" - the fight of 
Li's loyal supporters against the returned students. The Party 
obviously did not wish to convene a Congress that might be dominated 
by Li Li-san-ists.
Ho Meng-hsiung had opposed Li Li-san*s “adventurist" policies 
at least since May 1930. He claimed that Li exaggerated the role 
of the Chinese revolution, and that he followed incorrect policies
p
with regard to the Chinese labour movement. Eventually, in October,
*i
See Hsiao, I, op.cit., pp. 125-149. According to Wang Chien- 
min, op.cit. , pp. 67-68, there was a top Party meeting on November 22, 
at which the Returned Students were criticised on the basis of the 
Li Li-san line. Apparently Chou En-lai attacked the returned 
student Shen Tse-min for having said that the lines of the Third 
Plenum and the Comintern were not the same.
 ^Ho Meng-hsiung i-chien-shu. (A Statement of the Views of Ho 
Meng-hsiung), dated September 8, 1930.
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under the' prevalence of Li Li-san, Ho confessed to his "errors".'*'
V/ith the fall of Li Li-san in November, Ho was rehabilitated, but 
soon found himself in opposition to the Returned Student group. He 
was defeated by them at the Fourth Plenum in January 1951* It is 
a further indication of Mao's view of Li Li-san that he subsequently
p
spoke well of Ho Meng-hsiung. Since the leaders of the ”28 
Bolsheviks" were not established in power until January 1931 (and 
even then they were still subject to opposition from Ho Meng-hsiung 
and former Li Li-san-ists), it is not surprising that they did not 
feel able to organise the December 11, National Congress* No doubt 
the Party also felt the need to put on a show of unity at such an 
occasion.
The second reason for not holding the Congress was undoubtedly 
the prevailing military situation. The Nationalists were particularly 
active, towards the end of 1930, in hunting down Communists in the 
cities,^ but, more importantly, the First "Bandit Encirclement 
Campaign11 was launched by Chiang Kai-shek in December, against the 
soviet areas#4 Therefore one cannot be surprised that the Congress
n
Ho Meng-hsiung i-chien-shu, (A Statement of the Views of 
Ho Meng-hsiung), dated October 97 1930.
 ^Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works* III, p. 188.
 ^T ’ang Liang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China*
"China Today" Series, No. 1, (Shanghai: China United Press, 1934),
p. 60.
 ^Edgar Snow, op.cit*, pp. 182-5* Also see Schram, Mao Tse- 
tung, p. 159«
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never met In 1930, but such was the importance of it to the 
Party that it again became a major item of policy as early as 
January 1931 when the Returned Student group formally triumphed 
at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee,
CHAPTER 2
THE FIRST RATIORAL SOVIET CONGRESS
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The initial impetus for a fourth Plenum of the Central 
Committee came from the Comintern during the trial of Li Li-san in 
Moscow, December 1930. Dmitri Manuilsky, the Comintern represen­
tative in charge of the proceedings, called for a new Plenum to 
indulge in self-criticism and eliminate the errors of the Li Li- 
san line from the Party.^
The Fourth Plenum was convened in Shanghai early in January, 
1931* It pointed out the bad influences of the Li Li-san line on 
the Party - the weakening of the Party!s influence over the masses, 
and the weakening of the mass organisations,^ and especially con­
demned the premature attack on Changsha, made, according to the 
Plenum, without adequate preparation.3 Li Li-san was also casti­
gated for neglecting the task of establishing a strong central 
soviet government.^
As was discussed in the preceding chapter, Li had in fact 
paid considerable attention to the creation of a soviet govern­
ment, and a good deal of preparatory work had been carried out.
The only point concerning the soviet government on which he could 
be held guilty was the tactical error of proposing to site it in
^ !,Ma-nu-i-s2iu-chi fa-yen1*, (Remarks of Manuilsky), dated 
December 1930, in Pu-erh-se-wei-k1e, Yol. IY, No. 3, (May 10,
1931), p. 42.
2 Chung-kuo kung-ch1an-tang chung-yang wei-ydan-hui k fuo-ta- 
hui ti-szu-tziu ch^dan-t1! hui-i i-chdeh-an (Resolution of the En- 
larged Fourth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee), SSG 15. Also 
in CHBRD, p. 424.
3 CRBRD, p. 425.
4 Ibid., p. 426.
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a large city, rather than in the rural soviet areas* This had 
led him to delay the creation of a central soviet government while 
he attempted to occupy a key city with the Red Army* The fact that 
the National Soviet Congress was not held on the date proposed was 
largely due to factors not under Li*s control. The Plenum elected 
a new Politburo of 16 full and alternate members* Chfen Shao-yii, 
Chang Wen-t'ien and Shen Tse-min, members of the Returned Student 
group, were made leaders of the Party. Ch'en Shao-yd was appointed 
a member of the Standing Committee,^* and General Secretary of the 
Kiangsu Provincial Committee; Chang Wen-t’ien became head of the 
Peasant Department, the Women1s Department and Chairman of the 
Party newspapers editorial committee; Shen Tse-min became head 
of the Propaganda Department; and Ch’in Pang-hsien (Po Ku) General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communists. Many 
of those associated with the Id Li-san leadership or with 
opposition to the *28 Bolsheviks" were removed from power, includ­
ing Li Li-san, Ch*d Ch’iu-pai, Lo Ghang-lung, Wang K 1o-ch 'dan, Li 
Wei-han, Ho Chlang, and Kuan Hsiang-ying. Hsiang Chung-fa was re­
elected and retained as General Secretary after making a public 
confession. Chou En-lai was also re-elected and appointed head
*1
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 99 (Presumably of the Politburo, 
although no other such members were listed).
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1
of the Military Affairs Department.
The establishment of a new leadership in power meant no
diminution in the priority accoi’ded to the creation of a soviet
regime, and this was made clear by the Resolution of the Fourth
Plenum. This did not imply however, any abandonment of the
Party's main task of capturing the urban proletariat. On the
contrary, the Fourth Plenum spoke of giving special emphasis to
2Party work in the factories, and as will be discussed shortly,
Party documents during 1931 generally spoke of the soviet areas 
as being developed so as to occupy cities such as Changsha and 
Wuhan as soon as practicable, a policy which in fact differed 
little from that of Li Li-san.
But in spite of the desire of the Party leadership not to 
lose sight of their urban goals, it became apparent during the year 
that lack of response to the Party's overtures from the workers in 
the towns, and the increasing harshness of ICuomintang oppression 
and police supervision, coupled with the desire of the new COP
Ho definitive list of Politburo members elected at the 
Fourth Plenum is available. This information is drawn from Hsiao,
I, op.cit., p. 115, Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 99, and Wu Hsiang- 
hsiang, op.cit.. p. 118. Also Tang ti Chien-shiht (Party Re­
construction^ No. 1, (January 25, 1931), pp. 17-21. (l am grate­
ful to Mr. Roy Hoffheinz of the East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, for information from this last source). With the arrest 
of Hsiang Chung-fa in June, the Returned Student group further 
consolidated their hold on the Party, with the appointment of Ch'en 
Shao-ytl as General Secretary, and Chang Wen-t'ien as head of the 
Organ!sat ion Department•
2 CHBRD, p. 433.
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leadership to establish control over Mao in the rural hinterland 
(for the soviet areas had been developing extensively) led the 
Party to pay increasing attention to the countryside - a switch 
which was institutionalised by the formal creation of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic at Juichin, Kiangsi on November 7, 1931*
Soon after the Fourth Plenum, on January 15,*L the new Party 
leadership created the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas - a new 
organ which was to be directly responsible to the Politburo, but 
located in the soviet areas, in charge of preparatory work for 
the Soviet Congress^ and of facilitating the transfer of the CC 
from Shanghai to Kiangsi.^ A Preparatory Commission was also
n
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 503*
 ^Su-wei-ai ch^-ytl chung-yang-chtl ti chfeng-li chi ch!i .jen-wu, 
(Establishment of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas and its 
Tasks), Notice No* 1 of the CCP Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas, 
(January 15 > 1931), SSC 14* (Also reprinted in Wang Chien-min, 
op*cit*, pp. 505-506) Although formally inaugurated at this time, 
the Central Bureau had its origins at the Third Plenum of September 
1930* As Rue points out, one of its members, Ytt Pei, had opposed 
the Returned Student leaders and would not therefore have been given 
his position had the Central Bureau been newly created in 1931*
^/"john E* Rue, op* cit *. pp. 235-236 + J  In fact, YU was removed from 
his position on the Central Bureau shortly after the Fourth Plenum 
^Warren Kuo* "Chinese Communist 6th, CC*s 4th. Plenum and Party 
Rift (Part 1)", Issues and Studies, Vol. II, No. 12, (September 1966), 
p. 46_y In addition, the document on the establishment of the Central 
Bureau refers to the need of the Party to implement the resolutions 
of the Third Plenum. (See Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505; or the 
copy of the original document: on SSC 14, p. 6 - emphasis mine. The 
Wang Chien-min version has been checked against the original 
document, where the latter is legible.)
 ^Hsiao, I, op.cit.♦ p. 151. Interview with Chang Kuo-t’ao.
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set up, but its work was halted when twenty-four of its members 
were arrested in January 1951* and executed -the following month.1
Under the situation of the new revolutionary high tide in 
China, the documents stated that the Party had two major tasks.
The first was to consolidate the soviet areas, establish a 
national soviet base, and a provisional central government, and 
strengthen the leadership of the Party in the soviet areas, so 
that “in the future, according to political and military circum­
stances, (we will) be able to occupy one or several key industrial 
or administrative centres”, which were specified as Nanchang,
Changsha or Wuhan•^  The second task was to strengthen the Party*s 
leadership of the workers1 movement, so as to strengthen the 
leadership of the proletariat with respect to the soviet areas.
Armed uprisings were called for, to be coordinated with the work 
in the soviet areas. Por the implementation of these tasks, the 
existing soviet areas were divided into the following six 
administrative districtss-
1. Southwest Kiangsi special area and the Hsiangokan 
(Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi) border special area to be the Central Soviet 
District and the seat of the central provisional government.4
1 Agnes Smedley, China!s Red Army Marches. (New Yorks Vanguard 
Press, 1934), pp. 290-291.
2 Su-wei-ai ch!li-ytt chung-yang-chd ti ch'eng-li chi chTi .jen- 
wu, op.cit.. p. 3> Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 504.
 ^Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505*
4 Possibly this area was chosen in preference to Oyiiwan because 
of the desire on the part of the GO to control Maofs activities in 
Kiangsi. See R* W. McColl, "The Oyiiwan Soviet Area, 1927-32”, Journal 
of Asian Studies, XXVII, No. 1, (November 1967), p. 54.
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2* Hsiango (Hunan-Hupeh) border soviet special area, which 
included West Hupeh and Northwest Hunan,
3. Oyiiwan (Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei) boi*der special area, which 
included Northeast Hupeh, Southeast Honan and West Anhwei*
4* Kanminwan (Kiangsi-Pukien-Anhwei) border special area, 
which included Hast Kiangsi, North Fukien and the Anhwei-Kiangsi 
border.
5. Minyilehkan (Pukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi) special area, which 
included West Fukien, Northeast Kwangtung and a part of Southeast 
Kiangsi *
6. The Kwangsi left and Right River Soviets special areas.
With reference to the soviet areas, the Party was urged:-
1. to carry out land reform, equally distribute the land, 
and establish a soviet areas broad mass base.
2. to conduct elections to set up and transform the soviet 
organs by encouraging the active participation of the masses while 
driving out the rich peasants and corrupt bureaucratic elements* 
luring the elections, propaganda for the National Soviet Congress 
and the central government was to be expanded*
3* in addition to the capture of key cities, to expand the 
soviet areas, and coordinate their development so as to cause the 
soviet areas of the whole country to combine.
4* organisationally, a special region (t fe-chfiQ committee 
was set up in each soviet, responsible directly to the Central
^ Su-wei-ai ch fii-ydchung-yang-chtl ti ch^ng-li chi ch’i ,jen-wu, 
op.cit., p* 4»(The microfilm copy is so poor at this point that I 
have relied on Wang Chien-min, o p .cit.. p. 505.)
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Bureau* Areas not linked to the central soviet district could, 
where conditions proved difficult, take their orders from the 
highest Party branch in the area.***
The Central Bureau had a membership of nine, headed by Chou 
En-lai, and including Hsiang Ying, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Jen Pi- 
shih, Yti Pei, Tseng Shan and two others - one from the Hsiangkan 
special border area, and one from the Central Committee of the 
Young Communists,2 probably Ku Tso-lin.^ The Maoists (Mao, Chu 
and Tseng Shan) were clearly the dominant grouping in the soviet 
areas* Chou En-lai did not move towards Juichin until the spring 
or summer of 1931, about the same time as Jen Pi-shih left for the 
Hsiangosi soviet area.^ As already mentioned, Ytt Pei ceased to be 
a member of the Bureau early that year* Hsiang Ying was the only 
Returned Student supporter on the Central Bureau actually present 
in the soviet areas for the few months after its creation in 
January 1931*^ So Mao, in spite of the fact that his General Pront 
Committee had been abolished by the Third Plenum,6 was able to
1 Wang Chien-min, op*cit*, pp* 505-506.
2 Ibid•t P* 503* According to one source, members co-opted from 
within the soviet areas included "Chu Teh, Dseng Bing-chiu (?), Tcheu 
Yi (Chen Yi), Dscho Yi-li, P*eng Teh-huai and Bing Piao (Bin Piao)" 
^"""Better from Central Bureau of Soviet Areas to the CCn, (April 19,
193l)7 in Chinese Nation, (September 19, 1931), Nym Wales Collection, 
(Hoover library); quoted in Shanti Swarup, A Study of the Chinese Commu­
nist Movement, 1927-54* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), P* 247_7*
 ^Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 
(Part l)", Issues & Studies, Vol. Ill, Ho. 6, (March 1967), p. 50.
£ Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit*, interview with Chang Kuo-tfao, p. 162.
It is not known where Ku Tso-lin was at the time.
6 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 506.
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consolidate his position by temporarily capturing the Central 
Bureau, and also by virtue of his position as director of the 
G-eneral Political Department of the Revolutionary Military Council. 
Mao retained control of the Central Bureau at least up to the time 
of its first expanded meeting in March.^ By the autumn however, 
following the transfer of the bulk of the Central Committee to the 
soviet areas, Mao had lost his hold over the Party apparatus.
But to return for a time to the situation following the 
Fourth Plenum in early 1931, it appears that a "Soviet Movement 
Committee" was set up either at, or shortly after, the Plenum, This 
committee contained both Party and non-Party members, and had the 
task of drawing up draft resolutions for the National Soviet Congress 
and submitting them for ratification to the Party P o l i t b u r o H o w ­
ever, it is clear that slow progress was made towards calling a 
Congress, and in February, the Politburo re-emphasised that one of
1 The directive establishing the Central Bureau had ordered 
the immediate creation of a Central Revolutionary Military Council 
to unify the Red Army command:* (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 505)
In January 1931, Mao was appointed director of its General Political 
Department. /Warren Kuo, "The COP 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party 
Rift (Part 3) , Issues and Studies. Vol. Ill, No. 2, (November 1966), 
P. 45_y
2 The Returned Students later attacked the March meeting for 
^errors of left and right opportunism" (Wang Chien-min, op.cit., 
pp. 509-510).
3 "Resolution on Militarist Attacks on Soviet Areas", adopted 
by the Politburo on January 20, 1931; quoted in Warren Kuo, "Chinese 
Communist 6th. 0CTs 4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 2)", Issues and 
Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 1, (October 1966), pp. 47-48. “
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the central tasks of the CCP was defined as being the coordination 
of the soviet areas in preparation for the establishment of a 
soviet government, which was to be a government of the labouring 
masses under proletarian leadership. A June directive of the CC 
said that the Congress should be convened in the central soviet
in Kiangsi by August 1 at the latest.^
The fact that Mao was not associated with the calls to convene
a National Congress is a fairly clear indication that he realised
that the Returned Student leadership was out to use the Congress 
to change the policies he was implementing in the revolutionary 
base areas*
Chu Teh also related to Agnes Smedley that early in March "we 
received resulutions passed by the Fourth Delegates Congress of our
-*• "Mu~ch1ien cheng-chih hsing-shih yd chung-kuo kung-ch' an-tang 
ti chung-hsin jen-wu", (The Current Political Situation and the 
Central Tasks of the CCP), Shih-hua, No. 8, (February 2, 1931), p. 2*
2 ”00 directive to Party Branches in the Red Army and local 
areas at all levels - on the current political situation and urgent 
tasks of the Party", approved by the Politburo in June 1931; quoted 
in Warren Kuo, "Chinese Communist 6th. CC's 4th. Plenum and Party 
Rift (Part 2)", op *cit * * p. 50. This confirms what Chu Teh told 
Agnes Smedley - that August 1 (the anniversary of the Nanchang^Up- 
rising) was the first date proposed for the Soviet Congress. / See 
Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p. 294_J7 There are two references 
to the Congress being_jplanned for May, but that idea must have been 
quickly abandoned. Hung Oh'i Chou~pao, No. 4, (April 6, 1931) P* 1*
and Agnes Smedley, China!s Red Army Marches» p. 289. J An even 
earlier source, dated February 28, 1931, refers to "support and 
preparation for the National Soviet Congress", which probably implied 
the projected May meeting. /~""Chun-pei fShang-hai pao-tung' yd 'Pa~li 
kung-she1 chi-nien-chieh ti kung-tso""^ (The Work of Preparation for 
the 'Shanghai Uprising1 and 'Paris Commune' anniversary celebrations), 
CCP Soviet Areas Central Bureau notice No. 16, leaf 3, SSC 3* J
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Party*• *, which finally repudiated the Li Li-san line and re-affirmed
ours”,"*■ and he went on to say that on receiving the instructions
to prepare for the national Soviet Congress on August 1, (in south
Kiangsi), he and Mao called a conference of Communist Party
delegates from all the soviet districts which lasted nearly one
month. (There are no records of this conference, hut it is probable
that Mao and his followers were actively engaged in ensuring that
they had the electoral machinery for the Congress firmly under
their control* Gommittees were set up to prepare for the Congress,
but, said Chu Teh, KMT military activities caused the date to be
put back first to November 7, then December 11* (The Congress
actually did convene on November 7, so Chu was probably confused
here with the 1930 Congress which was supposed to have been held
on December 11.) Chu said that during 1931 the soviets became
efficient administrative organs for dealing with such problems as
finance, communications, local armed forced, health and education.
Their organisation was pyramidal in form, reaching from the village
2to the province. This organisation was to be formalised and 
extended at the Soviet Congress.
 ^Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, p. 294. Chu was quite mis­
taken about the identity of views between himself and Mao on the 
one hand, and the new Party leadership on the other. Subsequent 
Maoist commentary classifies the period from the Fourth Plenum to 
the Tsunyi meeting (January 1935) as the gravest of the three "Left" 
errors of the Party (the other two being those of Ch'd Oh'iu-pai 
and Li Li-san), which "caused serious losses to our Party and to the 
Chinese revolution". (RCQHP, p. 180.)
2 Agnes Smedley, The Great Road, loc.cit.
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The Eleventh Plenum of the EOGI (Executive Committee of the 
Comintern) was held in Moscow in April 1931 and discussed the 
future programme of the CCP.'1* In a directive to the CCP two 
months later, the ECCX Presidium listed its conclusions on the 
Chinese revolution. The directive approved of the changes 
wrought by the Fourth Plenum in liquidating the Li Li-san line 
and rectifying the Party line,^ and urged the formation of a 
soviet government,^ which had been qoposed by the anti-Leninist 
line of Li Li-san.4 Although the directive praised the leader­
ship of the Returned Student group, it gave no indication of 
wanting to eliminate Mao*s position in the soviet areas, and 
indeed spoke highly of his experiences there. Another Comintern 
directive a month later also urged that ,!a central soviet govern­
ment should be formed in the shortest possible time, in the most 
secure arean*^
These Comintern instructions had duly to be relayed to the 
soviet districts and therefore, on September 1, the Party Central 
organs in Shanghai sent a major directive to their counterparts
nKung-ch,an kuo-chi chih-wei ti shih-i-ta *u ch*ttan-hui chtieh- 
i-an", (Resolution of the ECCI Eleventh Plenum), dated April 1931, 
printed in Kuo-chi Lu-hsien, (December 1932), pp. 1-265 published 
by the Central Bureau of the Soviet Areas. SSC 14.
 ^ !,Kung-ch*an kuo-chi chih-wei chu-hsi-t 'uan kei chung-kuo 
kung-ch1an-tang ti hsin”, (A Letter of the ECCI Presidium to the 
CCP), dated July 1931; in Pu-erh-se-wei-k1e♦ Bo. 1, (July 1934), 
p. 10. SSC 15.
 ^Ibid., p. 7 .
4 Ibid., pp. 9-10
5 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
6 Resolution of the ECCI Presidium on the tasks of the CCPf 
(August 26, 1951)* Printed in Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist 
International 1919-1943t documents (Three Volumes, Londons Oxford 
Univer si ty Pre s s, 1965) * H I > P. 174.
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in the soviet areas.1
The directive explicitly criticised Mao*s land policy of 
"drawing on the plentiful to make up for the scarce" and "draw­
ing on the fat to make up for the lean", and urged that the 
fertile land and surplus implements of the rich peasant should be 
confiscated and distributed to the poor and hired peasants. The 
rich peasant was to be given poor land in return.2 Central stated 
that using productive implements as a criterion for land distribu­
tion was a rich peasant line,^ and that the criterion to be adopted 
was the mixed criterion of population and labour power.4 The fact 
that these policies had not been carried out said Central "shows 
that the fruits of the land revolution have still not fallen into 
the hands of the poor and middle peasants, but have been seized by 
the rich peasants."5
The Red Army was urged to occupy one or two comparatively 
large cities,^ but the letter said that the Red Army!s organisation 
was not suitable for large-scale war and the achieving of initial 
victories in one or more p r o v i n c e s .  ^ The concept of guerrilla war­
fare was criticised and the Red Army was told to "completely get 
rid of the tradition of guerrilla-ism"8 although Central did not advO' 
 ^ Chung-vang tui s u - c h 1#  chih-shih-hsin, (A directive letter of
2 Ibid., P* 4 and
3 Ibid.* p. 8.
4 Ibid., P* 15*
5 Ibid., P* 4.b Ibid., P* 12.7 Ibid., P* 16.
8 Ibid.
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oate the abandoning of the function of guerrilla techniques^
The letter complained that the soviet areas had not yet 
been unified and that a provisional central government had still 
not been set up*2 Central went on to say that they realised 
that the war had caused great difficulties in choosing a suitable 
place to convene the National Soviet Congress* However, said the 
directive, it was not important as to whether or not the Congress 
could be convened for the whole of China, nor even as to whether 
it could be convened for all the soviet areas. nThe important thing 
is that we must have a soviet government of the masses to lead the 
civil war to overthrow the rule of the imperialist KMT and to deve­
lop the land revolution."3
Central stated that the soviet government would be produced 
by a National Congress that would convene on the anniversary 
of the October Revolution, for there were to be no more time ex­
tensions. ^ prior to the Congress, there was to be a re-election 
movement in the central soviet area, which would ensure that "all 
landlord elements, rich peasants, merchants, employers, and corrupt 
elements" would be eliminated from the organs of soviet government 
and the revolutionary organisations, so that soviet delegates would 
truly elect members of the "worker and peasant labouring masses".
This work, said Central, had in the past been put off, not carried 
out, or carried out poorly* Now it had to be carried out successfully,
1 Ibid., p. 18.
2 Ibid., p. 1 and
3 Ibid., p. 19.
4 Ibid.
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even if if meant that delegates from other soviet areas would not 
be able to come to the Congress on time,1
It is clear that this letter represented an attack by the 
Returned Student leadership in Shanghai on the policies pursued 
by Mao in the central soviet district* for example, in addition 
to attacking Mao!s land policies, Central attacked the idea of 
guerrilla warfare, which Mao favoured, and urged the occupation 
by the Red Army of large cities, which Mao opposed,2 furthermore, 
Mao wanted the main emphasis of operations to be in the rural 
areas, rather than directed towards the cities*^ The directive 
was accepted by the first Party Congress of the Soviet Areas, held 
in November 1 9 3 1 and shows that the Maoists had been unable to 
withstand the onslaught of the Returned Students, carrying the 
mantle of the official Party leadership and backed by the prestige 
of Moscow, and had lost control of the CCP machine in the central 
soviet districts*
The Political Resolution of the Party Congress urged the soviet 
area leaders to eliminate the gentry, landlords and rich peasants,
1 Ibid*, p* 20•
2 EGQHP, pp. 199-200.
 ^Ibid., p. 198.
4 Su-ch'ti tang ti-i-tz’u tai-piao ta-hui t!ung-kuoi cheng-chih 
chtteh-i-an,(Political Resolution adopted by the first Congress of 
the Party in the Soviet Areas), Central Bureau, Soviet Areas, 
(November 1931 )* SSC 15* The actual date of the Party Congress 
was November 1 (Wang Chien-min, op.cit*, p. 288) J
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to deepen the class struggle, and link up outlying soviet areas 
with, the central soviet district*1 As in the September 1 letter, 
Mao's land policies were condemned by the Party Congress as "a
Q
rich peasant line"* Village and town soviets were to be esta­
blished as the basic organisations of soviet government* By the 
system of conferences based on these units, democracy would be 
maintained, and "in this way, the soviet regime would become a 
genuine mass regime of the workers and peasants."^
Progress towards the Soviet Congress was aided by the Mukden 
Incident of September 18, when Japan occupied Manchuria and dis­
tracted Chiang Kai-shek's attention from the prosecution of his 
third "bandit encirclement campaign", which was in the throes of 
malting successful inroads into the soviet areas. For almost iwo 
years, until April 1933? the soviet areas were to be relatively 
free of ICMP military encroachments, and to enjoy their greatest 
period of stability and development*^*
It was in this atmosphere that electoral preparations got 
underway for the First National Soviet Congress. Propaganda
^ lbid_- j P • 10.
2 Ibid.. p. 3.
3
Ibid*, p. 11.
^ According to Chu Teh, the first KMT campaign was from 
December 1930-January 1931? the second from May « May/June 1931, 
third from July - September 1931? fourth April - June 1933, and 
fifth from October 1933? resulting in the loss of the soviet areas 
in October 1934. Nym Wales, New China, pp. 58-66.
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documents concerning the Congress asked the question "why do we 
have to hold the National Congress?", and then answered:-
1. Because of the need to summarise the experience of land 
distribution and soviet organisation of several years•
2. To establish a soviet government of workers, peasants 
and soldiers to unite and centralise all organisation and work.
3. To discuss and decide important laws and regulations of 
the soviet government and development plans of the future.1
If there were to be added to this list the desire of the 
Returned Student group to centralise organisation and work under 
their own control, and to implement their own policies, it would
become an accurate summary of some of the main reasons for convening
the Congress*
For administrative and electoral purposes, according to the
2law passed by the CCP, local soviets were divided into sheng, 
shih, hsien, ch'tl, hsiang and ts (un. The hierarchical organisation
of these units was not clear, although the law stated that there
were in fact only four levels, as the shih and hsien were on the 
same level and had the same organisation, as did the ch'tt and hsiang. 
Probably the shih and oh1# referred to urban areas, and the hsien
1 Kuan-yil ch!#an-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti wen-ta, 
(Questions and Answers on the National Soviet Congress)', reprinted
by the Hsingkuo hsien soviet government, (June 21, 1931), SSC 10. See 
also Chi-nien shih-ytleh ko-ming yil yung-hu ch^an-su ta-hui hsiian- 
ch!uan ta-kang, (Propaganda Outline for CQmmemoratingthe October 
Revolution and Supporting the National Soviet Congress), General 
Political Department, Central Revolutionary Military Council,
(October 24, 1931). SSC 3.
2 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 339.
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and hsiang to the rural areas, with ts!un sending delegates to the 
hsiang soviet conference. The kind of committee structure set up 
under each levels1 delegate conference (or mass meeting in the case 
°£ "k*1® ts !un) was similar to that finalised by the First Soviet 
Congress at the national level, with a soviet committee and chair­
man controlling the cabinet, or Council of People's Commissars, 
under which various departments functioned. In theory, the 
provincial committee had from 70-150 members, each with a two- 
year term of office, one quarter of them being re-elected every 
six months. The provincial delegate conference was to meet once 
every six months. Proceeding to lower levels in the soviet administra­
tive hierarchy, the numbers on the committees grew fewer, they 
had shorter terms of office, and they met more frequently.^
On August 1, 1931, the Revolutionary Military Council laid 
down the electoral rights and regulations for the production of 
delegates to the First Soviet Congress.5 It was stated that all 
people had the right of election and being elected with the exception 
of landlords, gentry, capitalists, rich peasants, those preaching
Ten in all, such as finance, culture, land etc., and a 
secretariat. (ibid.) ^/~According to another source, there were 
only four levels of soviet organisation - hsien, ch'ii, hsiang and 
ts1un. The hsiang and ts'un soviets were directly produced by mass 
meetings. Higher level soviets were produced by either mass meetings 
or delegate conferences. (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423) J
2 Ibid.
3
Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 423-424.
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religion for a living, participants in counter-revolutionary 
organisations, and those deprived of their public rights by the soviet 
government. All who were not included in one of these categories? 
and who earned their living by labour, were given electoral rights, 
provided they were over 16 years of age, regardless of sex or 
nationality.*** On this basis, the hsiang was taken as the initial 
electoral unit, and delegates were elected using the raios of one 
to every five workers and hired peasants and one to every 50 poor 
and middle peasants and others* At the chfil delegate conferences, 
every 20 workers and hired peasants elected one delegate, as did 
every 200 poor and middle peasants etc. The hsien was the final 
unit, and sent the representatives direct to the National Soviet 
Congress, using the ratio of one delegate for every 5,000 people.^
In an overall comparison between these electoral rules and 
those of the Li Li-san Congress of 1930, one is struck by a con­
siderable difference in emphasis which reflected the transfer of 
the energies and outlook of the COP from the urban to the rural 
areas. The 1930 regulations discussed in Chapter I placed heavy
^ Ikifl» (These categories were virtually the same as those of 
the Li Li-san period).
2 Ibid*, p. 424. The Red Army, using the company as the electoral 
unit, had one representative for every 30 men. At the ensuing dele­
gate conference, delegates were sent to the Soviet Congress on the 
basis of one to 300 men. There were also regulations concerning 
electoral procedures in the cities, (ibid.) Slightly different 
procedures are described in one secondary source China Porum,
(January 27, 1932), pp. 4-5J
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emphasis on election of delegates from the cities under KMT control, 
and laid out detailed proposals for producing these delegates.
The 1931 regulations, however, as the title indicates, were 
concerned mainly with the soviet areas, and there were but few 
references in the literature to activity on behalf of the Soviet
-1
Congress in non-soviet areas. In listing the areas and organisa­
tions from which the delegates came, documents of the Congress 
record only that some Trades Unions were represented, together 
with representatives from partisan groups from places like Hainan 
Island.2 There was apparently no substantial body of delegates 
coming from the urban proletariat.
The proletariat was represented only in the Leninist sense 
that the Communist Party was by definition the "vanguard of the 
proletariat", even if the Party itself was largely made up of 
members of peasant background. In fact the soviet movement remained 
a movement of the villages alone, and the Red Army never controlled 
the large towns held by the KMT such as Kiukang, Nanchang or ICanchow, 
which lay within the soviet territories.^
There is one injunction to calling mass meetings to raise 
delegates in the "enemy controlled areas", in Hung Ch'i Chou-pao,
No, 4 (April 6, 1931), p. 1,
 ^ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui kei chung-kung chung- 
yang tien", (The Telegram of the Chinese Soviet Congress to the COP 
Central Committee), Hung Ch’i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December, 1931),
pp. 1-2.
 ^Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, p. 339. 
The Central Soviet Area in the summer of 1931 comprised, according to 
one communist source, some 31 hsien, and measured 400 li^  from north to 
south and 300 li^  from east to west, (Hsiao, II, op#cit., p. 423).
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However, with reference to the election campaign of the 
summer and autumn of 1931, there is evidence indicating that 
elections were either not conducted at all, or that they were 
carried out in a manner which bore little relationship to any 
formal system of organisation,
To begin with, a Central Executive Committee directive 
issued shortly after the Eirst Congress said that soviet organisa­
tion had, in the past, been very imperfect.-1* The administrative 
areas had been too wide and inconvenient, and there were too many 
levels of government for the efficient communication of instructions* 
The directive said that neither mass meetings, nor delegate meetings 
or joint meetings of chairmen had been convened so as to elect the 
various levels of the government, and further complained that the 
work division and work methods inside the various levels of govern­
ment were largely unsuitable - all of which was neither in accordance
o
with the constitution or with the provisions made by Central*
It became clear that the Party saw a number of deficiencies 
in local soviet government which it wished to eliminate. One source 
spoke of "bad elements" such as rich peasants, rascals and members 
of the AB (Anti-Bolshevik) Corps, who had hidden in and sabotaged 
the soviet organisations*3
1 "Su-wei-ai chien-she chung-yao ti hsttn-ling", (important 
Instructions concerning Soviet Construction^, Hung-se Chung-hua, (Red 
China), Ho, 2, (December 18, 1931), P* 4, All future references to 
Hung-se Chung-hua will be abbreviated to HSCH J
2 Ihid*
 ^Kuan-yd chfilan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui ti wen-ta» op*oit. 
(Also see HSCH, Ho. 43* December 5. 1932. p. 2) •
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Reform was also necessary it was said, in order to oppose 
bureaucratism, commandism, and the separation of the soviets from 
the masses* It was also required to wash out rich peasants, rascals 
and all reactionaries, and replace them with workers, hired and 
poor peasants, middle peasants, coolies and labouring women*"**
The reference to rascals (liu-mang) shows that the complete 
electoral law in force at this time has yet to be located, for 
this term cannot be found in any one of the sources discussed so 
far* The September 1 directive letter of Central for example, 
pointed out that "the slogan 'wash out rascals' in the soviet 
electoral law also stipulates that rascals do not have the right 
to elect or be elected",  ^ and that this stipulation was a confused 
class line that would cause bankrupt and homeless peasants to be 
treated as rascals, and so "drive them outside the land revolution 
battleline".^ In 1932, this was to be referred to as "last years' 
undiscriminating with respect to class (pu-fen chieh-chi) mistaken 
electoral method".^ Central's September 1 letter went on to say 
that the soviet re-election movement had so far had very little 
success, that the lower levels of the soviets had become "pan-ch'ai" 
(or "routine work") organs; that the participation of the masses' 
delegates in daily work was extremely defective, and that landlords, 
rich peasants and merchants still managed many soviets and mass
Ibid.
, , , ■ ,
Op.cit*, p. 3*
 ^Ibid*, p. 4*




A later source reported that voters frequently had no contact 
with the ts!un or hsiang soviets, which were supposed to be the 
basic soviet organisations of the regime.^ Furthermore, not one 
city (ch!eng-shih) soviet had been established.^
Writing at the time of the election campaign for the Second 
Congress, the Preparatory Committee noted that there were many 
defects in the campaign for the First Congress.^ Residents were 
not clearly distinguished between those having electoral rights 
and those not, and furthermore, "many of the masses did not fully 
realise that the election was their own to administer, an 
important part of their life, and thus we did not achieve the parti­
cipation of the majority of electors in the election.1*'^
Judging by the results of the First Congress - which confirmed 
Mao and his supporters in power in the soviet government - it would 
seem that Maofs machine kept a tight grip on the electoral machinery 
so as to ensure the election of delegates with views sympathetic 
to their own. The evidence cited above shows clearly enough that
** Qp.cit., pp. 4-5.
 ^Hsiang Ying, nTi-fang su-wei-ai ti chien-she wen-t'i", (The 




,fChung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei- 
yilan-hui hsRn-ling", (Chinese Soviet Republic CEC Order’), Hsiian- 
chH YRn-tung Chou-pao, Ho. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 2, SSC 10.
5 Ibid.
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the election was not an affair that involved the large mass of the 
soviet population in an orderly procedure* More probably, the 
Maoists hindered the movement to reform and re-elect the soviet 
administrative organs and arranged for the selection of their own 
representatives to the National Congress.
Apparently, at some time prior to September 1, the workers' 
and peasants' revolutionary committees (or soviets), which were the 
provisional organs of the regime before the establishment of a 
central government, had been abolished, and a "military organisation" 
had been substituted for them.-*' In addition, the electoral regu­
lations in force at that time were laid down by the Revolutionary
p
Military Gouncil. Since Mao almost certainly retained his position 
as head of the General Political Department of the Revolutionary 
Military Council up to November 1931, and this body was known to 
have been running the land reform programme during the year,^ it is
reasonable to assume that it was also in charge of the election
movement, arranging the production of a majority of Congress delegates
Ohung-yang tui su-ch'ii chih-shih-hsin, p. 4 & p. 19*
2 Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 423. See also China fforum, (January 27,
1932), p. 4.
 ^Pu-tso tiao-ch'a mei-you fa-yan-ch 'tlan. pu-tso cheng-ch 'tleh 
ti tiao-ch'a t'ung-yang mei-you fa-yan-ch'&an, (if you have not ~ 
made an investigation, then you have no right to speak, and if you 
have not made a correct investigation you have no right to speak), 
Notice of the General Political Department, Revolutionary Military 
Council, director Mao Tse-tung, (April 2, 1931), SSC 6. This 
document makes it clear that the General Political Department was 
in command of the land reform movement at that time.
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with pro-Mao sympathies.-**
Laws and Resolutions of the Congress
The First National Soviet Congress convened at dawn in
Juichin, Kiangsi on November 7, 1931, the anniversary of the
Russian Revolution, with a ceremonial parade. Some 610 delegates
were in attendance, representing the Central Soviet Area, West
Fukien, Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi), Hsiangkan (Hunan-
Kiangsi), Hsiangosi (Hunan-West Hupeh), Northeast Honan and
Hainan Island. Delegates also came from the Red Army's First and
Third Army Corps, the Second, Sixth and Sixteenth Armies, and
various independent divisions. The National Labour Federation,
the Seamens Union and Korea were also represented.^ One secondary
source says that the latter was in fact a representative of the
■2
Korean Communist Party.About one quarter of the delegates were 
women. ^
*i
According to an eyewitness, one of the charges levelled by 
the CO at Mao during the period prior to the First Congress was that 
of using nepotism in the Red Army so as to increase his personal 
influence. Warren ICuo, "The Anti-Mao Struggle during the Govern­
ment 4th. Encircling Offensive (Part l)", Issues and Studies, Vol. Ill, 
No. 8, (May 1967), p. 45J7
2 Hung Ch'i Chou-pao, No. 25, (December, 1931), p. 2.
3 M. James and R. Doonping, Soviet China* (London: .Modern Books 
Ltd., 1932), p. 15. Agnes Smedley also reports that there were dele­
gations present from Korea and Formosa. She also states that the 
Congress was held, not in Juichin, but in Yehping, some 10 li to the 
north. Miss Smedley however, was never in the soviet areas~Tchina1s 
Red Army Marches, pp. 292-4).
 ^ Kung Yung-kang, "The revolutionary bases in the countryside,
1928-1933”, People's China, No. 8, (April 16, 1957), pp. 34-35.
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A comparison between the soviets represented at the Congress 
and the list of soviet areas put forward by the Central Bureau in 
January reveals certain discrepancies* The Hunan-Hupeh soviet of 
January was now the Hunan-West Hupeh soviet - a minor difference 
representing a small change in territory. However, neither OyHwan 
(Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei), Kanminwan (Kiangsi-Fukien-Anhwei), Minyilehkan 
(Fukien-Kwangtung-Kiangsi), or the Kwangsi left and Right River soviets 
were reported present. Kanminwan and Minyilehkan had undoubtedly 
suffered during Chiang Kai-shek's "bandit encirclement campaigns", 
and what was left of them probably joined with the central soviet 
area. The Kwangsi soviets were still in existence but probably did 
not send delegates because of their distance from Juichin.
OyiLwan was the most important and stable soviet next to the 
central soviet district itself. Two important Central Committee 
members, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Shen Tse-min, had been sent there in
April to implement the policies of the Fourth Plenum. According
to Chang delegates were not sent only because of the presence of
KMT troops between the Oyilwan soviet area and Kiangsi.2
The main items on the agenda of the Congress were a Political
1 Interview of Chang Kuo-t'ao with Hsiao Tso-liang, quoted 
in Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 161-2.
2 Ibid., p. 172. One account does say that Chang sent a re­
presentative to the Congress, but he is not identified. See Agnes 
Smedley, Red Flood over China. (Moscow & Leningrad: Co-operative 
Publishing Society of Foreign Workers in the USSR, 1934), p. 377.
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Programme, a Constitution, a Land Law and a Labour Law, resolutions 
on the Red Army and economic policy, and other laws and decrees.
The Chinese Soviet Republic was formally established, and a central 
soviet government was elected."*"
None of the laws or resolutions passed by the assembled 
delegates had their origin at the Congress. They had all been 
basically decided on well beforehand, and most of them had their 
roots in Comintern directives or CCP policies of 1930, during the 
reign of Li Li-san, or stemmed back even earlier to the Sixth Con­
gress of the CCP in Moscow, 1928.
A Russian source disclosed that the majority of the proposals 
put to the Congress were circulated in draft form as early as March 
1931? and some days before the Congress was due to convene (in 
Hung Ch1! Chou-pao of October 30, 1931), an article written by 
Chang Yfen-tHen, a leader of the Returned .Student group, announced
^ ORBRD, p. 630. According to this source, the name of Juichin 
was changed to Juiching, because the town was made the formal 
capital of the Republic. In the Party press, however, the name of 
Juichin was maintained.
rj
Sovety v Kitaei sbornik material ov i documentov, (The Soviets 
in Chinas a collection of materials and documents), Moscow, 1933, 
p. 417. Quoted in Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese 
Communists, 1931-1946, p. 38.
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all the ma;jor decisions of the Congress.-**
The First Congress did not adopt a full Constitution, hut 
only a constitutional outline, introduced by the C.entral Committee.2 
This contained 17 articles, whereas the electoral regulations of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic, also passed at the Congress, made re­
ference to articles 73-84 of the Constitution.^ Ho fuller 
Constitution has been found, other than the outline.^
The outline constitution as passed on November 7, 1931, was 
shorter, but virtually identical in principle to that drawn up 
by Li Li-san's Central Preparatory Committee in 1930.
It was not a law laid down for immediate implementation in 
the soviet areas; rather it was a statement of aims which were to
•*• Szu Mei (Chang Wen~t!ien), Ch'ing-chu su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u 
ch'itan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui, (Celebrate the First National Soviet 
Congress), Hsiao, XX, op.cit. ,pp. 429-430. The draft resolutions 
and laws had in fact circulated in book form before the Congress 
so that Party members could discuss them and make suggestions for 
revision to the Central Bureau of the CCP. This comment, and the 
drafts, are in Ch'ttan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, 
(Draft Resolutions of the First National Soviet Congress), proposed 
by the CCP Central Committee; reprinted by the General Political 
Department, Third Army Corps, First Front Army, Chinese Workers1 
and Peasants' Red Army, n.d. SSC 16.
2 "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa ta-kang", (Consti­
tutional Outline of the Chinese Soviet Republic), Hung Ch'i Ohou-pao» 
Ho. 25, (December 1931), pp. 2-7.
5 CRBRD, p. 814.
4 Hsiang Ying, speaking on the constitutional situation to the 
Second Soviet Congress in January 1934 did not mention the existence 
of a fuller constitution other than the outline passed in 1931. See 
"Hsiang Ying t'ung-chih kuan-ytt hsien-fa ti pao-kao", (Report of 
Comrade Hsiang Ying on the Constitution), HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 7, 
(February 3, 1934), p. 3.
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be put into practice over the whole of China "after the defeat of 
the imperialists and the Kuomintang'1.1 Currently, a start was being 
made in carrying out the constitutional provisions in the CCP con­
trolled areas.^ According to the outline, the state form of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic was to be a workers and peasants democratic 
dictatorship,^ a transitional form en route to a proletarian dictator­
ship. This was the identical form to that adopted by Lenin' during 
the 1905 revolution in Russia, although circumstances were quite 
different. Lenin's formula was aimed at a coalition government 
of his Social Democrats with the Socialist Revolutionaries, in a 
provisional revolutionary government in which the peasants would 
be represented by their own party.^  (Emphasis mine). In China 
however, both the workers and the peasants were to be represented 
by one party - the Communist Party. Consequently, the Chinese 
Soviet Republic made no claim to being anything but a communist 
party dictatorship.^
In the interval between Congresses, said the Constitution, 
there was to be a Central Executive Committee which would be the 
supreme executive power. The CEC in turn was to appoint a Council
Hsien-fa ta-kang, Preamble.
2 Ibid*
 ^Op.cit., article 1.
^ Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, I960), p. 78.
 ^ In organisation charts, communist sources showed the authority 
of the Congress as stemming directly from the Party. e.g. Lien-yu, 
(Russian Friends), Ho. 7, (Peking), May 21, 1932, p. 6.
Ill
of People’s Commissars-1* as the highest administrative organ of the 
state*^ There may have existed ansren higher hody than the CEG or 
the CPC, for the Resolution on the Question of the Red Army passed 
by the Congress charged the Presidium of the CEO with enforcing the 
provisions of the Resolution*^ The CEO Presidium may have been one 
of the organs specified in the full constitution, which has not 
been found* Official government documents issued after the Congress 
however, were signed by CEC officials, and made no mention of a Presidium, 
so in all probability it was not established at that time.
In the outline, the soviet government pledged itself to free China 
from the "yoke of imperialism", and threatened to nationalise much of 
the property owned by the "imperialists".4 However, it was declared 
that foreign enterprises would be allowed to continue production for 
the present, provided that they complied with all the laws of the 
soviet government.^ As in the constitution of the Soviet Union, 
national minorities were given the right of self-determination* This 
meant, in theory, that they could either choose to join with the 
Chinese Soviet Republic or break away and set up their own state*6
^ Jen-min wei-yttan-hui*
 ^Hsien-fa ta-kang* article 3*
3 Hung-chiln wen-t'i chdeh-i-an, (Re slut ion on the Question of 
the Red Army), November 1931, SSC 16 (Emphasis my own).
4 Hsien-fa ta-kang, article 8 (Banks, railways, factories etc.)
5 Ibid*
 ^Pbid*, article 14.
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(The constitution guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly and 
the press to the worker and peasant labouring masses; spoke in 
favour of democracy for>the workers and peasants and against the 
democracy of the landlords and bourgeoisie, who were to be deprived 
of all political freedom.1 In addition, the outline affirmed that 
the goal of the soviet regime was the liberation of women,2 asserted 
that it would introduce free and universal education for all the 
worker and peasant toiling masses - the progress of the class 
struggle permitting,3 and guaranteed "true” religious freedom,4 
although priests, monies, and other clergy were deprived of the 
right to vote. Finally, in line with international communist policy 
after the Manchurian Incident, the soviet regime expressed its 
desire to form a revolutionary alignment with the world proletariat 
and oppressed nationalities, and proclaimed its loyalty to the 
Soviet Union.5
The Political Programme of the Chinese Soviet Republic, 
adopted by the Soviet Congress, was a general collection of basic 
principles, and was actually listed before the constitutional 
outline in the first proclamation of the CEO.
1 Ibid., article 10.
 ^Ibid., article 11.
 ^Ibid^., article 12.
4 Ibid., article 13.
 ^ I *>!<*• f article 17.
 ^ Ohung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho~kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei- 
y&an-hui pu-kao ti-i hao, (The First Proclamation of the CEC of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic), December 1, 1931; SSC 16, The Political 
Programme can be found in CRBRD, pp. 657-8, and in Wang Chien-min, 
op.cit., pp. 321-2, labelled “Ten Great Political Programmes".
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Unlike the constitutional outline, the political programme 
differs considerably with its counterpart from the Li Li-san period* 
The major distinction between the two was on agrarian policy* The 
1930 Li Li-san document prohibited the buying and selling, and leasing 
of land, as well as the mortgage system* It also urged the 
nationalisation of land. This policy was denounced later by many 
Comintern directives. The Programme passed by the 1931 Congress 
reflected the views of those directives and permitted what would
p
have been forbidden by Li Li-san. The 1931 Programme, although 
it urged the confiscation of the land of the feudal landlords, rich 
gentry and other groups, did not however call for the confiscation 
of the land of the rich peasant, a demand which was included in 
the 1930 document, as well as in both the draft and final Land Laws 
of the 1931 Congress .
Other differences included the permitting of private enter­
prise and free trade by the 1931 programme,-5 a right which was not 
guaranteed in 1930; no provision for the right of assembly, speech 
and strike action, such as was contained in the 1 9 3 0  d o c u m e n t ; 4 and 
some elaboration in 1 931 of the "foreign policy" of the new state.^
Por example, the Comintern letter received by the CCP on 
November 16, 1930 (SSC 12), and the July 1931 letter of the ECCI 
Presidium to the CCP, (SSC 15).
\ Qhung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chang-kang, (1931), article 6*
^Article 9? (l93l)*
4 Article 6, (1930).
5 Article 10. (1931).
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The Labour Law passed by the First National Soviet Congress*1* 
was in substance the same as the Draft Labour Lay/ circulated 
earlier*2 The Draft Law itself was almost identical in its major 
provisions with those included in the Comintern directive of 
July 1931, and with those of the Labour Protection Law put forward, 
in 1930 by Li Li-san. In turn, this drew on the Political Programme 
adopted by the May 1930 Conference of Delegates, which was directly 
linked to the Ten Great Demands passed by the CCPfs Sixth Congress 
held in Moscow in 1928.^
The final Labour Law was fuller than its draft, and stipulated 
that it covered all wage earners in factories, workshops and other 
productive enterprises as well as governmental, co-operative and 
private institutions* The other provisions added to the draft law 
in general increased the benefits and advantages to the workers*
For example, the final Law specified that tools were to be provided 
without cost to the worker,4 and free housing was to be made availa­
ble to him.^ Neither provision can be found in the draft law* He 
was also to get one more day!s holiday - on March 18, the anniversary 
of the Paris Commune - than originally laid down.^ Trade Unions
1 Lao-tung fa, CRBRD, pp. 1341-56.
2 Ch'ilan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tis’u tai-piao ta-hui tsfao-an, op .cit *, 
pp* 15-25. Some differences are discussed in Hsiao Tso-liang, I,
op .cit., pp. 181-2.
3 For the Ten Great Demands, see Documentary History, p. 132.
^ Lao-tung fa, article 52.
5 Ibid*, article 53.
 ^Ibid•» article 21.
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also acquired benefits under the new law that were not included 
1in its draft*
The Labour Law was clearly designed with an industrial prole-
2
tariat in mind* It provided for trade unions, collective bar­
gaining,^ an eight-hour working day (less for minors),4 two weeks' 
holiday a year on full pay, a minimum wage, and a social insurance 
fund contributed to only by the employer, which would provide sick
7
benefits, old age pensions etc* The final clause stated that
the Labour Law did not apply to non-contiguous soviet areas, whose
ftlocal governments could make their own Labour Laws.
Clearly this Labour Law could not be implemented in a backward 
economic area, made up largely of peasants, whose only "industry" 
was agriculture and whose only "workers" were handicraft workers 
and village artisans* No doubt it was passed in the hopes of 
soon capturing "one or more key administrative or industrial centres", 
but as this never happened, what value it had must have remained 
purely on the level of propaganda.
^ Ibijd., articles 63 & 64.
2 Ibid., article 6.
 ^Ibid*, articles 10-13.
^Ibid *, articles 14-15*
 ^Ibid.* article 20.
 ^Ibid*, article 25•
 ^Ibid*, articles 68-71*
8 Ibid., article 75*
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As was seen, in the discussion on the Political Programme, the 
Land Law passed by the First Congress was the law that differed most 
from its predecessors of the Li Li-san period. The Provisional Land 
Law passed by the May 1930 Conference of delegates from the soviet areas 
prohibited the buying, selling and leasing of land; condemned the 
"mortgage11 system; and advocated collectivisation of land.-L
These policies passed by the 1930 Conference were condemned as 
premature in the 'Comintern directive of July 23, 1930, with the con­
sequence that the Provisional Land Law was revised by the Central 
Preparatory Committee in time for its September 12, 1930 meeting*
The offending passages of the May law were removed, although one
*
secondary source reports that in the first draft of the 1931 Land Law 
there was still a clause permitting voluntary collectivisation.2 
The Land Law passed by the Congress spoke approvingly of the 
nationalisation of land, but said the putting into practice of the 
measure would have to await the victory of the land revolution in 
important regions of China, and have the support of the peasants. 
However, said the Law, the Soviet government at the present time should 
explain the advantages of land nationalisation to the peasantry.^
 ^In CRBRD, pp. 918-921. "Mortgage" is the usual translation of 
the Chinese term "tien-ya". In fact, the tien system, in which a peasant 
makes over the title deeds of his land to a landowner in return for a 
loan, differs considerably from the Y^estern mortgage system, mainly in 
the rights of conditional ownership granted by the peasant to the 
landlord.
2 REtechina, (Moscow: 1934), p. 621. Quoted in Documentary 
History, p. 218.
‘ 5 Ohung-hua su-wei-ai. kun^-ho-kuo, t 'u-1i_ fa, (Land Law of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic), December 1, 1931, Article 12* SSC 18. The 
translations of the Law in Documentary History, pp. 224-226-, and in 
Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, (London: Martin 
Lawrence Ltd.,1934), pp. 24-27, both contain only seven clauses, 
whereas the actual law has 14.
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Following the correct anti-Li Li-san line, the Land Law also 
permitted the leasing, and buying and selling of land, but cautioned 
that the rich peasants and landlords were not to be allowed to buy
•i
bach their confiscated land. Abolition of the tien system was 
covered by article 9.
The Land Law when finally passed was drawn from Comintern 
directives -for example the Draft Resolution on the Land and
p
Peasant Problem in the Soviet Areas of November 1930, and the
letter of the ECGI Presidium to the CCP of July 1931*
The aim of the Land Law was to correct the policy of land
reform in the soviet areas during 1930 and 1931 which had proved
to be ineffective. Xn many places, the landlords and rich peasants, 
by pretending to support soviet policies, managed either to retain 
control of their land, or to be in a position to implement the land 
reform policy, which meant that they either escaped expropriation 
completely, or redistributed the best land to themselves. The 
poor peasants got no land or poor land, and their continued requests 
for land caused repeated redistributions, which resulted in reduced 
crops.^
** Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo t'u-ti fa. (1931), article 12.
p
Su-wei-ai ch'il-yd t1 u-ti nung-min wen-tTi i-chfieh-an tsfao-an, 
Hsiao, II, op.cit., pp. 195-7*
fi£techina, part III, passim, quoted in Documentary History, 
p. 219. Also, Pavel Mif, China's struggle for freedom, (London; 
Modern Books Ltd., n.d.), p. 76.
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fhe 193 1  land Law therefore confiscated the land of all the 
feudal landowners, landlords, rich gentry, militarists and bureau- 
crats without compensation - their land to be given to the poor, 
middle and hired peasants.1 Q?he land belonging to ancestral shrines 
and temples was to be confiscated, but with the support of the
p
peasants,so as not to offend their religious feelings. fhe land of 
the rich peasant was also to be confiscated, but unlike the land­
lords and gentry etc., he was entitled to 3eceive some ’'comparatively 
poor" land in the subsequent redistribution, providing that he 
cultivated it with his own labour power.^ fhe confiscated land was 
to be distributed according to the principle of equal distribution,4 
although the law protected the interests of the middle peasants by 
allowing them not to participate in the operation of this principle 
if the majority of them were unwilling.5 However, local soviets 
were to select the principle most advantageous, under their local 
conditions, to the interests of the poor, middle and hired peasants, 
and were to give out the land using a mixed principle of the total 
number of people in a family and the number of persons capable of 
working in each family. Or alternatively, in areas where the poor, 
middle and hired peasants received land on the principle of equal 
distribution according to the number of people in the family, every 
person capable of working in a rich peasant family was to receive 
as much land as every consumer in the family of a poor, middle or
1 Q?’u-ti fa, article 1.
2 Ibid., article 6.
 ^Ibid., article 3*




This article clearly hit at the rich peasants, who sought to 
have the land distributed according to the productive implements 
possessed^ - a measure that would have gained them land at the 
expense of the poorer peasant classes.
In addition to land, all the fixed and moveable property, 
houses, granaries, cattle and farm implements of the feudal militarists, 
rich gentry and landlords was to be confiscated* After distributing 
the land, the rich peasants’ surplus houses, farm implements, cattle, 
water mills and oil presses were also to be confiscated* The con­
fiscated houses were to be distributed partly to the poor and middle 
peasants who had no homes, and partly made into schools and clubs 
for the use of local soviets, Party and Youth Corps committees, 
trade unions etc*
The confiscated cattle and farm implements were either to be 
distributed to the poor and middle peasants or, if peasant opinion 
was favourable, rudimentary cooperatives could be f o r m e d .4
1 I M A  * i article 7 (emphasis my own). This was in line with the
Comintern directive of November 1930, which pointed out that rich
peasants often had big families, with several generations living 
together, and that it was therefore preferable to distribute land
to them using the criterion of labour power. (Hsiao, II, op*cit* * p. 196)
2 Ibid*, article 7*
 ^Ibijd., article 8*
4 Ibid.
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The law staled that where land had already been distributed
in the soviet areas in accordance with the principles laid down,
then it must- not be re-distributed* However, where it had been
distributed in accordance with principles not corresponding to
1those in the law, then it must be re-distributed.
Special provisions were made in the law for Red Army men, who 
were each to be given a plot of land. Arrangements were to be made 
by the local soviet for it to be cultivated in their absence.^
It is now time to consider the significance of the differences 
between the draft land Law introduced by the CC of the Party, and 
the final Land Law passed by the Congress. Article 5 of the final 
law protected the interests of the middle peasants more than the 
draft by allowing them to opt out of the land reform under the 
principle of equal distribution if a majority of them so desired.
This addition to the draft law was in harmony with the Comintern 
July letter which urged the CCP to obtain the agreement of the middle 
peasants before carrying out land distribution, and stressed the 
need to consolidate the alliance between the proletariat and the 
poor and middle peasants.*^
Articles 7 and 8 of the final law were different from their 
counterparts in the draft law, and the changes reflected differences 
in land reform with respect to the rich peasants. Both the draft 
and final laws were in agreement that the rich peasants1 land
n
Ibid*, article 14.
2 Ibid *, article 2.
** OP *oit., article 27.
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should be confiscated, and that when it was distributed, he should 
receive a share, although not land of the best quality. With 
regard to the criteria for distribution however, article 7 of the 
draft law stipulated that a mixed principle was to be applied, so 
that land was to be divided among families partially according to 
the total number of people in the family, and partially according 
to the number of people in the family capable of working. Article
7 of the final law repeats this, but then adds that an alternative 
principle could be adopted - that the poor, middle and hired peasants 
could receive land according to the number of people in their 
families, while the rich peasants would receive land according to 
the number of people in the family who had the ability to work*
Shis new principle were detrimental to the interests of the rich 
peasants, for it implied that in the hypothetical case of a poor 
peasant family of five, made up of two adults and three young 
children, that they would receive five units of land, whereas an 
identical rich peasant family would receive only two units (and those 
would be of poor quality). Although the draft land law stipulated 
that the mixed principle of land distribution was to be implemented 
by local soviets in the way that would be most advantageous to the 
poor and middle peasants, it is clear that the additional criterion 
included in the final law made more specific and concrete the dis­
crimination against the rich peasants, The changes made in article
8 confirm this, for while the draft law ordered the confiscation 
of the rich peasants' surplus farm implements and cattle, the 
final law adds to these two items the confiscation of their surplus
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houses, water mills and oil presses*-^ -
The principle of land distribution enunciated by Mao in his 
February 7 (1930) land Law of "draw on the plentiful to make up 
for the scarce" and "draw on the fat to make up for the lean", appears 
in neither the draft nor final 1931 Land Law. This principle was 
attacked as a "rich peasant line" by the Returned Student group, 
for example by the September 1 directive letter, and at the First 
Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas* However, it cannot 
necessarily be concluded from this omission that the law was passed 
against the opposition of Mao. H© may very well have changed his 
mind on the operation of this principle, which was in fact referred 
to in the February 7 Law as "striking a blow at the rich peasant".2 
Although the text of the final land law certainly discriminated 
more against the rich peasant than the February 7 law, under both 
laws his land was to be confiscated.
Rue, op.cit., pp. 249-250 has mis-read these two articles, 
which leads him to interpret the changes in the law as being 
beneficial to the rich peasants.
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 357* According to one account, 
at a meeting of the Central Bureau before the Party Congress, Mao 
defended his land policies on the grounds that they were "only 
temporary measures to meet a wartime situation, and not an implemen- 
tation of the rich peasant line". Bee Warren Kuo, "The CCP after 
Japanese Invasion of Manchuria (Part 2)", Issues and Studies.
Vol. Ill, Ho. 7, (April 1967), p. 38.
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The Returned Student group attacked not only the text of the 
February 7 law, but also the way that the "draw on the plentiful..." 
principle apparently worked out in practice to the interests of the 
rich peasant in the soviet areas.**- Given the radical land policies 
carried out by Mao in earlier years on Chingkangshan, he possibly 
concurred in some of their opinions, thus explaining the differences 
between the texts of the draft and final 1931 land Laws.
The resolution on the Red Army that was adopted by the Congress 
dealt essentially with questions of military administration, and 
did not concern itself with matters of strategy or tactics.2 The 
resolution as passed was identical to that of the Draft Resolution 
proposed earlier by the Party, with the addition of a section 
dealing with special privileges to be granted to fighters in the 
Red Army.^
One of the main proposals of the Resolution was to establish 
a Revolutionary Military Council (ko-ming chttn-shih wei-yflan-hui) 
to .centralise the leadership of the Red Army.^
The Resolution urged an increase in Red A m y  recruitment, 
particularly among "revolutionary workers" and agricultural labourers.
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 508.
 ^Hung-chttn wen-t*i ohtleh-i-an_. (Resolution on the Question of 
the Red Army), November 1931» SSC 16.
3 Chl&an-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, 
pp. 1-7, SSC 16.
_ 4 Hung-ofrttn wen-t'i ohtteh-i-aru article 1. The Hesolution gives 
the impression that the RMC was a newly created body, but other 
documents show that it was operating at least as early as April 1931.
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This, together with the strengthening of Communist Party organisa­
tions in the Red Army, would ensure proletarian leadership.1 The 
leading military and political positions in the Red Army were to 
go to workers, agricultural labourers, poor peasants and revolutionary 
fighters of proven loyalty.^
The special privileges extended to Red Army men included 
grants of land when land reform was carried out; provision for the 
cultivating of this land during their absence; and help for the 
families of Red Army men away fighting.^ in addition, soldiers 
were exempt from taxes, their families lived rent free (if they 
lived in a house belonging to the state), and bought goods at 
reduced prices, as well as having priority treatment in the supply 
of scarce commodities.^ Pensions and disability benefits were 
provided for."* Article 18 however, specified that the wife of a 
Red Army man could obtain a divorce only with the consent of her 
husband, a rule which put the Red Army man on a different basis 
to that of the rest of the soviet population, for the Marriage Laws
1 Ibid., article 2.
 ^Ibid., article 4.
5 Ibid., articles 1-5• These articles are to be found separate 
from the main Resolution* They are on SSC 8. Hung-chdn yu-tai t fiao~ 
li (Regulations on special privileges for Red Army menj, passed by 
the Pirst Rational Soviet Congress; printed by Central Revolutionary 
Military Council Pol* Dept., December 1, 1951*
4 Ibid., articles 6-8.
 ^Ibid., articles 12-14.
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passed by the Soviet Congress specified that a divorce could be 
obtained either by mutual consent or at the firm demand of either 
one of the two parties.
Another resolution of major importance passed by the Congress 
was that on economic policy.2 hike most of the resolutions, it 
was virtually identical to its draft introduced earlier by the 
Party.^ fhe draft, in turn, borrowed heavily from the Li Li~san 
Political Programme passed at the May 1950 Conference of Delegates.
fhe resolution stated that the soviet government would nationalise 
all the key enterprises of the imperialists, though unlike the 1930 
Programme, if the imperialists concluded contracts with the soviet 
government that included the enforcement of the soviet government's 
Labour Law, then they would be allowed to continue production.4 
Industries belonging to the Chinese were not to be nationalised
Qfoung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung«yang cheng-fu pan~pu: 
hun-yin t1iao-li, (Marriage Regulations promulgated by the Central 
Government of the Chinese Soviet Kepublic), (December 1931), article 9. 
SSC 6.
2 Chung-hua su-wei~ai kung-ho-kuo ohing-chi cheng-ts'e. (Economic 
Policies of the Chinese SovietRepublic), (December l7 1931), SSC 11. 
Por some reason, Hsiao, I, op.cit.» p. 184, says that this resolution 
is not available. (it can also be located in Wang^ Chien-min, op.cit., 
pp. 373-375, in an abbreviated form).
 ^Ohing-chi cheng-ts!e tsfao-an, (Draft Resolution on Economic 
Policy), printed in Ch'ttan-kuo su-wei-ai ti-i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui 
ts'ao-an, pp. 27-30, SSC 16. One phrase has been added to the final 
resolution, Part 3, Article 1, which however, does not alter the 
meaning.
^ Phung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ching-ohi cheng-ts'e. Section 1,
Article 1.
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but were to be run by the workers - ownership remaining with the 
c a p i t a l i s t O n  the one hand, freedom of trade was guaranteed, 
but on the other hand, the government proposed to combat specula­
tion, inflation and monopoly prices, and to fix maximum prices
2m  emergencies*c
Consumer co-operatives were to be encouraged by the government,^ 
and the old system of taxation was to be replaced by a single pro­
gressive tax.^ In order to develop the economy, a workers' and 
peasants' bank was to be set up, which would give credit to the 
peasants, to industry and to the Co-ops*  ^ Little was said about 
economic policy towards agriculture, presumably because this field 
was covered by the Land Law.
A further major resolution passed by the Congress was a series 
of regulations concerning the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.6 
Of all the drafts introduced prior to the Congress by the Party CC, 
the difference between this draft and its final product is greater 
than that between any other law or resolution*7 The organisational
Ibid*, Section 1, Article 2.
2 Ibid* * Section 2, Article 1*
 ^Ibid., Section 2, Article 3.
4 Ibid*, Section 3, Article 1.
 ^Ibid* * Section 3, Article 4*
6 Kung-nung chien-ch'a-pu tsu-chih t'iao-li, (Organisational 
Regulations of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate), passed by the 
Pirst Rational Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic, (November 
1931), SSC 10.
Kung-nung chien-ch'a-ch'u ti tsu-chih hsi-t'ung yd .jen-wu 
ts'ao-an, (Draft Resolution on the Organisational Structure and [Casks 
of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate), in Ch'dan-kuo su-wei-ai ti- 
i-tz'u tai-piao ta-hui ts'ao-an, pp. 31-36, SSC 16,
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system of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate (WPI) as defined 
in the final resolution was more formalised than that of the 
draft. It provided for a system of WPI*s from the central 
level down to chl-d and shih soviets, each level under the con­
trol of the respective soviet Executive Committee, and at the 
same time receiving orders from higher level WPI organs
Duties of the WPI included the supervision of state 
enterprises and organs, supervising the implementation of the 
labour and land laws etc., supervision of soviet organs and 
economic policy, and the referring of criminal acts such as 
bribery and corruption to the courts for action.^ These tasks 
were in substance the same as laid down in the draft resolution 
except that the draft specifically included the preparation 
and conduct of soviet elections.5 The draft explicitly stated 
that the Inspectorate was not to interfere in the internal affairs 
of the Party or the Red Army,4 a demand which was left implicit 
in the final version. The draft version also referred to the 
fact that during land distribution, the poor and hired peasants 
often received poor quality land, while the rich peasants, occupy­
ing the soviet organs, retained property and good quality land 
for themselves.^ The WPI was charged with rectifying this 
situation. In the final law, these items were implicitly
d Tsu-chih t'iao-li, articles 1-3.
2 Ibid., articles 5*-6.
 ^Ts^o-an. article 2.
^ Ibid.» article 3.
 ^ Ibid.. article 5*
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subsumed under the heading of implementing the land law.
In order to facilitate the work of inspecting state organs
and economic enterprises, the final resolution provided for the
establishment of specialist committees (such as a land distribution
inspection committee) of 3-5 members.1 The results of the inspection,
and the committees1 proposals, were to be reported to the personnel
of the enterprises for discussion, and the proposals were to be
2enforced by the local soviet. Whereas these methods were provided 
for in the draft resolution, the final resolution also spoke of 
establishing commando units to suddenly inspect state organs and 
enterprises, as it was easier in this way to discover corrupt elements 
and bureaucratism.^ Both the draft and final resolutions mentioned 
the need for proposals to be made by the WPI to the inspected enter­
prises' personnel meeting, in order to rectify errors and defects in 
work that had been disclosed by the inspection. Both resolutions
also provided for legal proceedings in cases of violation of the
laws. The final resolution however, also referred to the establishing 
of 'inass courts" to deal with "cases not involving acts violating the 
law". These courts would have the power to dismiss work personnel 
and publicly announce the facts of corruption*^ No such article was 
included in the draft law.
The draft law did make explicit the close connection between the
^ Tsu-chih t'iao-li, article 6.
2 Ibid., article 8.
3 Ibid., article 11.
 ^Ibid., article 12.
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WPI (a government organ) and the Party. The draft specified close links 
between the WPI and the Party's inspection committee, and said that 
although the two organs were completely independent, the Party's 
inspection committee personnel were all members of theWPI, and partici­
pated in its work. The draft stated that this connection had proved 
absolutely necessary.1 This article in the draft was not included in the 
final resolution, but there is1 no reason to suppose that close links 
between the Party and the WPI were not established after the latters1 
creation in November 1931, and that the WPI therefore became an organ 
for the Party supervision and control of soviet organs.
At the first plenary session of the CEO, held on November 27, new 
regulations were announced concerning the demarcation of administrative 
areas and the organisation of local soviet regimes, as well as a set 
of electoral procedures. As these were a fairly complex series of 
regulations, they must have been under consideration for some time 
and were undoubtedly discussed at the Congress. These regulations 
were generally designed to rectify the deficiencies of the previous 
system, to create a more permanent and organised administrative 
system, so as to bring the regime into closer connection with 
the masses and facilitate control of the people in the soviet areas.
As Hsiang Ting wrote in a Red China editorial, the various local 
soviet governments were not very well established and "had still not 
got rid of the provisional regime form and made progress towards a 
formal regime system".2 Hsiang Ying went on to say that "if we do
1 Ts'ao-an, article 8.
2 Hsiang Ying, HSCH, No. 2, p. 1.
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not have completely healthy local soviets, then we are not able to, 
consolidate the basis of the Chinese Soviet Republic* If we do not 
have local regimes with a strong work capacity, then we are not 
able to fully put into practice all the political programmes of the 
soviets to unite with the countless worker and peasant labouring 
masses, and will not be able to go and strive for the victory of 
the soviets over all China"*-**
According to the CEC, the old system of administrative areas 
in China was more suited to feudal rule than soviet democratic 
centralism* Also, because of wartime conditions, the soviets had 
developed unevenly, some occupying only part of a province, hsien 
or chffl, and some in between several provinces* In addition, the 
original system of administrative areas demarcated by the soviets 
had proved to be too large, (especially at the ch'tl and hsiang 
levels), for administrative convenience. There were also too many 
levels of government so that the transmission of orders took a long
p
time to reach the grass roots* A new system was therefore required*
Basically, the new regulations prescribed that the hsien, ch 
shih,5 and hsiang soviet areas were to be demarcated anew, that the 
tsfun and small group organisations were abolished, and that the hsiang
1 Ibid.
O
Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'tt-ytt 
chan-hsing t'iao-fi, (Temporary Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Re- 
public for the Demarcation of Administrative Areas), printed in Wang 
Chien-min, op*cit*, pp. 328-9; also HSCH, No. 2, p. 4.
 ^Also referred to in contemporary documents as the ch1 eng or 
ch!eng~shih» Shih is used throughout this thesis for the sake of 
consistency.
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*■ Wang Chien-min, op.,cit., p. 328*
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and shih areas were to be the basic level soviets of the regime*-1'
The new hierarchy of soviet organs would therefore be as in Table XII.^
The sphere of jurisdiction of the provincial soviet was to be 
decided by the central government according to the military situation 
and the nature of the terrain* The jurisdiction of the hsien soviet 
depended on whether it was in mountainous territory or level land.
In the case of mountain areas, the hsien was to command a maximum 
of 12 ch!iU but this could be increased to 13 in the case of level 
land. The actual hsien soviet organisation was to be established in a 
big market town*^ likewise in the case of the ch*& soviet, in 
mountain areas it was to have jurisdiction^ over a maximum of 9 
hsiang, and its length and breadth was not to exceed 45 li. On 
level land, the maximum number of hsiang to be controlled was not 
stated, but the dimensions of the ch*tt were not to exceed 30 li.
This made it a smaller unit than the old ch*!! area, and therefore, 
easier for the soviet organisations to implement their policies.
Each ch *& was to have an economic centre, such as a market town, 
to fraction as an administrative centre*4 The jurisdiction of hsiang 
soviets in mountain areas was not to exceed a length and breadth of 
15 li, with a total population of not more than 3,000. On level 
land the optimum length and breadth was 5 li, although this could 
be increased up to 10 31,^ with a maximum papulation of 5j000* When 
redefining the jurisdiction of the hsiang, local soviets were warned
1 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 328-9.
2 On the previous page.
5 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.
4 Ibid.
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1to use the principle of nnot changing the old field division units", 
disorder to avoid generating disputes among the m a s s e s " .  ^ for shih 
soviets, besides the area of the city, neighbouring areas up to 2 li 
from the city's circumference could participate
The regulations also stated that while the original names of 
the old ares could be retained, very feudal names should be changed - 
either by adopting the name of a market town in the area, or the 
name of a "suitable great struggle incident" or great revolutionary 
leader#4 The names had to be approved by the provincial soviet and 
registered with the central government#5
The kind of soviet organisation that was to be established on 
this administrative base was as follows: as usual, each lower level 
soviet sent delegates to form the next higher level soviets* 
delegate conference, from the hsiang and shih up to the provincial 
and central levels# The “organisation of the provincial, hsien, 
and ch'tl level soviets were the same. (Central soviet organisa­
tion will be dealt with later in the chapter.) Each of these three 
levels' delegate conferences elected an Executive Committee, which 
in turn elected a Presidium and a chairman of the Presidium. Under-
^ * PP* 328-9.
2 Hsiang Ying, loc.cit.
 ^Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.
4 Por example the renaming of Hingtu hsien as P'o-sheng hsien 
after Chao P'o-sheng, a leader of the Hingtu Uprising. See HSCH,
Ho. 47, (January 14, 1933)* P* 1. Kunglueh county was named after 
Huang Kung-lueh, Commander of the Third Army Corps of the Red Army, 
killed there in October 1931, according to Selected Works, I,
p. 152, ft. 3.
5 Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 329.
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neath the Presidium were set up various departments for land, 
finance, labour, military affairs, culture, health etc. In the 
case of the province, the Executive Committee (EC) was to hold a 
plenary session at least every four months - every two months in 
the case of the hsien, and every month for the ch1 tl. The number 
of personnel controlling expenditure at the provincial level was 
not to exceed 90 - 25 at the hsien level, 15 at the ch 'tl level*
In general, from higher to lower levels there was a progressive 
reduction in numbers of delegates, the plenums met more frequently, 
and the delegates had shorter periods of office.
The structure of the basic level soviet organisations, the
shih and hsiang soviets, was different. The shih soviet had a
Presidium, which met once a week, but no EC. There were no
departments (pu) under the Presidium, but various personnel were
allocated to supervise military affairs, labour, cultural affairs 
o
and so forth. The hsiang soviet possessed neither an EC nor a 
Presidium* Instead, the hsiang soviet itself was to be responsible 
for all affairs, with a plenary session convening once every 10 days,
This, and subsequent information on soviet organisation,' is 
drawn from Tir-fang su-wei-ai cheng~fu chan-hsing tsu-chih t'iao'-li,
(Local Soviet Government Temporary Organisation Regulations),
printed in ibid., pp. 341-344.
 ^One source says that sections (k^o) rather than supervisory 
personnel, were responsible for this work. The source also adds 
that a shih soviet plenum was convened every two weeks. See Ho 
Chung-jen, "Ti-erh-tz'u kuo-nei ko-ming chan-cheng shih-ch'i ko-ming 
ken-chu-ti ti chi-ts*eng cheng-ch'tlan chien-she,f, (Basic level 
construction of a political regime in the revolutionary bases during 
the second revolutionary civil war period), Kuang-ming Jih-pao,
(June 27, 1953), p. 5.
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under the guidance of a chairman. (Large hsiang-:- were permitted 
a vice-chairman as well). No sections or departments were provided 
for in the organisational regulations, although provisional committees 
were permitted, for example, during periods when land confiscation 
was in progress, a provisional committee to watch over this could 
be formed. The number of those controlling expenditure was not 
to exceed three.
Finally, the first plenum of the OBC passed a set of detailed
2electoral regulations. The initial step in soviet elections was
for the urban soviets or (in rural areas) district (ch1 tp executive
committees to organise an electoral committee to manage the election
for that area. The same applied to the big cities (if any) and
the large districts, except that these were allowed electoral sub- 
■5
committees.
The fact that the electoral committees were to be formed by 
the soviets rather than elected by the general population meant 
that from the start the election would be controlled by those 
having power over the soviet machinery. Once formed, the electoral 
committee had to compile a list of all those in its district who 
were eligible to vote. Then the total number of voters was to be
1 Ibid., says that the hsiang was allowed provisional and 
ordinary departments.
2 Qhung-hua su-wei-ai fcung-ho-kuo ti hgttan-ohtt hsi-tse,
(Detailed Electoral Regulations of the Chinese Soviet Republic), 
in GRBRD, pp. 814-823.
 ^Ibod., Section 3.
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announced, together with the number of delegates permitted by 
this figure. The list of names of those deprived of electoral 
rights was also to be made public*^*
The actual process of arriving at delegates to attend the 
National Congress was a complicated one, and by its nature virtually 
guaranteed that no-one unacceptable to the Party could be a delegate. 
At the lowest level, election meetings were to be held in the urban 
areas on the basis of each nunit of production'1. In the country­
side, meetings were organised with the village (ts*un), or groups
2
of villages, as the basic unit.
The meeting was to begin as soon as half the total possible 
number of voters was present, and was to elect first the full 
delegates and then the alternates. Election was to be determined
■3J
by a majority vote on a show of hands. The lack of any form of 
secret ballot facilitated official supervision.
At this point, a contradiction arises in the electoral regula­
tions. As already mentioned, article 18 specified that the basic 
electoral unit was to be the ts!un in the rural area, and the 
"production unit" in the towns.4 However, the electoral regulations 
do not specify the ratio of delegates to population to be elected
X
Ibid., Section 4.
 ^Ibid., article 18.
 ^Ibid., articles 28-33.
^ Ibid. (This was reiterated by article 4 of the Constitution.)
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at these meetings, or to which higher level organs the delegates 
were sent. Instead, the regulations, when they refer to the question 
of the number of delegates, initially speak of all-hsiang voters 
conferences which would elect delegates to the hsiang soviets,^
In the rural areas therefore, it would seem that the hsiang (rather 
than the ts fun) Was to be the basic unit. Similarly, in the case 
of the towns, the regulations spoke of all-city (ch!eng~shih) voters 
conferences electing delegates to the urban soviets, thus replacing
p
the production unit as the basis of soviet elections.
One possible solution to this contradiction is that the 
"voters conferences" in fact referred to the ts!un and production 
unit meetings, even though this is never stated explicitly.
Delegates to the hsiang soviet were permitted on a ratio of 
one to every fifty residents of the hsiang. The ratio in the towns 
was one delegate for every two hundred residents. This ratio in 
favour of the peasantry however, was reversed at higher levels.
The hsiang soviets then elected delegates to an all-ch1# soviet 
conference (one delegate to four hundred residents)*^ The ch,jd 
conference then sent delegates to the hsien (one to one thousand
five hundred residents), where they were joined by representatives
/ \ 4“from the city (one to five hundred residents),
1 Ibid., article 34.
 ^Ibid., article 35.
 ^ Ibid., article 36.
4 Ibid., article 37*
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^ke hsien conference duly elected delegates to the provincial 
conference (one delegate to twenty-five thousand rural residents), 
and were joined there by delegates from towns under the direct 
responsibility of the province (one to five thousand residents)
Finally, the provincial conference elected delegates to attend 
the National Soviet Congress (one to fifty thousand rural residents), 
as did cities under the direct responsibility of the Central level 
(one to ten thousand urban residents)•2 In addition, candidate 
delegates were permitted at each level up to one-fifth the number 
of full delegates*^
fhe local papulation of the soviet areas participated in only 
the very first of the series of elections - and from then onwards 
the elections were of delegates voting for other delegates, an 
indirect system which preserved soviet control over the end product, 
while giving the appearance of democracy for all*
It is now appropriate to discuss the way the soviet leaders 
envisaged that this soviet organisation would function - how 
soviet political processes would operate to produce personnel to 
man the soviet structure, and how the structure would operate as 
a two-way transmission belt, delivering., orders from the higher 
levels to the masses, and reflecting information and public opinion 
back to the leadership*
"* Ibid*, article 38*
2 Ibid* * article 39*
 ^Ibid* * article 35 (Appendix).
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In the past (i.e. throughout 1930-1931 up to the time of the 
First Congress) it appeared that many of the hsiang and shih 
soviets had existed in name only, and that few delegate meetings 
had been convened. Hsiang Ying pointed out that "the previous 
reckless concept of re-election and reform must be discarded'1, 
that these processes had to be carried out carefully in order to 
avoid having to repeat the process time and again. In the past, 
the masses had had little or no contact with the various sections 
and departments set up under the ch'tl or hsien, so that now they 
had decided to create the hsiang and shih soviets as the basic 
level organs of the regime, and to structure them as delegate 
conferences rather than have a committee system, so that all the
soviet delegates at these two levels would be responsible directly
2
for all the work to the whole body of voters within the area.
The task of re-structuring was under the command of the various 
provincial governments. Initially, the provincial soviet was to 
call meetings of "responsible personnel" from the hsien and ch*t[ 
levels, to be held at the place where the provincial government 
was sited. Meetings of responsible personnel from the hsiang and 
ts fun levels would follow, under the guidance of the provincial 
soviet.^ The purpose of these meetings was to discuss in detail
1 HSCH, Ho. 2, p. 4.
2 Hsiang Ying, HSCH, Ho. 2, p. 1.
 ^HSCH, Ho. 2, p. 4. (Tsfun here is possibly a misprint for 
ch1 eng or shih).
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the task of soviet construction and how to put it into practice. 
Although the soviet organs were to be constructed from the bottom 
up, supervision and control of this process proceeded from the top 
down, with the hsien commanding the chjii, and the ch commanding 
the hsiang.
Following the discussion meetings, the process of electing 
soviet organs started with the hsiang and shih soviets. The basic 
electoral units at these levels were arranged according to the 
areas where the factory workers lived, and according to where the 
handicraft workers, peasants and urban poor lived. In practice 
this meant that the peasants used the ts'un as the basic unit and 
the workers the hsiang. Some one to two months prior to the actual 
voting, electoral committees, composed of delegates from local 
Party branches, local government and various peoples' organisations, 
were established to prepare for the election. This represented a 
significant intrusion by the Party into local soviet organisation. 
These committees were the means by which the leadership controlled 
the elections and the resulting soviet apparatus. The preparatory 
work of the committees entailed compiling an electoral register 
which listed on a red poster those possessing electoral rights and 
those under 16 years of age and therefore without electoral rights, 
and on a white poster the names of those deprived of electoral 
rights. These posters were to be made public in the areas where
1ibia.
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the elections were to be held, at the same time as propaganda 
for the elections was to be carried out by the committee."**
The electoral committee was also in charge of the vital 
task of drawing up a list of candidates for election. The list 
of candidates for election at the basic levels of the hsiang 
and shih soviets was particularly important, since only at this 
level did the population of the soviet areas (those with the 
right to vote) participate in electing government representatives, 
for all the organs of the higher soviet levels were formed from 
delegates of lower level soviets, with no direct election by the 
people.
The candidate list had to contain at least twice the number 
of people to be elected, and to contain a sufficient number of 
worker and peasant delegates "to guarantee working-class leadership, 
and a strong foundation for the worker-peasant alliance”. It was 
then forwarded to meetings of the members of mass organisations, 
trade unions, poor peasant corps, mutual aid associations, anti­
imperialist alliances, female worker-peasant conferences etc. A 
major task of these meetings was to criticise candidates on the 
list who were known "to care only for their individual lives, who 
were inactive in work, or had a bureaucratic style of work". These 
people had a note made under their names, so that "the electors, 
before participating in the election meeting, have previous
Ho Ohung-jen, loc.cit.
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preparation as to whether they should or should not elect certain 
men", When the electoral meeting was convened, the electoral 
committee was to report on electoral work, then the responsible 
members of the hsiang and shih would report on government work, 
followed by statements from higher level government delegates, 
and finally the names on the candidates list would be voted on 
one at a time.
In this way the leaders of the regime hoped to absorb a 
large number of activists into local soviet work at all levels 
of the government. Do summarise Hsiang Ying, this was the basic 
work of local soviet construction, and soviet work personnel had 
to devote great effort and time to it as well as making the broad 
masses understand it, and enthusiastically support and participate 
in it, for only then could the soviet base be really established, 
so as to allow the re-election of the ch1# , hsien and provincial
soviets.5
Having been established, the hsiang and shih soviets became 
the basic units of the administrative organisation of the regime, 
through which all policies, laws and decisions were transmitted to
*■ Ibid. (No mention was made in this article, of the existence 
of rich peasant elements in the soviet organs, which was one of the 
major criticisms of soviet administration made in the September 1 





the people, and by which the people were mobilised to carry out 
these policies. Organisationally, in order to foster a close 
relationship between government and people, the hsiang or shih 
soviet was divided up so that each soviet delegate was responsible 
for a neighbourhood of 30-70 residents* These delegates were to 
work at the ts *un and street level "paying attention and listening 
carefully to the criticisms of the masses, and suggestions con­
cerning government work, without delay understanding the masses1 
difficulties and demands, so as to guarantee the coordination of 
all work and the masses practical interests."^ At this level 
therefore, the soviet representative." would be in constant personal 
contact with the residents within his small a^ ea., able to draw 
them into political life and break down some of the localist 
barriers of loyalty to units lower than the state, such as family 
or village, that hampered the execution of soviet policies.
For every 3-7 delegates, there was elected one chief delegate, 
whose task it was to distribute work to the other delegates, and 
transmit to them the decisions of the hsiang and shih soviet presidia. 
The chief delegate was also in charge of convening a voters 
meeting to examine work and solve practical problems concerning 
his area. This was in addition to the regular meetings of all the 
voters (once a month) and plenary sessions of the soviets (every 
10 days to two weeks) which also summarised work progress. The
1 Ho Chung-jen, loc.cit.
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masses directly concerned in a particular problem being discussed 
were invited to join in the plenary session.**- This exposition 
shows up the basic characteristic of the hsiang and shih soviets 
as important two-way transmission belts of the soviet regime, 
helping the leaders implement policy, and ascertaining the reactions 
of the population at the same time.
To conclude this section, other laws and resolutions passed 
by the Congress which were either of lesser importance or of purely 
propaganda value, included
(a) Marriage Regulations.
(b) A letter from the Chinese soviet first national congress 
to the workers and labouring masses of China. (November 9, 1931).
(c) Manifesto of the provisional government of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic, (November 7, 1931).^
(d) Resolution on the question of national minorities in 
4China.
1 Ibid.
 ^In Su-wei-ai yen-chiu she, (Soviet Investigation Society), 
(Shanghai: China Bookstore, 1932), pp. 1-6.
Ibid., pp. 6-8. According to Wang Chien-min, op.cit., it can 
also be found in Hung Ch1i Chou-pao, No. 24, (November 27, 193l); Wang 
has an abridged version on p. 289. The fact that this was addressed 
to "the toilers and governments of the whole world" led the Shanghai 
Evening Post & Mercury. (November 10, 1931) to comment on receiving a 
copy that they could not understand why they had been sent one,
"since we toil little and govern not at all".
^ A translation is in Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic, pp. 78-83. This book also contains translations of most 
of the other laws and resolutions, although there are a number of 
errors in translation. The Land Law is considerably abbreviated.
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(e) Telegram to the whole country's revolutionary bodies for 
transmission to all-labouring masses and revolutionary soldiers,
(f) Telegram to the oppressed peoples and proletariat of the 
whole world,
(g) Telegram to the workers of every country, (November 11)•
(h) Telegram on the same day to the American Communist Party 
and Youth Corps.
(i) Telegram on the same day to all China's workers, peasants 
and Red Army soldiers.^
Creation of a Soviet Government
Having passed all the aforementioned decrees, the delegates to 
the Congress set about electing the personnel of the soviet govern­
ment* The first body elected was the Central Executive Committee, 
composed of 63 members* There were no candidate members*2
Among those elected to the Central Executive Committee (CEC) 
were Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, Chang Kuo-t'ao, Ch1en Shao-yH,
(Wang Ming), Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Ch'ti Ch'iu-pai, Jen Pi-shih,
Lin Piao, Liu Shao-ch!i, P feng Teh-huai and Shen Tse-min,^
1 Yfeing Chien-min, op .cit * * p. 290.
2 See Table IV, footnote*
 ^A full list will be found in Table IV*
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T A B L E  IV
ALPHABETICAL LIST OP ALL CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS
ELECTED AT THE PIRST NATIONAL SOVIET CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 19311
41 Chang Hua-hsien 15 Kuan Hsiang-ying
5 Chang Kuo-t’ao 16 K ’ung Ho-chlung
8 Chang Ting-ch * eng 60 Li Tsung-po
49 Chang Yiln-yi 24 Lin Piao
31 Ch’en Cheng-jen 59 Liu Chien-chung
38 Ch'en Pu-ytian 56 Liu Kuang-wan
13 Chfen Shao-yd 29 Liu Shao-ch*i
48 Ch’en Yi 61 Liu Sheng-ydan
25 Ch*en Yd 30 Liu Ta-ch*ao
4 Chou En-lai 47 Lo Ping-hui
50 Chou Yi-li 26 Lo Teng-hsiep.
6 Chu Teh 5 Lu Pu-t * an
7 Ch'd Chfiu-pai 51 Lu Teh-kuang
34 Ch’d Teng-kao 1 Mao Tse-tung
12 Pan Lo-ch’un 37 P feng Kuei
17 Pang Chih-min 14 P ’eng Teh-huai
19 Ho Lung 54 Shao Shih-p fing
42 Ho Shu-heng 20 Shen Tse-min
27 Hsla Hsi 21 T*an Chen-lin
2 Hsiang Ying 9 Teng Pa
46 Hsiao Heng-tfai 28 Teng Tzu-hui
11 Hsd Hsi-ken 45 T * eng Tai-ydan
53 Hsd T1eh-li 23 1Tseng Shan
52 Hu Chdn-ho 33 Ts*ui Ch’i
44 Hu Hai 35 Tuan Teh-ch’ang
22 Huang P’ing 10 Wang Chia-ch’iang
43 Huang Su 62 Wang Yung-sheng
55 Hung TKU-ch!ing 40 Wei Pa-ch’dn
18 Jen Pi-shih 58 Wu Chih-min
63 Juan Hsiao-hsien 57 Yd Han-chao
36 Ko Yao-shan 32 Ydan Teh-sheng
39 Ku Ta-tsfun
*■ This list is taken from an original copy of the Chung-hua 
su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-ydan-hui pu~kao, 
ti-i-haol (Anno\mcement No 7 1 of the Central Executive Committee 
of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated December 1, 1931 - on SSC 16 
also printed in HSCH, No. 1, (December 11, 1931)? P* 2. The 
numbers represent the order that the names were listed on the 
Announcement and possibly indicate the relative number of votes 
received. (Also in CRBRD, pp* 650-651*)
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The CEC was to be the highest political organ of the Chinese 
soviet government when the National Congress was not in session.
On November 27 the CEC had its first meeting and elected Mao Tse- 
tung as Chairman.*** By virtue of this post, Mao became Chairman 
of the Chinese Soviet Republic, a post which he was to hold until 
the collapse of the Republic in October 1934. Hsiang Ying and 
Chang Kuo-t*ao were elected as Vice-Chairmen.2
On the same day, the CEC also elected a Council of People*s
(or cabinet) as the central administrative organ of the 
Its membership composition was as follows:
Wang Chia-chfing Foreign Affairs
Ghu Teh Military Affairs
Hsiang Ying Labour Affairs
Teng Tzu-hui Financial Affairs
Chang Ting-ch1 eng Land
Ch!tt Ch*iu«pai Ediacation
Chou Yi-li^ Internal Affairs
Chang Kuo-t*ao Judicial Affairs
As with the CEC, Mao was elected Chairman of the CPC, with 
Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-tfao as Vice-Chairmen.^
^ Ibid.
2 Ibid.
 ^Not Chou Yi-su as stated in Jerome Chfen, op.cit., p. 172, ft. 58.




In addition to these eight commissariats, there was also set 
up a Workers1 and Peasants1 Inspectorate, which was not directly- 
controlled by the CPC, although its head, Ho Shu-heng, was a 
Commissar like the other heads of departments* Unlike the other 
departments, this one was set up as the result of a resolution 
introduced, like the other Congress resolutions, in the draft 
resolutions proposed by the Party1s Central Committee, which 
was adopted by the Congress* Finally, under the CPC there was 
set up a State Political Security Bureau, with Teng Fa as its head.
In order to analyse the eridence offered by the proceedings
of the First National Soviet Congress on the inner-Party struggle
existing in the CCP at the time, it is necessary initially to return
to the policies adopted by the Congress. The origins of these
resolutions and laws have been traced back, in the main, to the
1928-1930 period between the Sixth Congress of the CCP and the
fall of Li Li-san. It is clear therefore that the impact in the
field of policy of the Fourth Plenum and the Returned Student
leadership should not be over-estimated. However, a considerable
divergence of opinion can be discerned between the Returned Students,
and Mao and his followers in the soviet areas. Writing some years
after the event, the Maoist leadership strongly criticised the
leadership of the Returned Students for the period from the Fourth
Plenum of the Central Committee (January 1931) to the Tsunyi
1Conference of January 1935? held on the Long March,
RCQHP, op. cit *, Selected Works« III, pp. 177-225.
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Mao*s general thesis is that the Returned Students applied an 
"incorrect" line, particularly with respect to military policy 
and policy towards the peasants. In the military sphere, because 
the central leadership "greatly exaggerated both the current crisis 
of the ICuomintang regime and the growth of the revolutionary 
forces...it once again put forward many adventurist proposals,
■l
such as the seizure of key cities by the Red Army..." Further­
more, the Returned Student exponents of the "Third left line"^ 
underestimated the importance of peasant guerrilla warfare and 
rural base areas, and "were for ever dreaming that the struggle of 
the workers and the other masses in the cities would suddenly*.* 
erupt into armed insurrections in key cities"and "they did not 
realise that they had to adapt themselves to dispersed rural 
areas and to protracted guerrilla warfare...
According to the account of a Mr. Chen Jan, who was present in 
the Kiangsi area during the period, the Central Committee favoured 
a skilled Red Army, capable of large-scale operations, and the 
imitation of Soviet experience with political commisars, and mobile 
and positional warfare. Mao opposed these ideas as "bookish Marxism 
leninism unsuitable for combat and Soviet military experiences
Ibid., p. 189.
 ^A term used by the Maoist leadership to describe the policies 
of the Returned Student leadership during the latter*s period of 
dominance. (The first two "left lines" were those of Ch'tl Ch*iu-pai 
1927-8; and li li-san, 1930).
3 Ibid., p. 199.
4 Ibid.. p. 200.
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unadaptable to China", and favoured a peasant guerrilla force
Mao, who opposed "positional warfare and so-called regular
p
warfare, which relied solely on the main forces”, and who favoured 
a reliance on peasant guerrilla warfare, the tactics of which had 
served the Red Army well during the first three of Chiang Kai- 
shek's "Bandit Encirclement" Campaigns of 1930-1931, consequently 
believed in a moderate agrarian policy that would win the support 
of the majority of peasants - support that was vital for a successful 
guerrilla policy. Mao's extremely radical land policies that were 
initially implemented on Chingkangshan had not succeeded in pro­
ducing this peasant support that was needed if the soviet areas 
were to survive.^ The early policy of confiscating the land of all 
the peasants was ameliorated somewhat in April 1929,^ and by Mao's 
land Law of Eebruary 1930.5 This, together with other "rightist 
errors", was the basis of the "rich peasant line" which was attacked 
by the Returned Student leadership as being "the main danger in the 
Party at present".0
1 Warren Kuo, Issues and Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 8, p. 45.
 ^Ibid-., p. 2071 Also see his "Problems of Strategy in China's 
Revolutionary War", (1936), Selected Works, I, pp. 239-244.
3 See Schram, Mao Tse-tungf pp. 130-131; Selected Works, I, p. 87 
for a translation of' Mao's December 1928 land law on Chingkangshan 
and his later comments, see Rue, op.cit., pp. 111-114.
4 Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 137.
 ^ GRBRD, pp. 912-918; a translation can be found in Rue, op.cit., 
pp. 300-304.
6 RCQHP, pp. 186-187.
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After the Fourth Plenum, which according to Mao ’'played no posi- 
tive or constructive role”, the glaring contrast between the 
successes of Mao and the Red Army in the soviet areas, and the 
waning influence of the Party in the cities, naturally forced the 
new leadership to pay increasing attention to the situation in 
the countryside, and to attempt to put their policies into practice 
there, which led to the inevitable clash with Mao and his supporters.
After the Fourth Plenum the Returned Students sent represen­
tatives to all parts of the country to oppose Mao’s policies*^
However, before the ’’erroneous line” of the new leadership could 
be implemented, the Red Army was victorious in smashing the two 
military campaigns of the Kuomintang (spring and summer 1931) be­
cause of ’’the correct leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung".^
According to Mao, his progressive loss of power was accelerated 
after the Returned Student leaders arrived in Juichin in January 
1933> where they "elbowed aside Mao Tse-tung’s leadership, 
especially his leadership in the Red Army, and imposed and carried 
out their own wrong policies*
1 Ikia*9 P* 187.
2 ibid., p. 188. In addition to sending Hsia Hsi to run the 
Hsiangosi Sub-bureau, Teng Chung-hsia went to the Fukien-Kwangtung 
area, Ts'ai Ho-sen to Kwangtung, and other Returned Student supporters 
to other provinces. (Wang Chien-min, op.cit.. p. 101 )_7
 ^Ibid., p. 189•
4 "From the First to the Seventh Rational Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party", People’s China, No. 18, (September 16, 1956); printed 
in John W. Lewis (ed.j, M^jor Doctrines of Communist China, (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1$64), p. 27* Mao told Edgar Snow in 1936 that "from 
October 1932***I myself devoted my time almost exclusively to work 
with the soviet government, leaving the military command to Chu Teh 
and others"* (Snow, op .cit*» p. 185.) These points will be dealt 
with more fully in the following chapter*
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Mao could well be wrong on the date of the move, but there is 
unfortunately no hard and fast evidence for the date of the transfer 
of the CO - various observers having put it between the summer of 
1931*1* and January 1934*2
Robert North, partly on the evidence of his interview with 
Chang Kuo-t'ao, is in favour of the autumn of 1932 as the probable 
date of the transfer.^ Schwartz also agrees broadly with the 
M1932-1933u period.^ Chang Kuo-t!ao has said that he left for the 
Oyttwan soviet district in April 1931, that Chou En-lai went to 
Juichin in May to organise the National Soviet Congress, and that 
the rest of the CC followed Chou there in August.5 Reminded in 
his interview with Robert North that he had put the date of transfer 
as 1932, Chang said that he had been in error.6
1 Chang Kuo-t’ao interview with Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., p. 161.
2 Li Ang, Hung-se Wu-t1ai, (The Red Stage), (Chungking: 1942),
Chap. XIV* Quoted in Robert C. North, Moscow and Chinese Communists* 
pp. 157-8.
 ^Ibid., p. 158.
4 «Schwartz, op.cit., p. 185.
5
Interview with Lieberman, printed in Charles B. Melane, 
op.cit., p. 38. An eyewitness at the First Congress however, reported 
that Chou did^not arrive until mid-December, after the close of the 
Congress. /  Warren Kuo, "The CCP after Japanese Invasion of 
Manchuria (Part l)n, Issues and Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 6, (March 
1967), p. 49J
Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., p. 162.
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Hsiao Tso-liang also interviewed Kung Chfu, a Red Army officer
during the Kiangsi period, who agreed with Ghang Kuo-t'ao that
the CO had arrived in Kiangsi by the autumn of 1931 •
The probability must not be overlooked that a combination of
dates is possible, based on the assumption that the CC travelled not
as a body, but, for the sake of safety, as individuals, by differing
routes, over a substantial period of time. This is particularly
likely as not all the CC went to the Central Soviet Area. According
to Chang Kuo-t'ao, leading Party figures such as Chou En-lai, Po
ICu (Ch'in Pang-hsien), Lo Pu (Chang Wen-t'ien), went to Kiangsi
(where the central base was), but Jen Pi-shih, Hsia Hsi and Kuan
Hsiang-ying went to Ho Lung's area - the Hsiangosi soviet, with
Ch'en Chang-hao, Shen Tse-min and Chang himself going to the Oyttwan 
2
soviet. A newly formed rump Central Bureau was left in Shanghai 
headed by Liu Shao-ch'i.^
 ^I*>id»» p. 161. It is possible that Kung, a military man, 
could have mistaken the Central Bureau - set up by the CC - for the 
CC itself, but it is inconceivable that Chang Kuo-t'ao, a top Party 
leader, would have made the same mistake* One scholar, John Rue, also 
believes that the CC was present at the First Congress, but he states 
that they then returned to Shanghai, only to transfer permanently to 
the soviet areas in 1932* It is possible, but rather improbable' 
that they .made:.this journey three times. Given the difficulties in 
travelling caused by the KMT, the likelihood is that, if they arrived 
there in 1931, they stayed. See John Rue, op.cit., p*,250& p.,257.
2 Hsiao, I, op.cit., p. 162; North, op.cit., p. 159; Wang 
Chien-min, op.cit♦, p. 101.
 ^Hsiao, ibid. According to Harold Isaacs, "the communist 
nuclei in these cities (of the central and eastemprovinces)... 
narrowed down to shrinking groups of intellectuals, students and a 
tiny handful of workers...(who) performed the function of a 'rear' 
for the peasant forces in the countryside, carrying on agitation 
about their accomplishments and even recruiting workers and intellectuals 
to leave the cities for the distant Red districts." Isaacs, op.cit., 
p. 303. ----
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Yet more evidence is offered by Warren Kuo, provided by an 
eyewitness in Juichin.'*' This is more likely to be correct than 
that of either Kung Ch'u (who was often absent from the soviet
i
capital) or Chang Kuo-t’ao (who was never there at all). Kuo*s i
evidence is to the effect that a large advance contingent of
ranking Party personnel moved to the soviet areas in the summer 
2
of 1931j but that the CC did not transfer formally until a year 
later (October 1932), when Ch’in Pang-hsien, Chang Wen-t’ien and 
Yang Shang-k’un left for Juichin, leaving a new Central Bureau 
behind in Shanghai under Liu-'Shao-ch’i. In January 1933 the CC 
formally began functioning in the soviet areas. While this 
corroborates Mao’s statement, it should be noted that prior to the 
formal establishment of the CC in the soviet areas, large numbers 
of Returned Student supporters, and the bulk of the CC apparatus, 
moved before that time.
In addition to the date of the transfer of the Central Committee 
from Shanghai, there are other problems in this retrospective 
interpretation of the period by the Maoist leadership. Difficulties
Warren Kuo,"The Struggle against the Lo Ming Line in the COP 
(Part i)”, Issues and Studies, Vol. Ill, No. 10, (July 1967), pp. 40-43.
2 The KMT "white terror” was at its height in Shanghai in the 
summer of 1931. The arrest of Noulens and his wife on June 15 ’’destroyed 
for a time the Komintern’s technical apparatus for liaison with the 
communist parties in the Par Bast”, Robert Magnenoz, Prom Confucius 
to Lenin, n.d., (typescript), p. 259.
155
in the analysis of the statement are compounded by conflicts 
between what Mao said at the time (in the 1930*s) and what he 
stated in 1945 •*** Some of these conflicts can be resolved on 
the assumption that Mao, as he progressively lost power in the 
soviet areas, found himself forced to speak under duress, so that 
his public pronouncements may not necessarily reflect his real 
opinions at the time.
However, whether or not Mao occasionally voiced agreement 
with the policies of the Returned Student group, it is clear 
that there was a genuine conflict of views between them. Mao's 
agrarian and military policies were condemned by the September 1 
directive letter of Central to the Soviet Areas, and by the First 
Congress of the Party in the Soviet Areas, whose Political Resolu« 
tion echoed the September 1 letter.2 Even so, the laws and 
resolutions passed by the First Soviet Congress, although introduced 
by the Returned Student group, did not contain proposals to which 
Mao would have taken objection, except possibly in the case of the 
Land Law. (As already mentioned, even in the case of the Land Law,
n
Discussion of some of these discrepancies, e.g. the "Lo,
Ming" line, and the question of the treatment of the Fukien rebels, 
will be left to the next chapter.
2 See also the Hung-chtln wen-t'i ch&eh-i-an (Resolution on the 
Question of the Red Army) adopted by the First Congress of the Party 
in the Soviet Areas; printed by Central Bureau, Soviet Areas; 
(October 1931*) SSC 16. This attacks "guerrilla-ism" in the Red 
Army. Also see Mao's comments on the "correct" line being maligned 
by the Party Congress. (Selected Works, III, p. 190.)
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it is extremely difficult to classify its proposals from the point 
of view of the power struggle in the soviet areas*) In 1931 there­
fore , the Returned Students apparently realised that they were 
unable to prevent Mao from dominating the Congress. This would 
explain the differences between the resolutions of the Party 
Congress and those introduced by the Party to the Soviet Congress* 
However, the Returned Students then went on to consolidate their 
command of the Party organisation and eroded Mao*s support in the 
military and governmental spheres, foreseeing that once having 
usurped Maofs military and governmental power, they would then be 
in a position to convene a Second Congress more favourable to 
themselves. Therefore, Mao and his supporters, at the time of the 
Pirst Congress, did not have control over the Party in the soviet 
areas, but did command the government apparatus, a hypothesis 
which is substantiated by the following analysis of the structure 
and personnel of the government.
An inspection of the organs elected at the Pirst Congress 
shows the pre-eminence of Mao and his supporters. The 63-man Central 
Executive Committee (CEC) contained both T,Maoists,, and members of 
the Returned Student Group, but it is significant that two important 
members of the Party leadership - Po Ku and Lo Pu - failed to win 
places.1 Chfen Shao-yd (Wang Ming) was elected to the CEC, but
1 Schwartz is therefore incorrect in stating that "all the 
CC leaders won positions as members of the CEC of the new govern­
ment11. Op.cit., p. 185.
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whether this was in absentia or not is uncertain*
Although the CEC was theoretically the highest organ of the
government when the National Congress was not in session, the fact
that its membership was made up of men from widely separated
2
soviets, plus representatives present in Shanghai, meant that the 
actual responsibility of government was vested in the smaller 
Council of People’s Commissars (CPC), the regime’s top administra­
tive body, whose members were largely drawn from those provinces 
adjacent to or making up the central soviet area.
According to Jerome Ch’en, ’’none of the commissars of the 
Provisional Soviet Government belonged to Mao’s central soviet 
except Mao himself and perhaps Teng Tzu-hui", a fact which ’’made
manifest the party centre’s efforts to intensify its control over 
%
the soviets". Although the Party centre was undoubtedly trying 
to control the soviets, this statement does not stand up to 
examination.
\
Wang Ming left for Moscow about this time. Chang ICuo-t'ao 
says this was in the winter of 1932 (North interview, Hoover micro­
film), but another source dates his departure as 1933 / China Youth 
News, July 27, 1957; quoted in Who’s Who in Communist China? (Hong 
Kong: Union Research Institute, 1966), P* 79__/. A Russian source 
however, indicates that he was in Moscow in time to address the Profin­
tern at the end of 1931, and if this was the case, it is unlikely that 
he attended the Congress at all. (Charles B. McLane, op.cit. , p. 38, 
ft. 96). This is substantiated by Warren Kuo, who says Wang left 
Shanghai for Moscow in September 1931. Z~" Chinese Communist 6th. CC1s 
4th. Plenum and Party Rift (Part 2)”, Issues & Studies, Vol. Ill,
No. 1, (October 1966), p. 46._/
2 Eor example liu Shao-ch'i, and Ch'd Ch’iu-pai.
•5
Jerome Ch’en, op.cit., p. 172.
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In addition to Mao himself as Chairman of the CPC, Chu Teh,
Teng Tzu~hui, Chang Ting-ch’eng, Ho Shu-heng and Teng Pa could be 
counted as Maoists. Chu Teh had been with Mao since the early 
days on Chingkangshan from 1928, and together they had founded the 
Kiangsi soviet base. Teng Tzu-hui was a graduate of the peasant 
training school jn Canton when Mao had been its Director in the 
mid-1920's. He too had been active in the central soviet district 
as Chairman of a small soviet in Western Pukien from 1930, and as 
a political officer in the Red Army* He worked closely with two 
other CPC members, Chang Ting-ch’eng and Teng Pa. Chang Ting-ch’eng 
was the founder of one of the first soviets in Pukien and chairman 
of the Pukien Provincial Soviet in 1930* Teng Pa was Secretary of 
the Pukien-Kwangtung-Kwangsi Committee of the CCP in 1930 as well 
as Chairman of its Military Sub-committee. He was apparently 
summoned by Mao to Kiangsi to head the State Political Security 
Bureau, being selected for this job because of his loyalty to Mao.^
Ho Shu-heng had a long history of association with Mao, stemming 
back to 1913 when they met the Hunan Pirst Normal School in 
Changsha* In 1918 Ho joined the New Peoples Study Society that 
had been founded by Mao and Ts’ai Ho-sen. The two of them went to
I must thank Mr. William R. Dorrill, Research Analysis Corpora­
tion, for this point. According to Mr. Dorrill, the establishment 
of the Political Security Bureau preceded by some months the creation 
of the central soviet government.
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Shanghai in 1 9 2 1  and were the two Hunan representatives at the 
founding of the GOP that year, Idttle is known about Ghou Yi-li's 
factional sympathies. Possibly he was a Maoist, as he was appointed 
the Chief Editor of the official government newspaper Bed China 
in December 1 9 3 1 Presumably Mao, as head of the government, 
would have appointed someone loyal to himself*
Of the three remaining personalities, Ch1# Chfiu~pai cannot 
be classed as a Maoist, but neither can he be classed as a supporter 
of the Party leadership, since as an adherent of Li Li-san, he had 
been attacked-by the Returned Student leaders at the Fourth Plenum 
and removed from the Politburo or Central Committee at that time*2 
Chang Kuo-t'ao would also have played little part in the power 
struggle in the central soviet area, as he was in the Oyilwan soviet 
area or Szechuan during the whole period, and never visited the central 
districts. Hsiang Ting on the other hand, had been made Secretary of the
Central Bureau by the new Party leadership, and went to the soviet areas
in the summer of 1 9 3 1  to see that the policies of the Fourth Plenum 
were carried out. And Wang Chia-ch1 iang was also a member of the Re­
turned Student leadership who was in Kiangsi for the Congress. Reverthe- 
less, it is clear that Mao and his supporters dominated the chief organ .
of the government,. for out of a total of ten members of the CPC,^
^ HSCH, H o .  2 ,  (December 1 8 ,  1 9 3 1 ) ,  p *  4 *
2 In any case, Ch'il was elected .in absentia* for he remained 
in Shanghai until December 1 9 3 3 *  See Hung Ch*i P'iao-piao* (Red 
Flags Fluttering), Ho, 5 ,  (December 1 5 ,  1 9 5 7 ) " ,  P* 1 0 1 .
5 Eight commissariats, plus the Workers1 and Peasants1 
Inspectorate and the State Political Security Bureau.
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at least five (and probably six) members can be marked as being 
loyal to him, as opposed to two members of the official Party 
leadership•
The same situation prevailed during the actual proceedings 
of the Congress. The body responsible for guiding the major items
on the agenda through the Congress was the Standing Committee of
the Presidium, an ad hoc steering committee.1 Its seven-man 
membership was made up of Hsiang Ying, Chou Yi-li, Tseng Shan, Teng 
Pa, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Ch'en Cheng-jen and Chu Teh.
The same analysis that applied to the CPC applies here. In
addition to the Mao supporters Chu Teh, Chang Ting-ch'eng and 
Teng Fa (and probably Chou Yi-li) can be added Tseng Shan and 
Ch'en Cheng-jen, both of whom were old and trusted supporters of 
Mao in the Kiangsi area. Only Hsiang Ying remained to redress 
the balance.
Control over the organs of the new soviet government was there­
fore vested in the trusted supporters of Mao Tse-tung who had their 
roots in the soviet areas, rather than in the former Shanghai leader­
ship of the Central Committee. Consequently Chang Kuo-t'ao must be 
wrong when he told Robert North that Chou En-lai called the First 
National Soviet Congress and "squeezed Mao out".^
1 Hung Ch'i Ohou-pao» No. 29, (January 15, 1932,) pp. 71-72. See 
also the signatures appended to the land Law (SSC 18) and the Economic 
Resolution (SSC 11). This substantiates the hypothesis that Chou En- 
lai was not in Juichin at the time. Since he had been appointed by 
the CC to supervise the Congress he would have been a member of this 
Standing Committee if he were present.
2 North, op.~cit., p. 158.
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A similar result is obtained if one applies the same analysis 
to those members of the GEO who were actually present at the First 
Congress and were operative in the central soviet district.*** Of the 
63 members, 2? were most probably present, 15 were not, and the
whereabouts of the other 21 at the time is unknown. (See Table V)
Of these 21, in the vast majority of cases their factional loyalty 
is unknown, and it is interesting to note that 15 of them (or over 
10%) were not re-elected to the CEC at the Second Congress in 1934> 
indicating that in general they can be considered relatively 
unimportant figures.
Of those presumed absent from the Congress, Chang Kuo-t’ao and 
Shen Tse-min were in the Oyiiwan soviet area, Ch’il Ch’iu-pai, Lu Eu- 
t ’an and Liu Shao-ch'i were in Shanghai, Ch’en Shao-yU was probably 
in Moscow, Lo Teng-hsien was in Manchuria, Wei Pa-ch’tln was active 
in ICwangsi, Chou En-lai was en route for Juichin, and the remainder, 
Ho lung, Hsia Hsi, Hstl Hsi-ken, Jen Pi-shih, Kuan Hsiang-ying and 
Tuan Teh-ch’ang were in the Hsiangosi soviet area (although one or 
more of them may perhaps have made the journey to Juichin). Of those 
present at the Congress, an absolute majority can be identified as
1 This is determined by reports of the individual taking part
in the proceedings of the Congress, by his election to such bodies
as the Steerang Cbmmittee which functioned at the Congress, or by 
his known existence in the Juichin area or adjoining soviet at the 
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being Maoists# Eighteen people fall into this category, with
only two definitely classed as representing the Returned Student
leadership - Hsiang Ying and Wang Chia-ch’iang# A further seven
cannot be definitively classified with respect to their
2
factional affiliations, if any.
The situation with regard to the organs of military command 
and their relationship to the Party and the government is complex, 
obscure, and outside the scope of this thesis# There were at least 
four overlapping military organs - the Central Revolutionary Military 
Council, the Military Affairs Commissariat, the Military Affairs 
Committee of the Party and the General Political Department of the 
Red Army. In December 1931> the CEC appointed Chu Teh as Chairman 
of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, with Wang Chia- 
chfiang and P feng Teh-huai as Vice Chairmen.5 Chu Teh was also 
appointed Military Affairs Commissar at the National Congress.
Wang Chia-cb^iang was also appointed by the CEC as head of the 
General Political Department - probably the highest position to be 
held at the time by a member of the Returned Student group.^
Chang Ting-ch*eng, Chang YUn-i, Ch'en Cheng-jen, Ch!en Yi,
Chou Yi-li, Chu Teh, Pang Chih-min, Ho Shu-heng, Hstt T'eh-li, Ku 
Ta-ts'un, Lin Piao, P'eng Teh-huai , Shao Shih-p'ing, T * an Chen-Yin, 
Teng Pa, Teng Tzu-hui, Tseng Shan, and of course Mao himself.
 ^Chang Hua-hsien, Chfen Ytl, Hu Ghiih-ho, Huang P fing, lo Ping- 
hui, P'eng Kuei, and T'eng Tai-yUan.
^ HSCH, Ho. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4* (For a complete list 
of RMC members, see Table VI).
4 Ibid.
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T A B L E  VI
Members of the Central Revolutionary Military Council 
appointed at the Pirst National Soviet Congress-*-
Chu Teh Chairman














^ HSCH, Ho. 2, (December 18, 1931), p. 4.
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The same conclusion is reached - that Mao and his followers retained 
control at the First Congress - if we examine the composition of 
the Revolutionary Military Council - the only military organ for 
which there is a complete membership list* Of those members active 
in the central soviet district or vicinity, six out of eleven were 
probably loyal to Mao, (Chu Teh,-** P'eng Teh-huai, Lin Piao, T ’an 
Chen-lin, Shao Shih-p’ing and Mao himself). Ho Lung, another 
probable Maoist, was operating in the western Hunan-Hupeh (Hsiangosi) 
soviet district, with Kuan Hsiang-ying, who, if he was not pro-Mao, 
at least had no liking for the Returned Student leadership who had 
dismissed him as a Li Li-san-ist from his place on the CC at the 
Fourth Plenum. Chang Kuo-t'ao of course was in the Oydwan soviet 
area during the entire 1931-1934 period, and never visited the 
central soviet area, a fact which also applies to another RMC member, 
HsH Hsiang-ch’ien.
Little is known of Yeh Chien-ying’s factional sympathies. He 
studied in Moscow at the same time as the Returned Student Group, 
but was not known to be particularly associated with them. He was 
not at the Sun Yat-sen University, but in a military training class. 
Little is known about two other RMC members, K ’ung Ho-ch'ung and
1 Possibly Chu Teh may have opposed Mao’s "dictatorial role 
in the military force". See Warren Kuo, Issues and Studies, Vol. Ill, 
No. 7, p. 38.
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1Wang Sheng-jung, neither of whom were particularly prominent in 
the Kiangsi period, or after it, This leaves only two known 
supporters of the Party leadership, Wang Chia-ch'iang and Chou En- 
lai on the 15-man RMC,
Summary
The First Rational Soviet Congress therefore accomplished the 
following ends:-
1) It created a formal state, the Chinese Soviet Republic, which 
was of enormous value to the Communists in their claim to 
represent an "alternative way" for the Chinese people to that 
taken by the KMT. As the Comintern asserted, "(the laws and 
resolutions of the First and Second Soviet Congresses) have 
an immensely wider significance than that of mere guides to 
action in the areas already won by the soviets. They are the 
programme documents for the entire national revolutionary war 
in China and for the development of the agrarian revolution. 
(Emphasis in original.)
2) In addition, by the creation of. a soviet government it insti­
tutionalised the shift of the Party’s efforts from the city 
to the countryside - where it was to remain for more than 
fifteen years.
1
Wang Sheng-jung is classified as a member of the Returned 
Student group by Wang Chien-min (op,cit., p. 100), No source is 
given.
2 Programmnye dokumenty kitaiskikh sovetov, (Programme 
Documents of the Chinese Soviets), Moscow, 1935, p. 3 of the Intro­
duction, printed in Ch a r l e s  b , McLane, op.cit., p. 21.
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There, through the occupation by the CCP of parts of central-
south China by the Red Army, the local population experienced
1a primitive form of "social mobilisation"• The Red Army and 
the GCP conducted propaganda among the peasants, recruited 
them as soldiers and distributed to them the land which had 
been confiscated from the landlords and gentry* The Party 
and the Army held widespread literacy campaigns, organised 
trade unions and poor peasant associations. This marked 
increase in political and military activity brought about by 
the communists in turn generated demands from the peasants
for administrative and economic services based on new ex­
periences and expectations which needed a bureaucratic apparatus 
to provide them. As the communists had destroyed the traditional 
government in the area, they had to set up their own as a 
replacement.
3) This new bureaucratic apparatus had not been well-established 
by the time of the First Congress. Talcing the criticisms 
of the Returned Students from 1931-1933 concerning this pre- 
Gongress period - criticisms of guerrilla-ism in the Red Army, 
a feudal administrative structure, few soviet elections, a poor 
soviet apparatus infiltrated by "class alien elements", and 
little mass participation - and combining them with other
1
For a theoretical discussion of this term, see Karl W.
Deutsch, "Social Mobilisation and Political Development", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. LV, No. 3? (September 1961), 
pp. 493-514.
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evidence pointing to the dominance of the military in the day- 
to-day running of the soviet base, it would appear that Mao 
and his supporters were operating in some ways more like 
warlords than communists, having made little attempt to organise 
a soviet administrative apparatus to convey policy to the masses, 
and to listen to and pass on the opinions of the masses to the 
soviet leaders. There is virtually no evidence in this 
pre-Oongress period of Party organisational control over 
soviet elections at the local level. It is significant from 
the point of view of Mao's declining authority after the Pirst 
Congress that the regulations on soviet construction, passed 
shortly after the Congress, specifically provided for Party 
participation inihe crucial electoral committees, which drew 
up the candidates' list, compiled the electoral register, and 
conducted the electoral meetings, all under the general 
directive of "guaranteeing working-class (i.e. Communist 
Party) leadership".
4) The new government it produced represented a counter~weight to
the Party organisation in the soviet areas. The Returned Student 
leaders clashed with Mao over the policies to be followed in 
the revolutionary base areas. This struggle deepened after the 
transfer of many of the Central Committee personnel from Shanghai 
to Juichin in the summer and autumn of 1931. Nevertheless, 
although the Returned Student group gained control over the 
Party in the soviet areas, Mao and his supporters, by controlling
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the machinery for electing delegates to the Congress, won 
command of the soviet government established by the Congress, 
and were sufficiently influential to ensure that the laws and 
resolutions passed at the Congress were favourable to their 
way of thinking* The analysis of the First Congress therefore 
confirms the assumption implicit in the Maoist interpretation 
of the events of this period, (as set forth in the "Resolution 
on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party"), that Mao 
and his followers, although under attack from the Returned 
Students, nevertheless retained a substantial measure of 
authority in the soviet areas for some time after 1931.
In addition, Mao, as the head of this embryo national govern­
ment, must have had considerable prestige, and his personal 
stature was far greater than that of the Party leaders, although 
this was offset to some extent by the fact that Moscow still 
dispatched its rather intermittent directives, not through Mao, 
but via the official Party leaders, mainly Po Ku,2
5) The Congress, by the inclusion in the government of leaders from 
other soviet areas, (for example Ho lung from Hsiangosi, Chang 
Kuo-t'ao from Oydwan, Chang Ting-ch'eng and Fang Chih-min from 
Fukien, and P'eng Teh-huai from Hsiangkan), also substantiated
It is significant that the Resolution refers explicitly to 
loss of power in the Party and military spheres, but does not refer 
to the soviet government * ~
2
Chang ICuo—t'ao interview with Robert C. Horth* (Hoover library 
microfilm)•
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the claim of the new central government to represent all the 
soviet areas, and to be a potential national government*
CHAPTER 3
THE SEC PHD NATIONAL SOVIET CQNG-RE S S
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Once the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic had been 
formally established in November 1931? it increased its efforts 
to ensure that the other soviet areas accepted its jurisdiction 
and implemented the decrees and resolutions passed at the Congress. 
These aims appear to have met with considerable success. At the 
Soviet Congress of Fukien Province, which opened on March 18, 1932 
(the 61st anniversary of the Paris Commune), the central government 
sent no less a figure than Jen Pi-shih (member of the OOP Politbureau 
and the Central Bureau) to give the political report to the Congress, 
and to make certain that the directive sent by the central government 
was adopted* The Pukien Congress duly ''accepted the laws and 
decrees of the All-Soviet Congress, and the directives of the 
central government *
Because of communication problems, Juichin was not able to 
adopt the same procedure of sending a personal delegate when the 
Soviet Congress of the Hsiangkan (Hunan-Kiangsi) area convened 
in June 1932. Instead they radioed a directive.5 Perhaps this did
*1
"Fu-chien sheng kung-nung-ping su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui sheng- 
k'uang", (The festive event of the Fukien Soviet Congress of Workers, 
Peasants and Soldiers), HSCH, No. 15, (March 23, 1932), pp. 5-6.
2 Ibid*, p. 7. (The directive itself is pp. 1-2.)
3
"Chung-yang cheng-fu kei Hsiang-Kan sheng kung-nung-ping 
tai-piao ta-hui tien", (Telegram of the Central Government to the 
Wor:kers, Peasants and Soldiers Congress of Hunan-Kiangsi Province), 
HSCH, No, 22, (June 9, 1932), p. 1.
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not have the same effect as a personal visit by a high-ranking 
official, for the following February the Council of Peoples 
Commissars found important errors in the work of the province.
They did not have a clear class line, and were not actively ex­
panding their soviet territory so as to unite with the central 
soviet area. Central resolved to send a further detailed directive
pointing out these conservative errors and the remedial measures 
1to be taken.
As further examples of the extension of the power of the 
central territory into the outlying soviet areas, one can cite the 
establishment in the Hsiangosi area (West Hupeh-Hunan under the 
control of Ho Lung), of a provisional central government office 
headed by Kuan Hsiang-ying, a member of the Central Executive
p
Committee and the Revolutionary Military Council. In March of 
1952, the Hsiangosi soviet had called the first meeting of its new 
Executive Committee to accept the decisions of the National Congress 
and the Communist Party.^ In 1931 an emissary, Liu Shui-shen, was 
sent by Juichin to the Hsiangokan (Hunan-Hupeh-ICiangsi) area to 
ensure correspondence of policy between the two.^ Finally, when
1 32nd. CPC Meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 51, (February 10,
1933), p. 1*
2 20th. CPC Meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 30, (August 4, 1932), 
p. 4. It later transpired that sometime between the First Congress and 
August 1933, sub-bureaux of the CCP Central Bureau were established in 
Oydwan /"in June 1931 (Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 461)/* Hsiangosi 
November 1931 (Hsiao, I, op.cit., pp. 196-72J7 and Szechuan, Minehekan, 
Hsiangokan and Hsiangkan / ^iSCH, No. 108,(September 6, 1933), p. 3J
 ^HSCH, No. 14, (March 16, 1932), p. 2.
 ^Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 104.
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the new soviet area of Minchekan (Eukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) was
formed in December 1932, its leaders pledged themselves to accept
the "correct leadership” of the GGP, theCentral Government and the
Revolutionary Military Council, and to put into practice the laws
1
and decrees of the government.
As Chu Teh told Nym Wales: "Our most important work in 1932 
was in ’reddening* the new areas, that is, in penetrating further 
and in consolidating and deepening the Soviet movement. We co­
ordinated and connected the Soviet movement in all different districts, 
united the various armies and established schools, as well as doing 
much other work of this kind."^ However, Chu went on to say, the 
fact that the armies in the three provinces of ICiangsi, Hunan and
Hupeh were unable to establish close communication and co-ordination
•5
deprived the Red Army of even greater success.
nevertheless, the period between the two Rational Soviet Con­
gresses from November 1931 to January 1934, represented the highest 
point of soviet power. The first three of Chiang Kai-shek’s "Bandit 
Encirclement" campaigns had been defeated by October 1931, and the 
fourth campaign, which was begun in the late spring of 1932, was
1 "Min-che-kan hsin su-ch'R", (The new soviet area of Minchekan), 
HSCH, No. 46, (January 7, 1933), p. 1.
O
Nym Wales, New China, p. 6 3* / A communist source stated
that the Eirst Congress set up a government which had united the 
leadership of the various soviet areas. See Su-wei-ai Cheng-oh’Han, 




In spite of the fourth campaign however, the Red Army was
able to take the offensive on several occasions, and to increase
its ranlcs substantially. From Moscow, Wang Ming in November 1935
estimated the number of Red Army regulars at 350,000 plus a further
2600.000 irregulars. (Partisans and Red Guards.) Harold Isaacs, 
who says he checked his information carefully, quotes a much lower 
figure of 151,000 of whom only 97,500 had rifles.^ A Chinese, but 
non-communist,source gives a median figure of 200,000 troops with
150.000 rifles.4
The discussion in the previous chapter showed that Mao’s 
military policies had long been disputed by the leading organs of 
the Party. In the Central Soviet Area during 1931, Mao, in addition 
to waging a war of purely traditional guerrilla tactics, had used 
the Red Army as an all-purpose tool for a variety of non-military
1 Edgar Snow is of the opinion that there were no campaigns 
against the soviet areas in 1932. (See Red Star over China, pp. 185-6 
ft.) He asserts that no communist documents refer to a fourth cam­
paign in 1932. But in fact many do, for example the "Ghung-yang 
kuan-ytt ti-kuo-chu-i kuo-min-tang szu-tz'u ’wei-chiao1 yd wo-men ti 
jen-wu ti chdeh-i", (Resolution of Central concerning the imperialist 
KMT's fourth "encirclement" campaign and our tasks), dated June 21, 
1932, printed in ICo-ming yd Chan-cheng (Revolution and War), No. 1 
(August 1, 1932), SSC 15. There is no real contradiction here how­
ever. Preparatory moves were made in the fourth campaign during 1932, 
but the main attack against the central soviet district did not start 
until the spring of 1933. (See Schram, Mao Tse-tung, p. 171 ft.)
p
Wang Ming and Kang Sing (K'ang Sheng), Revolutionary China 
Today, (London: Modern Books Ltd., n.d.), p. 12.
3 Harold Isaacs, Pive Years of Kuomintang Reaction, (Shanghai: 
China Porum, 1932), p. 129.
4 T'ang Liang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China, p. 75.
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tasks. It was the Red Army in fact that "administered” the soviet 
areas, carrying out the land reform programme, supervising elections, 
and operating fund-raising drives and mass movement work. According 
to a Central Bureau resolution of June 1932, this led to the 
development of a "backward peasant mentality”* Little effort 
was made by Mao and his supporters to establish soviets, and indeed 
military organs were substituted for the worker and peasant 
revolutionary committees.
In November 1931 Chu Teh and Wang Chia-ch'iang (who replaced 
Mao as head of the General Political Department of the RMC) "de­
nounced Mao's dictatorial role in the military force".2 Prom this 
time on, the role of the military in the economy and administration 
declined rapidly, and these affairs came under the control of organs 
established by the new soviet government.
Militarily, the main objectives of the Red Army were to link 
the major soviet areas together, starting with initial victories 
in Kiangsi and neighbouring provinces.  ^ Prom Pebruary-March 1932,
Warren Kuo, "The COP after Japanese Invasion of Manchuria 
(Part 2)", Issues & Studies, Vol. Ill, Ho. 7, (April 1967), p. 42.
2 Ibict. f p. 36.
"Chung-kung chung-yang kuan~yd cheng-ch'd ko-ming ts'ai i-sheng 
yd shu-sheng shou-hsien sheng-li ti chdeh-i", (Resolution of CCP Central 
concerning the achieving of initial victories for the revolution in one 
or more provinces), dated January 9, 1932; published in Shih-hua,
Ho. 3, (April 20, 1932), pp. 7-11, SSC 18. See also: "Chung-kung 
chung-yang wei fan-tui ti-kuo-chu-i chin-kung su-lien kua-fen chung- 
kuo kei ko su-ch'd tang-pu hsin", (Letter from the CGP Central to the 
Party Headquarters in the various soviet areas objecting to the 
imperialists' invasion of Soviet Russia and their partition of China), 
dated April 14, 1932; in Shih-hua, Ho. 4 (May 10, 1932), pp. 5-8.
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the Red Army attacked the large city of ICanchow, but was unable 
to occupy it,1 By the summer of 1932, the 100,000 troops deployed 
by the KMT had liquidated the Hunan-Hupeh soviet area under the 
command of Ho Lung, and Oyttwan, the second largest soviet after the 
central base area, was hard pressed.^ In October, Chang Kuo-t'ao 
was forced to withdraw his troops from Oydwan and seek refuge in 
Szechuan.^
In the face of these reverses, the Central Bureau convened a 
meeting at Hingtu, Kiangsi, in August 1932 to discuss military 
strategy. According to Mao, who amended the Conference, it con­
tinued the erroneous policies decided at the Fourth Plenum of the 
Central Oommittee in January 1931.  ^ Mao favoured a policy of mobile 
guerrilla warfare, and the luring of the enemy deep into soviet 
territory before launching a surprise attack. These views had been 
ridiculed shortly before the Conference in an article by Liu Po-ch'eng, 
(a high-ranking military leader who was head of both the Red Army 
academy and of the Political Department of the 5th. Army Corps), 
who attacked "guerrilla-!sm and narrow empiricism”, and those who 
used Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Sun Tzu's The Art of War 
as guides to modern strategy and tactics.^
1 Edgar Snow, op.cit., p. 185.—   ■
Jerome Ch'en, op.cit«, p. 176.
 ^Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 158.
4 RCQHP, p. 190.
® Liu Po-ch'eng, "Lun chan-shu chan-lileh ti shih-tai-hsing ytt wo-
men hung-chiln mu-ch'ien tui-yii chan-shu chan-ldeh jen-shih wen-t'i11,
(On the question of the timing of tactics and strategy and our Red 
Army's current knowledge of tactics and strategy), dated July 20, 1932; 
printed in Ko-ming ytl Ohan-cheng, Ho. 1, (August 1, 1932), leaves 
14-22. SSC 15.
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Mao clashed at the Ningtu Conference with Chou En-lai who, 
as Secretary of the Central Bureau, backed by the Central Committee 
and encouraged by the growth of the Red Army, advocated positional 
warfare, capturing the cities, and taking the war into enemy 
territory* The views of Chou En-lai prevailed, and Mao, according 
to his own testimony, devoted himself almost entirely to governmental 
work from October 1932 onwards,  ^while Chou later became political 
commissar over the Red Army.^ At the same time, Returned Student 
Po Ku, and his supporter Hsiang Ying became members of the Central 
Revolutionary Military Council, and Hsiang was also made its temporary 
acting Chairman, indicating not only a decline in Mao!s military 
influence, but a similar reduction in the authority of Chu Teh, the 
formal Chairman of the RMC.4
The fact that the new strategy proved successful against Chiang!s
fourth campaign reinforced the belief of the Party leaders that 
Mao’s guerrilla tactics were obsolete. Mao was later to claim that 
the fourth campaign was defeated only because his influence in the 
Red Army had not been completely eradicated, and that the defeat
^ ICung Ch’u, Wo yd Hung-clrtha, (The Red Army and i), (Hong Kong: 
South Wind Publishing uo*, 1954), pp. 310-314.
2 Edgar Snow, op.cit., p. 185.
3 HSOH, No. 78 (May 11, 1933), p. 1. CRBRD, pp. 449-50. This
is substantiated by the testimony of Chang Kuo-t’ao, who says that
upon arriving in Kiangsi, Chou En-lai wrested political control of 
the Red Army from Mao. ("Chou En-lai is a round man", New York Times 
Magazine, April 25, 1954, p. 56.)
4 HSCH, ibid.
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inflicted on the Red Army by the fifth and final campaign, and 
the consequent loss of the Kiangsi base, were due in large part to 
the use of the incorrect strategy.'1' This chronology allows Mao 
to reap the credit for the successes against the first four 
campaigns, while absolving him from blame for the loss of the 
soviet areas. It also provides one possible explanation for Mao's 
statement that the GO transferred from Shanghai to Juichin in 
early 1933 rather than 1931-1932 as the available evidence suggests. 
Had Mao taken 1931 as the year of the move, it would have been 
difficult for him not to have given them some credit for the successes 
over the four defeated encirclement campaigns of Chiang Kai-shek.
The probability remains however that due to inadequate local 
support, poor resources, and the blockhouse tactics of the KMT, the 
fifth campaign would have resulted in a defeat for the communists 
regardless of the strategy they adopted. After the summer of 1932 
therefore, Mao's power in the military sphere declined and was negli­
gible by the spring of 1933. Y/ith his military and political 
spheres of influence eclipsed by the Returned Student leadership, 
only the governmental structure remained as a power base.
To turn now from the military to the social and political 
environment, in the year following the First Congress, new decrees 
were published concerning the division of soviet territory into
1 ROQHP, pp. 190-1.
180
administrative districts, and the establishing of a network of
local government from provincial to village level* Co-operatives
were encouraged, and a system of credits for agricultural invest-
2ment was inaugurated. These measures, and other reforms, were 
designed to win the approval of the local population, an approval 
which was necessary to the survival of the regime, dependent as 
it was on local production to feed the Red Army, to supply recruits 
to the Red Army, and to function as a general support and intelli­
gence network for guerrilla activities*
The deficiencies and shortcomings of the soviet governmental 
and administrative apparatus during 1931 have already been analysed 
in some detail in the previous chapter. One month after the First
Soviet Congress, instructions were issued to carry out a re-
election campaign to transform the soviet organs in the central 
soviet district.^ Kiangsi and Fukien soviet areas (and the hsien 
directly under the control of Juichin) were given one hundred days 
between December 20, 1931 and March 31, 1932 to complete the task 
of soviet construction* These provincial soviets were ordered to 
make out work plans immediately and to spend most of their time 
carrying out demarcation and elections at the hsiang level* Other 
provinces were to adopt a similar procedure
^ For details, see Chapter 2.
 ^ Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, Revolutionary China Today, p. 13*
3 HSCH, ho. 2, (December 18, 193l), p. 4*
4 Ibid.
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A few days after the receipt of this directive, various 
levels of the soviet governments of Kiangsi, Fukien and Juichin 
hsien called discussion meetings to decide how to put the re-election 
campaign into effect* Preliminary joint meetings of hsien and 
ch *11 soviet chairmen were held in west Fukien (December 20) and 
Kiangsi (December 25), with Juichin holding a similar meeting on 
December 26 composed of ch'tl and hsiang soviet chairmen* At all 
three meetings, delegates from Central were present to provide 
guidance* The meetings went on for 3-4 days, and investigated 
past work as well as deciding future election strategy*^
But in spite of this planning, the elections did not succeed 
as intended. In April, after the due date of March 31 for the 
completion of the elections, Hsiang Ying wrote that in spite of 
three months work, they were still not completed. Even in the 
majority of hsiang and shih soviets where an attempt to carry out 
elections had taken place, they had been undertaken incorrectly*
Mass meetings were called, but the election went ahead even if 
few voters turned up, in spite of laws to the contrary, and a 
minority of local chairmen ran everything without concern for the 
wishes of the masses.2 Hsiang Ying reiterated that hsiang a&d shih 
1 nMin-hsi Chiang-hsi liang-sheng-su Jui-chin hsien-su k'ai-hui 
t*ao-lun chung-yang cheng-fu ko-chung hsiln-ling", (The two provincial 
soviet areas of west Fukien and Kiangsi, and Juichin hsien soviet 
convene meetings to discuss the various instructions of the central 
government11, HSOH, Ho. 3, (December 28, 1931), p. 4.
2 Hsiang Ying, "ChSang-ku ch1eng-hsiang su-wei-ai ti tsu-chih 
kung-tso", (Strengthen ch1 eng and hsiang soviets organisation and 
work), HSOH,No* 16, (April 6, 19327,p. 1.
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soviets were the basic level organisations of the soviet regime, 
by which "the great majority of the worker and peasant masses 
are directly attracted to participate in the work of the regime’*, 
and that it was essential to consolidate the basis of the regime, 
otherwise it would stand little chance of victory. Hsiang ordered 
new elections in places where they had been performed incorrectly.^
The case of Ningtu hsien (Kiangsi) soviet may be typical.
Its first soviet conference was held from April 10-13, 1932.2 At 
the same time however, Liang Po-t*ai (a CEC member specialising in 
soviet construction work) listed a phenomenal number of shortcomings 
and deficiencies in the work of Hingtu. These included: a few 
hsiang soviets conspiring with the Ching bandits; hsiang and shih 
soviet Executive Committees and Presidia not holding meetings; weak 
connections between the upper and lower levels of government; the 
smoking of opium by soviet work personnel; merchants acting as 
secretaries in the government; and in some cases, the basic soviet 
organisation of the hsiang and shih delegate conferences were non­
existent. In electoral work, Liang reported that there was a 
general failure to mobilise the masses to take part in the election; 
that some ch*tl had still not yet completed their elections; where
1 Ibid.
"Ning-tu kung-nung-ping su-wei-ai ch'ttan-hsien ti-i-tz'u ta- 
hui ti ching-kuo'*, (The experience of the first workers', peasants’ 
and soldiers’ soviet conference of Hingtu hsien), HSCH, Ho. 18,
(April 21, 1932), p. 5.
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elections had "been held, representatives were sometimes elected 
even though voters did not register; in some areas no electoral 
organisations were formed at all; in one ch'ii all opium smo leers 
were deprived of electoral rights, regardless of their class origin, 
and in another chf il all those over age 45 were similarly deprived. 
Liang ended hy saying that the election would have to be repeated 
xn some areas.*1*
It would seem therefore that although efforts were made in 
early 1932 to create a viable soviet organisation from Central 
down to the grass roots level, that this endeavour was largely 
unsuccessful, particularly at the lower levels. The idea that the 
masses themselves were in charge of the election and had the power 
to elect their candidates had become so far divorced from reality 
that one of the top Party leadership had to write an article 
stressing that there was in fact no difference between l!soviet 
political power" and "mass political power". Many people, said 
Lo Fu, thought that soviet political power was what^ existed in 
the soviet areas, while mass political power was in the KMT 
areas. He pointed out that the slogan had been put forward 
precisely to show that the two were the same, that both were put 
Into effect under the soviet regime, and that "mass political 
power" was designed to show the distinction between the soviet
1 Liang Po-tfai, "Hing-tu su-wei-ai kung-tso chih i~pan",
(A section on Hingtu soviet work), dated April 21, (1932), in 
HSCH, Ho. 18, (April 21, 1932), p. 6.
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areas 5 and Ihe white areas - where only a minority had any rights.^
In September 1932, the GEO decided that yet another attempt 
was to be made to mobilise the population in a new series of 
elections. In spite of earlier efforts, the directive noted, 
there still remained soviet governments with "class outsiders11 in 
them, following an anti-class line in their work. Rotten bureaucrats 
persisted in local soviets, and there was a serious problem of 
corruption. All this had led to an isolation of the government from 
the masses. The purpose of the new election campaign was to 
eliminate all "class outsiders, elements sabotaging revolutionary 
war work and corrupt, rotten bureaucratic elements," and to replace 
them with active cadres, so as to set up strong and capable soviet 
governments who could really carry out the task of leading the 
revolutionary war.2
Since to hold all the elections at the same time would have 
the effect of causing the momentary cessation of the vital task of 
winning the war, it was decided that some hsien would undergo a 
total re-election and some only a partial re-election, and that these 
would be carried out one at a time. Seven hsien in Kiangsi and four
lo Fu, "Lun su-wei-ai cheng-ch*tlan yil min-chung cheng-ch'dan", 
(Concerning soviet political power and mass political power), dated 
January 19, 1932; in Hung Ch!i Chou~pao, No. 30, (February 15, 1932), 
pp. 20-23*
2 "Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yUan-hui ti shih-wu hao hsiln-ling", 
(Fifteenth instruction of the CEC), signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang 
Ting and Chang Kuo-^ao; dated September 20, 1932, in HSGH, No. 35, 
(September 27, 1932), p. 1.
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in Fukien were designated for total re-election, and seven in 
Kiangsi aid two in Fukien for partial re-election* Juichin hsien 
was also to have a partial re-election*
During the election campaign, the masses were to be propagandised 
to participate, and to examine and criticise soviet work* Soviet 
governments were to pay attention to attracting worker activists 
to participate in the c h and hsien Executive Committees, so as 
to strengthen the worker component at the various levels of the 
soviets*1 Following the receipt of this directive, the hsiang and 
c h governments made annual work reports to the electorate on 
November 8. The electors examined the reports and voiced opinions
p
on soviet work.
At the same time, in an attempt to enforce Central directives, 
it was decided to set up a formal system for examining the work of 
the local soviets, and to establish training classes for soviet 
cadresHowever, an inspection carried out at the end of November 
revealed that little progress had been made in reforming local soviet
^ •
2 "Kuan-yil chung-yang cheng-fu chou-nien chi-nien", (On the 
first anniversary of the central government), CEC order No* 9, dated 
September 24, 1932; in HSCH, No* 55, (September 27? 1932), p* 8*
3 MChung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng- 
fu ch'eng-li chou-nien chi-nien shang ch!fian-tfi hsiian-min kung-tso 
pao-kao shun, (fhe provisional central government of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic makes a work report to the whole electorate on the 





By December it became clear that the campaign had proved a
failure* Not one hsien had completed its election, the campaigns
were all peaceful with no struggle to get the masses to participate,
the electoral laws were not complied with, the elections that did
take place were superficial and negative, and bureaucratism was still 
2
rampant. The CEO ordered an immediate inspection of the election 
campaign. If the electoral law was found to have been violated, 
then the election would have to be repeated. Detailed instructions 
were issued, but the leadership must have realised that diminishing 
returns had set in, as no further electoral work was carried out 
until well into 1933.^
Preparations for the Second Congress
It was with this general failure in mass organisation and 
technique that the Chinese Soviet Republic entered 1933* The 
constitutional outline that had been passed by the Eirst National 
Soviet Congress in 1931 did not mention at what intervals Congresses 
had to be called. However the Organisation Law that was promulgated 
in 1934 by the Second Congress stipulated that All-China Congresses 
were to be convened every two years, which meant that the Second
28th, CPC meeting, reported in HSCH, No. 42, (November 28,
1 9 3 2 ) .  p .  6 .
"Chung-yang chih-hsing wei-ydan-hui chdeh-i kuan-yd ko-chi hsdan- 
chd ydn-tung ti chien-ch’a", (CEC resolution concerning the inspection of 
the electoral movement at the various levels), signed by Mao Tse-tung, 
Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao, dated December 1, 1932; in HSCH, No. 43, 
(December 5, 1932), p. 2*
 ^The electoral disasters of 1932 did not prevent a later communist 
source from claiming spectacular successes, with over 90$ attendance at 
some electoral meetings, and general mass enthusiasm, with only those 
sick, pregnant, or on guard duty not attending* See Kuang-ming Jih- 
pao, (June 27, 1953), p* 5*
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Congress would be due on or by November 1933. The first hint of |
any political activity directed towards elections in 1933 can be
found in a decision of the Council of People*s Commissars (CPC)
calling for work in preparation for a general re-election movement
at the shih and hsiang levels, which was to be held in the Central
■y
Soviet Area prior to the autumn harvests. The first indication
that this would culminate in a Second Congress came in a central
2
government dii'ective of June 1. This was soon followed by an 
official resolution of the Central Executive Committee (the highest 
governmental organ in the soviet when the Congress was not in session), 
issued on June 8, 1933 calling for the Second National Soviet 
Congress to open on December 11, 1933? the anniversary of the Canton 
Commune, and slightly over two years since the Eirst Congress of 
November 1931* The Congress was to be held in the Central Soviet 
Area.4
The Resolution declared that the revolutionary war was entering 
a higher stage of development, and that in order to strengthen the 
leadership of the revolution, and to summarise the experiences of 
the soviet movement over the last two years, it had been decided to 
hold a Second Congress, and to elect a new CEC.^
1 HSCH, No. 74, (April 29, 1933), p. 1.
2 HSCH, No. 85, (June 14, 1933), p. 3.
3 nSu-wei-ai chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yfian-hui kuan-yti chao-chi ti- 
erh-tz *u chftlan -su ta-hui ti chiieh-i", (Resolution of the Soviet Central 
Executive Committee on the convening of the Second National Soviet Con­
gress), dated June 8, 1933; in HSCH, No. 86. (June 17, 1933), p. 2. Also 




The GEO decided that the summary of the experience of the 
soviet movement was the task of the Council of People!s Gommissars, 
which would deliver a work report to the Congress.-*- Various electoral 
procedures were also decided: elections were to be carried out. on the 
usual hierarchical basis, with delegates from lower administrative 
areas attending the conferences of higher areas, up to the provincial 
level, the delegates from which would attend the National Gongress. 
These elections in the central soviet district at hsiang, ch*11, hsien, 
and sheng levels were ordered to be completed by November 15, and 
the delegates to the new Congress to be in place by December 5* In 
the case of other soviet areas, their elections had to be completed 
by October 31, and the delegates were requested to reach the central
p
soviet area by November 30.
After the elections up to each level had been completed, the 
electoral situation was to be reported to the next higher level.
Before November 15, each provincial soviet was asked to send a 
report to the central soviet government summarising its experiences 
of the last two years.^
All revolutionary mass organisations or individuals in the KMT 
areas, and in the countries neighbouring China, were invited either 






Ihe fact that the call for a Second Congress was issued by 
the CEC in June 1933 is a significant indication that by this time 
the Returned Student leadership felt that it had sufficiently eroded 
the influence of the Maoists in the governmental machine to be able 
to go ahead and convene a Congress that would formally pass laws 
and resolutions proposed by them, and replace the old government*
Indeed, the evidence points to an enlargement of the sphere of con­
trol of the GOP leadership over the government organisation by the 
summer of 1933 - sufficient to ensure the dominance of their authority 
in the running of the election campaign for the Second Congress*
In June 1933, l'an Chen-lin, a prominent Maoist and CEC member, 
was attacked on the basis of associating with the "Lo Ming line"* 
leng Tzu-hui was demoted to Deputy Commissar of Finance in August*2 
Chou Yi-li lost control of the Internal Affairs Department in January 
1933 to Ho Shu-heng (another Maoist) who was in turn replaced by 
Liang Po-t'ai (a probable member of the Returned Student group) by 
the time of the election campaign.^ Ho Shu-heng was criticised for
1 Lo Ming was acting Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Committee 
of the CCP. He was attacked by the Returned Student leaders for employ­
ing mobile and guerrilla warfare in opposition to the "correct11 line of 
the Party, I'an Chen-lin became linked with this line* See Hsiao,
II, op.cit *, pp. 669-670.
2 HSCH, Ho, 105, (August 25, 1933), p. 1.
 ^HSCH, Ho* 46, (January 7, 1933), p* 4. Also HsHan-chil Yiln- 
tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), pp* 6-8. Since most of 
the attacks on the Maoists were printed in HSCH, Chou Yi-li must 
have lost the position of Chief Editor that he had held since 
November 1931.
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nbureaucratism" in September.-*- In addition, Ohang Ting-ch’eng, 
Commissar for Land, was accused of "right opportunism" in November 
1933.2 All those who found themselves under fire were Maoists.
Some while after the CEC resolution, the provisional Central 
Government issued a formal declaration on the convocation of the 
Second Congress. The declaration stated that the Congress was being 
convened to centralise the leadership of the soviet movement through­
out China, to develop and consolidate the soviet regime, and to sum
up the experiences of the period since the first Congress. It was
also announced that the Congress would be held, as before, in 
Juichin, Kiangsi, the soviet capital.
The CEC set up a Preparatory Committee to make the necessary 
arrangements for the Second Congress.^" This Committee held its 
first meeting on June 9.^ With reference to preparatory work in 
the central soviet area, the Committee decided that during July 
and August, the area should be re-demarcated, at the same time 
carrying out the field investigation movement (oh!aMtfien ytln-tung),
1 HSOH, H o . 107, (September 3, 1933), p. 5.
2 HSOH, Ho. 125, (November 14, 1933), p. 4.
"Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng-fu 
ehao-chi ti-erh-tz'u ch'ilan-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui hsilan-yeh", 
(Declaration of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic convening the Second Rational Soviet Congress), dated 
August 1, 1933, signed by Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying, and Ghang Kuo- 
t!ao; in HSCH, Ho• 101, (August 13, 1933), P* 2.
 ^HsUan-chil Ytln-tung Chou-pao, Ho. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. 8. 
SSC 10.
5
Ibid. The names of the Committee members were not specified.
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and investigating the effect of the new labour law. It was hoped 
that hsiang, ch'tl and hsien level soviets would complete their 
election work during September and October, and that the whole 
province would be ready during November.
Additional organisational measures were taken by the Committee. 
The heads of Internal Affairs Departments of Kiangsi, Fukien, Minkan 
(Kiangsi-Fukien) provinces, and J juichin hsien were summoned to hold
p
a joint meeting to discuss the execution of the election work. 
Similarly, the Central (organ) of every mass organisation, and press 
organs were ordered to hold a joint meeting to discuss preparatory 
work. It was decided that there should be a continuous stream of 
radio reports, as well as press coverage of the elections in Red 
China and other papers. Various problems of the Congress budget, 
the Hall for the Congress, and the lodging of delegates, were also 
brought up.--*
With reference to the re-demarcation of the administrative 
areas in the summer of 1933, prior to the election campaign, the 
basic reasons behind the regulations can be reduced to one: the need 
to facilitate organisation, propaganda and control over the population 
by decreasing the size of the administrative unit, particularly at 
the basic levels of the hsiang and shih soviets. For all practical 
purposes, consideration of the shih soviets can be omitted, for
 ^ MChun-pei ti-erh-tz!u ch*tlan-su ta-hui ti kung-tso chi-hua", 
(Working plan of preparations for the Second Congress), dated June 10, 




city (shih) soviets were virtually non-existent in the soviet areas. 
Indeed an order of the CPC, issued on July 22, (the day after the 
promulgation of the resolution on re-demarcation), spoke only of 
the need to accomplish the elections to the Second Congress from 
hsiang, c h h s i e n  and sheng soviets, and made no reference to
"i
soviets at the shih level.
The new hsiang units were considerably smaller than the old 
hsiang. As before, a distinction was made between hsiang on level 
land and those on mountainous territory, although a new type was 
now added referring to hsiang in areas of mixed level and mountainous 
land.^ Under the new demarcation, hsiang on level land (or of 
especially crowded population) had a jurisdiction over 2,000 popula­
tion, as compared with 5*000 under the November 1931 regulations. 
Provision however was made for the figure of 2,000 to be increased 
if there were several villages within 5 11? although the total was 
not to exceed 2,500. Correspondingly, if a river divided the area
3
into two hsiang, the figure of 2,000 could be reduced. The new 
type of hsiang created for mixed terrain was to have jurisdiction 
over 1,500 inhabitants, with provision for variations.^
In mountainous terrain, the jurisdiction of the hsiang was 1,000 
(as compared with 3*000 previously) and provision was made for this
^ Kuan-ytl chih-hsiug chung-hsin hua-fen hsing-cheng ch'd-ytl 
ti chtteh-i (Concerning the carrying out of the decision to re- 
demarcate the administrative areas), Order No. 46 of the CPC (July 22,
1933) SSC 10.
 ^Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 330. Also printed in HSCH,




to be drastically reduced to a minimum of 250 if the mountains
i
were large and the population sparse. The new ch*# soviets were 
each to control seven hsiang, which could be increased to nine in 
flat crowded areas, or reduced to five in sparsely populated 
mountain areas. Once again, this was a reduction in size compared 
with before. Unlike the earlier regulations, no legislation was 
passed concerning the linear dimensions of the soviets.
Responsibility for the correct demarcation of the hsiang rested 
with the ch^ soviet, although decisions had to be reported to the 
hsien committee for investigation and approval. Similarly, demarca­
tion of the ch*11 was the responsibility of the hsien committee, 
which was obliged to report to the provincial committee. The pro­
vincial committees in turn reported to the Central Internal Affairs 
Commissariat,^ The Internal Affairs Commissariat was responsible 
for general guidance of the whole demarcation and sent personnel to 
various places to inspect the execution of the work. Once it was 
finished the elections could begin,3
An article in Red China during July gave some more details 
about the election timetable. From September 25 to October 10, there 
were to take place the elections in the hsiang and shih soviets. 
Following this, from October 10-20 the ch1!! soviet conferences were
** Ibid.




to be held. Hsien soviet conferences were allocated October 20-30, 
and finally November 1-15 for the provincial conference, which were 
to elect the delegates to the All-Ghina Congress.*1* This timetable 
indicates that the schedule laid down by the original resolution 
of the GEO of June 8, was still being adhered to.^
Meetings of the Preparatory Committee continued to be held 
regularly, and work to mobilise the population to take part in 
the Congress went on apace. At its third meeting on July 5, the 
Committee requested the trades unions to send special deputies to 
help with the preparatory work. At the fourth meeting on July 20, 
a budget for the Congress of over 56,800 yUan was put forward and 
sent to the Council of People!s Commissars for approval.4 And at 
the fifth meeting on July 26, the draft of the Election Law was 
examined and sent to the CEC to be promulgated after it had been 
inspected* ^
^ "Erh-tz’u ch!tlan-su ta-hui ti kung-tso pu-chihu,(Arrangements 
for the work of the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 90, 
(July 2, 1933), p. 6.
2 HSCH, No. 86, p. 2.
5 Hsilan-chii Ydn-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, loc.cit. The response 
to this request was slow. It was not until January 1934 (a few weeks 
before the Congress actually opened) that the Executive Bureau of 
the Trades Union Federation decided to send 150 of the best cadres 
to help carry out the extra-work at the Second Congress, (HSCH,




This new Election Law,**- took effe.ct from August 15, 1935
at which time it superceded the "Detailed Electoral Regulations
of the Chinese Soviet Republic", which had been passed by the
Eirst Congress,
The new Election Law, differed little, in essence, from the
1931 Law, All residents of the soviet areas over 16 years of age
had the right to vote, regardless of religion, sex or nationality,
provided that they were hired labourers, poor or middle peasants,
workers, members of the sea, land or air forces of the Chinese
Soviet Republic, or a dependent of a man falling into one of these
categories,2 Likewise, as in 1931, those deprived of their
electoral rights included those who lived off the labour of
others, lived from profit or rent; rich peasants, capitalists,
landlords, compradors; "those who rely on the propagation of
religious superstitioh for a living"; KMT police, and spies,
■5
lunatics and criminals*
The hierarchy of delegate conferences which were finally to 
produce the delegates who would actually attend the Rational 
Soviet Congress were treated in a little more detail in 1933 than 
in 1931, "but the administrative units were basically the same, and
1 Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsdan-chil-fa, (Soviet Temporary Election 
Law, dated August 9, 1933, SSC 10, Part 9 contains a note which 
states that the Law was to take effect in the central soviet district 
when published, and in other soviet areas when it reached them,
(Also published in CRBRD, pp, 829-846).
2 Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hstlan-chti-fa, article 4,
J Ibid,, article 5*
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the bias in the favour of workers vis-a-vis peasants was apparent 
at every level of the hierarchy.1 The 1933 Law however, did make 
explicit, in its Preamble, that the workers enjoyed "superior 
rights", which were in fact guaranteed by the Constitution. Also, 
less residents (urban or rural) were needed in order to produce 
one delegate, than in 1931, reflecting the growth of soviet administra­
tion, and the desire to have a larger and more representative All- 
China Congress.
Only at the very lowest level did the population as a whole 
play a direct part in sending their representatives to the Second 
National Congress. Above this level, matters were in the hands of 
delegate conferences, and with each step up the hierarchy, the 
elections became progressively divorced from the mass of the people,
and more closely controlled by the CCP through its network of
2Electoral Committees.
Mao Tse-tung, in his Report to the Second National Soviet 
Congress, stressed that the bias in favour of the workers was 
designed to guarantee the leading position of the workers. Chung- 
hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tzfu ch 1 (lan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui 
wen-hsien, (Collected Documents of the Second National' Soviet 
Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic), p. 53, SSC 16.
2
It was the job of the Electoral Committee to manage the 
election on its particular level. It was composed of delegates 
from the government and the mass organisations. They performed 
the tasks of voter registration, posting up lists of voters and 
candidates for election, deciding the place of the election 
meeting and the agenda. (Articles 45-55)*
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Initially, workers were to hold electoral meetings talcing 
production, or occupation and industrial organisation as the basic 
unit.'** Peasants did the same with the "small village” (hsiao-ts!un- 
t m ) as the basic unit. At this, the basic level of the soviet 
elections, one delegate was elected to the hsiang conference for 
every 13 worker residents, and one delegate for everjr 50 peasants 
and other classes of residents. In small hsiang this ratio could 
be reduced to 1:8 for workers and 1:32 for other classes.The 
bias towards the peasantry of the earlier election law at the 
grass-roots level was therefore replaced by a bias in favour of the 
proletariat. The electoral process at this level will be discussed 
in detail later.
At the hslaftg conference, the law of 1933 stated that delegates 
from this body to the ch 'd conference should be elected on the basis 
of one formal delegate for every two hundred rural (hsiang-ts *un) 
residents.^ The 1933 law also introduced a new provision that 
workers had to comprise 20-25$ of the total number of delegates.5
Article 11. A later source clarified this to mean either 
the place of production, or the trade union organisation. /^""(Hsieh) 
Chdeh-ts’ai, "Tsen-yang k*ai hsdan-chd-hui11, (How to Start an 







Delegates elected from the hsiang conference then joined 
delegates elected from shih soviets to form the ch I conference, 
which was to elect delegates to attend the hsien conference.
Here a distinction between urban and rural dwellers was made.
At the ch1# conference, one formal delegate was allowed for 
every four hundred market (shih-ch rang) residents and only one 
for every sixteen hundred village residents.-1' In addition, 
the 1933 Daw specified that worker delegates must make up 20-30$
p
of the total*
The delegates elected at the cht-d conference then joined
those elected from soviets of towns directly responsible to the
hsien, to form the hsien conference, the task of which was to
elect delegates to attend the provincial conference* Market
dwellers were permitted one formal delegate for every fifteen
hundred, and rural dwellers one delegate for every six thousand 
3people. The additional instruction included in the 1933 Daw was 
that of the total number of delegates, workers should make up 
25-35$.4
The penultimate step in the procedure of electing a govern­
ment came when delegates from the hsien conference joined soviet
^ Article 27. 
 ^ Ibid.
 ^Article 28* 
4 Ibid.
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delegates from shih directly under the jurisdiction of the province, 
to form the provincial (sheng) conference, which was to elect the 
delegates who would have the privilege of being present at the All- 
China Soviet Congress. The 1953 Law allowed urban (ch1 eng-shih) dwellers 
one formal delegate for every fifteen hundred of their number, with 
rural residents having to be content with only one delegate for every 
six thousand they could muster.-1* Workers, the 1933 Law stated, must 
form 25-35$ of the total number of delegates.2 in addition, delegates 
were also elected directly to the National Soviet Congress from town 
soviets directly belonging to the Central.-'5 These regulations in 
general required a much lower ratio of voters to delegates than 1931> 
and insisted on a stricter bias towards worker delegates, reflecting 
the views of the CC3? leadership.
In addition to the numbers of formal delegates that weis permitted, 
candidate (or alternate) delegates could be elected in the ratio of one 
to every five formal delegates. These candidate delegates had the 
right to speak but not to vote.4 Special provisions were made, as in 





5 Articles 35-39. Pront Armies elected delegates direct to the 
All-China Congress, as did guerrilla units. Other units sent delegates 
^ e  ch!tl, hsien or provincial conferences. Police units participated 
in the areas where they were stationed. A high number of delegates per 
soldier was allowed, for example, one for every 100 (to attend the hsien 
conference), and one for every 600 (when electing direct to the All- 
China Congress).
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T A B L E  VII
CHART 0E 1933 ELECTORAL SYSTEM1






Soviet of towns directly 
belonging to Central
Soviet of towns directly 
belonging to Province
Soviet of towns directly 
belonging to hsien
Hsiang Conference Town soviets directly 
belonging to ch*ti,^
Delegates sent to.
Appended to the 1933 Electoral Law, SSC 10*
^own (shih) soviets under the ch'ti. were given one delegate 
for every 13 workers, and one for every 50 other residents. Those 
under the hsien were given one delegate for every 20 workers, and 
one for every 80 other residents. Those under the province were 
given one delegate for every 100 workers, and one for every 400 
other residents. Town soviets electing directly to the All-China 
Congress were permitted one delegate for every 500 workers, and 
one for every 2,000 other residents. (Articles 22-25).
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In addition to the election of delegates, the conferences at 
every level were to elect an Executive Committee which would be the 
supreme governmental organ of administration in that area* 
numbers of membership on these committees were laid down as
o h Executive Committee 35 
hsien ** M 55
province M 11 95
The All-China Congress was to elect a Central Executive
p
Committee which was not to exceed 581.
lot surprisingly, a reading of the press following the 
publication of this Electoral Law shows that not all soviet citizens 
fully understood its requirements. A high soviet government official 
admitted that some people did not know the difference between the 
voters list and the candidates list.^ He also had to point out 
that it was only those people who derived their living from the 
propagation of religion who were deprived of the vote, and not all 
those who possessed religious beliefs.^
1 Article 34 (1933).
2
Ibid. This conflicts slightly with the Organisation Law 
passed at the Congress which stipulated that the CEC was not to ex­
ceed 585. Chung-hua su-vei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai tsu- 
chih fa, (Organisation Law of the Central Soviet of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic), February 17, 1934; printed in Chung-hua su-wei-af 
kung-ho-kuo ti-erh~tz!u ch^an-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., 
p. 154, Article 8. SSC 16.
3 Liang Po-t*ai, "ICuan-yii hsdan-chtt-fa shang chi-ke t !i-wen ti 
chieh-shih”, (Explanation of some questions posed by the Electoral 






In October, the Internal Affairs Commissariat, which was 
responsible for organising the election, admitted that it had 
received constant requests for clarification of the law, especially
I
with respect to provisions concerning electoral rights. The 
Commissariat published a number of explicit, but complex explana­
tions which can be summarised as follows;-
1* Uh-der the original electoral law, representatives of the 
landlords and capitalists, middlemen, compradores, warlords, and the 
police spies and gendarmes in the service of the KMT were all deprived 
of electoral rights. However, in the cases of the representatives 
of landlords and capitalists, and middlemen and compradores, they 
could be allowed electoral rights if (i) before the soviets were 
established they had been in their jobs for not more than two years, 
after which they relied upon their own labour as their main source 
of income, or (ii) if they were in their jobs for three years, 
but it was not their main source of livelihood, then they could 
retain their electoral rights. In the cases of warlords and 
bureaucrats who were in these positions for less than one year, and 
did not oppress the workers and peasants, and they and their families 
relied on their own labour as their main source of income, then they 
could also retain their electoral rights. Police, spies and 
gendarmes If they worked at these jobs for less than one year, did 
not oppress the workers and peasants, and their families relied on
1 Tui-.yd. su-wei-ai ohan-hsing hs&an-chtl-fa t !iao-wen ti 
chieh-shih, TExplanation of the Provisions of the Soviet Temporary 
Electoral Law), signed by Liang Po-Vai; dated October 29, 1933« vv 
SSC 10.
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their own labour as a principal source of income, or, if before 
soviet occupation, they left their jobs and devoted themselves to 
labour for more than one year, were not opposed by the people and 
obeyed the laws of the soviets, then they too could have electoral 
rights*^
2. In the case of Communist Party members coming from land­
lord, rich peasant or capitalist families, it was stated that they 
had abandoned their original class interests in favour of struggling 
for the workers and peasants, and that therefore they should enjoy 
the same electoral rights as the workers and peasants.
3. Persons who came from landlord or rich peasant families 
who would normally be deprived of electoral rights could, if they 
participated in soviet work, retain their rights if (i) they parti­
cipated in soviet work "during the uprising, and firmly struggled 
for the interests of the workers and peasants", or (ii) if they 
participated in soviet work only after the uprising, but did this 
for more than five years, and then passed an examination by the
ch1 ii Executive Committee or shih soviet.
4. Captured officers and men of the KMT army were allowed 
electoral rights in certain circumstances. (i) Captured men, if 
they joined the Hed Army, or if they did not join the Ped Army, 
but lived on soviet territory, relied on their own labour as their 
principal source of livelihood, observed soviet lav/, and passed an
^ Ibid.
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inspection and investigation by the local soviet government, 
could retain their electoral rights. (ii) in the case of captured 
officers, if they were only platoon or company commanders, subse­
quently joined the Red Army, and came from a worker or peasant 
background, then after a long period of observation "to prove that 
they were firmly struggling for the interests of the workers and 
peasants", then they could receive electoral rights, provided that 
they served in the Red Army for more than a year (two years for 
a company commander) and were favourably inspected by the Red Army 
Political Department. Battalion commanders required five years' 
observation, and regimental commanders and above were deprived of 
electoral rights for ever*^ *
Again, in an article entitled "Two questions on the Electoral 
Law", one Huang Ta said that the Law stated that a man who was a 
military policeman of the reactionary government was deprived of 
the vote, and so was his family. But what if his family were
residents of the soviet areas, poor or middle peasants, and all
engaged in manual labour? The answer came back that they could 
have the vote provided that they had no economic link or counter-
o
revolutionary activity with the reactionary government# Huang Ta 
also asked the definition of the word "dependent" in the case of a
1 1 M 1 *
2 Huang Ta, "Kuan-yU hsttan-chti-fa ti liang-ke t'i-wen", (Two
questions on the Electoral Law), HSOH, Ho. 120, (October 18, 1933),
P* 3*
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worker's dependent, and pointed out that there might be landlords 
and rich peasants included in "dependents" if uncles etc. were 
included. The official reply was that only wives, children, and 
those directly relying on the worker for their principal source 
of livelihood were covered by the term, and that all others were 
excluded.1
In view of the relatively simple nature of these queries, it 
can be sincerely doubted whether the extremely complex provisions 
of many sections of. the Election Law were ever put into practice 
in quite the way the government intended them to be. The calcula­
tion of the number of formal and candidate (alternate) delegates 
permitted by the total number of voters at each electoral level, 
and the ascertaining of the right number of these required to 
reach the correct percentage of worker representation, must have 
been beyond the statistical ability and administrative experience 
of the majority of soviet officials.^
In addition to writing an Election Law that virtually ensured 
the production of delegations to the Second Congress having similar
1 Ibid. Another source spoke of some people incorrectly depriving 
all deserters and cripples of electoral rights. /~Kuan-yd hsiian-chd 
yiln-tung ti chih-shih (Directive on the election campaign), issued 
by the Internal Affairs Department of the Kiangsi Soviet Government, 
September 15> 1933* SSC 10._/
p
In an attempt to clarify the Election Law, the soviet government 
distributed some 500,000 posters and 150,000 illustrated booklets, 
just prior to the eLections, in September. (Chinese Workers Correspon­
dence, Ho. 82, n.d., p. 5.)
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views "to their own, the Party stressed that, if possible, within 
each delegation, there should be set up a Pa^ty Corps (tang-t'uan) 
or faction, "to guarantee the leadership work of the Party".1 The 
major policy decisions for the Congress were taken yust prior to 
the Congress, at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, and 
were transmitted from the Fifth Plenum to the Party Corps, thus 
ensuring synonymity of policy between the CCP and the resolutions 
and decrees expressed by the soviet government during the Congress.^ 
The Election Campaign
On a theoretical plane, the Returned Student leader Lo Fu 
explained the significance of the campaign:
"The revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the 
workers and peasants above all relies on force for the 
seizure and maintenance of its power. It relies on 
force to carry out the cruel and protracted civil war 
with external enemies, imperialism and the armed forces 
of the KMT. It also relies upon force to suppress land­
lord remnants within the soviet areas, and capitalist and 
rich peasant counter-revolutionary activity. But when it 
comes down to it, what are the prerequisites this force is 
dependent on? Lenin clearly answered this question thus:
'Rely on the masses.1"^
"Chung-yang kuan-ytt chao-chi su-ta-hui ti t'ung-chih", (Notice 
of Central convening the Second Congress), August 13, (1933), in 
Hung Ch'i Chou-ipao, No. 59, (August 1933), p. 8.
2 "Chung-kung wu-chung ch'Han-hui kei erh-tz'u ch'&an-su ta-hui 
tang-t1uan ti chih-ling",(instructions of the CCP Fifth Plenum to 
the Party Corps at the Second National Soviet Congress)} printed in 
Chung~h.ua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'tUn-kuo tai-piao ta- 
hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 9-21. SSC 16. Also in Tou-cheng, No. 4?. 
(February 16, 1934), pp. 16-20. SSC 18.
Lo Fu, "Erh-tz!u su-ta-hui ti kai-hs&an yiln-tung yil su-wei-ai 
ti teh-mo-k'o-la-hsi", (The new election campaign of the Second 
National Soviet Congress and soviet democracy), Tou-cheng, No. 21, 
(August 20, 1933), p. 9.
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Helianee on the masses implied, winning the support of the 
people by bringing them into the political life of society, and 
making them feel that they played their part, however little, 
in the decision making process, a concept that was quite absent 
from the traditional life of the Ghinese peasant. ’'Since11, Lo 
Fu went on to say, "our soviet regime is the democratic dictatorship 
of the workers and peasants, under the leadership of the vanguard 
of the proletariat, the Communist Party, therefore the central task 
of soviet democracy is to bring in the broad masses of workers 
and peasants to participate in political power and to teach them 
to administer their own state. "-**
In practice, of course, the idea of participation had to be 
linked during the campaign to the current political tasks. The 
major aims of the CCP, it was stated, were to create a healthy 
soviet organisation, to build up on the experience of two years 
management of the soviet regime, to discuss new policies, to 
strengthen the leadership, and to prepare to defeat Chiang Kai-shek's 
Fifth "Encirclement Campaign", which was in preparation, and
p
commenced in October 1933* It was felt that in addition to the 
military advantage, the defeat of Chiang's Fifth Campaign would
^ Ibid.*, p . 10.
 ^ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei- 
ydan-hui hsdn-ling; ti nien-erh hao", (Order No. 22 of the CEO of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic; Directive on the Election Campaign), 
Hs&an-chti Ytln-tung Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933)* P* 2. SSC 10. 
Henceforth referred to as Ti nien-erh hao.
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give a tremendous psychological boost to the activities of the 
Second Congress*"*- Thus the central government spoke of "presenting"
p
the victory to the Second Congress*
Soviet propaganda tended to slight the impact of the Fifth 
Campaign and compared the situation for the Second Congress 
favourably with the First. As compared with the First Congress, 
it was stated, domestically there was a nation-wide anti-KMT and 
anti-imperialist upsurge, the soviet areas had been extended, and 
internationally the world was heading towards a new revolutionary 
stage.^
In an attempt to whip up nationalist sentiment among the 
peasants, Mao spoke at election meetings of the links between the 
KMT 1s communist crusades and the desires of the imperialists
to carve out spheres of influence in China* Manchuria he said, 
had been annexed by Japan, in the south the British were trying to 
use the Tibetan lamas to establish a Tibetan "nation", the French
"Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo lin-shih chung-yang cheng- 
fu ch'eng-li liang chou-nien chi-nien tui ch’itan-t'i hsdan-min ti 
kung-ts© pao-kao-shu", (Work Report to all the Voters Commemmorating 
the Second Anniversary of the Establishment of the Provisional Central 
Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated November 13, 1933, 
printed in Ch'ih-fei wen-chien hui-pien, (Red Bandit Collected 
Documents), Vol. 7, p. 325, SSC 20.
2 Ibid.
Kuan-ytl yung-hu ti-erh-tzfu ch’dan-su ta-hui: cheng-chih k !o 
ts1ai-liao,(Concerning Support for the Second All-Soviet Congress: 
Political Lesson Materials), Red Army Political Department, September 30, 
1933* SSC 4*
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imperialists were after Yunnan and Kweichow, and in Central China, 
the Americans planned to rule over several provinces along the 
Yangtse. "The ICuomintang ", said Mao, ''serves as an accomplice to 
the imperialist plots".^
Therefore, Mao went on to say, the soviets under the leader­
ship of the CCP, were the leaders in a big revolutionary war, and 
it was essential to crush the Pifth Campaign that was just starting 
against them. In order to wage the war successfully, the election 
must produce powerful soviets, especially as the year 1933 was no
ordinary election year, but the year of the Second National Congress
2
and the re-election of the soviet government. Purthermore, in 
order to achieve a satisfactory election, na great number of the 
most progressive, most class-conscious, and most positive individuals 
must be elected to the soviets.,., and the old useless number in 
them must be eliminated".^
Mao pointed out that with reference to previous election cam­
paigns "the function of soviet powers and the importance of soviet 
elections have not been clearly understood by most p e o p l e H e
"Significance of this year's soviet election: Speech given 
by President Mao Tsak Tung (sic) in the election meeting of the 
Southern Eighteen Districts in ICiangsi", in Chinese Workers 
Correspondence, (Peking: n.d.), No. 1, p. 5* /This can also be 





then commented that "one who does not realise the importance of 
the election cannot be expected to participate in the election in 
the most positive manner, and likewise, soviet officials, who do 
not understand the significance, cannot lead the movement
ti i
sati sfactorily•M
The CEO, in its directive on the election campaign, said that 
although electoral procedures in 1932 were a great improvement on 
those for the First Congress, the importance of fully mobilising 
the masses had still not been fully understood during 1932 by the 
chairmen of local soviet governments.^ Nor, the directive continued, 
had they seen the importance of leadership, or propaganda incitement 
work, with the result that in many places only a minority of voters 
had participated in the e l e c t i o n s*5
Mass mobilisation had suffered because in many soviet depart­
ments, from the hsiang level right up to the centre, a few people 
were entrusted with everything, with the activists and delegates 
from the masses not being brought into the work*4 Yet at the same 
time, complained Lo Fu, there were comrades in these departments 
who nevertheless claimed that the soviet was short of working staff.5
1 I b i d .
O
Ti ^-nien-erh hao, p. 3*
5 Ibid.
 ^lou-cheng, No* 21, p. 12.
5 Ibid.
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A further consequence of the lack of mass mobilisation during 
previous elections was that some areas had had "completely peaceful 
campaigns", with none of the "ardent criticism and struggle" that 
the Party considered essential to win the support of the people.^*
The masses had played little part in the discussion of the draft
p
proposals, and there had been little change from the past. The 
result was that "negative, slothful, corrupt elements and 1 class 
outsiders* had not been fully investigated, and were able to worm 
their way into the soviet regime",5 Other shortcomings in electoral 
work included insufficient workers put up for election, and lack of 
female participation,4 At times, it was said, talcing the hsiang 
as the electoral unit had created too big a unit, so that many could 
not travel the distance needed to get to the electoral meeting, and 
even if they did get there, often the resolution on the list of candi 
dates was apparently taken before the list was discussed.  ^ Finally, 
it was reported that in a minority of districts, the responsible 
officials had simply ignored the election lav/, had not called voters* 
meetings and had oust nominated their own delegates.
The management of the election at the grass-roots level was 
largely the responsibility of specially appointed election committees
1




3 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
Ibid., p. 4.
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These were to be organised at the shih and ch'tt levels, although 
in practice, owing to the absence of urban areas in soviet territory, 
only the chTtt committees were operative. The ch1 fl committee was 
composed of 9-13 people***- Nine people would be sufficient for a 
small chflt, made up of the heads of the following departments:
Internal Affairs, Labour, Land, Education, and the Workers and 
Peasants Inspectorate. The committee was also to include a member 
of the CCP and Youth League c h committees, and two trade union 
members. In the case of a large ch Ttl, this membership could be 
expanded to 11 or 13 by the addition of members from the Anti- 
Imperialist Alliance and Poor Peasant Corps. One female member
p
was also to be appointed. The committee was to be chaired by 
the head of the ch!& Internal Affairs Department, or, if he was 
unable to cope, by the head of either the Workers and Peasants 
Inspectorate, or Labour or Land Departments*^ All the committee 
members were to be chosen by a meeting of the ch!ti Executive Committee 
presidium, and approved by the hsien EC Presidium*4 Electoral sub­
committees were established in each hsiang, organised from one
1 Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsllan-chtl-fa, article 45.
2 nWei chin-hsing hsdan-chd tui Chiang-hsi i-feng chih-shih-hsin11, 
(A directive letter to Kiangsi on carrying out the election campaign), 
signed by Liang Po-t'ai, acting Chairman of the Central Internal 
Affairs Commissariat of the CPC, dated September 7, 1933; printed
in Hstlan-chd Ytln-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933)» p. 6.
3 Ibid..
^ Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hstlan-chtt-fa, article 46.
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representative of the hsiang soviet, one from the trade unions, 
two from the Poor Peasant Corps, one from the female delegates 
conference, and one each from the Party and Youth League committees. 
The director of the electoral sub-committee was to be elected by
i
this group. The CEO directed that the electoral committees were 
not to be all name and no substance, as in the past.^
The primary initial task of the electoral committees was 
to mobilise the masses in the soviet areas to become aware of, and 
participate in the election campaign. The hsiang electoral sub­
committees organised propaganda teams of 9-11 members, which received 
training at the hands of the chftt election committee.5 Joint meetings 
to discuss the electoral law and electoral work were held between 
mass organisations at the ch!il and hsiang levels, as well as 
meetings of individual mass organisations. In this way, the trade 
unions, Poor Peasant Corps and female worker and peasant delegate 
meetings were mobilised.^
Hung-se Chung-hua printed a two-part article about one parti­
cular c h which was considered to be a model of its kind. Ts'ai- 
hsi ch1# in Pukien convened expanded meetings of the Party, Youth 
League committees and the chftl soviet to discuss electoral work,
"* Hsflan-chtt Yiln-tung Ghou-pao, loc .cit.
p
Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.
 ^Hsilan-chil Yiln-tung Ghou-pao  ^No. 2, p. 7.
4 Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.
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organise an electoral committee, and elect sub-committees. Dis­
cussion of the electoral work was also undertaken by the trade 
unions, Poor Peasant Corps and female delegate meetings* In 
every hsiang and ts ‘un propaganda teams were organised, which 
carried out propaganda family by family, in addition to putting 
on plays and delivering speeches. In this way "they mobilised the 
broad worker and peasant masses of ls!ai-hsi ch!tL to enthusiastically 
support and participate in the election.
The main target of the propaganda campaign was to register 
voters to cast ballots at election time*-. Phe first step was 
to decide who, under the provisions of the electoral law, was 
entitled to enjoy electoral rights. Voters organised into trade 
unions or Poor Peasant Corps were registered through their organi­
sations. Phe others were catered for by the registrar from the hsian 
electoral committee.5 Soviet workers were enjoined not to let 
landlords and rich peasants steal the election rights of the workers 
and peasants.^ Phose who were given electoral rights had their 
names written on red paper, and those who had been deprived of 
electoral rights were written on white paper. In the case of
 ^ Chang Ting~chfeng, "Hstlan-chit yun-tung ti hao mo-fan", (A 
G-ood Example of an Election Campaign), HSCH, No. 126, (November 17,
1933)j p. 3 & No. 127, (November 20, 1933)? P« 3.
2 Xbid.
 ^Hsdan-chd Ydn-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 8.
4 Kuan-.yd hstian-chit yiln-tung ti chih-shih, op. cit.
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those with electoral rights, their work capacities and "struggle 
history" had also to be listed. In the case of Ting-lung ch*# 
in Hsing.ku.o hsien, it turned out that 6,094 (68^) out of a total 
of 8,920 had the right of election, with 2,826 (32fo) deprived of 
electoral rights*2 An example was given of a member of the Fukien 
'.provincial soviet work personnel, one Kuan Ch'd-wu, who although 
he was a rich peasant, was listed on red paper during voter 
registration in fs'ai-hsi ch *#. According to the source, the people 
of the hsiang immediately went to the hsiang soviet and "struggled" 
with the electoral committee, "and they did not allow his name to 
be written on the red paper". From this, said the article, it 
could be clearly seen that in Is'ai-hsi ch1# "the worker and 
peasant masses supported and respected their own electoral rights, 
and paid very cautious attention to inspecting for class enemies, 
After voter registration came the even more important task of select­
ing a candidates list, from among which the delegates would be 
elected to attend the hsiang soviet conferences, which would send 
representatives to the ch1# conference, until a few would eventually 
reach the National Soviet Congress, Initially, at the lowest levels
 ^ H S Q H , No. 1 2 6 ,  (November 1 7 ,  1 9 3 3 ) ?  P - 3 -
2 "Mo-fan ch1# ti hsllan-ch# y#n~tung", (An example of a ch'il 
election campaign), HSCH, No. 1 . 1 3 ,  (September 2 7 ,  1 9 3 3 ) ,  p* 1 .
5 HSCH, N o .  1 2 6 ,  p .  3 *
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of the hierarchy, the ch1# electoral committee directed in the 
hsiang electoral sub-committee to mobilise all the mass organisations 
to propose candidates.-*- The lists of candidates from the trade 
unions, Poor Peasant Corps, Mutual Aid Societies etc. were then 
collected and distributed among the electoral units in the hsiang, 
each electoral unit only having a proportion of the total list, 
so that they would be able to give their candidates careful con­
sideration and examination.^
This examination was designed not only to ensure the production 
of "good" delegates to the Second Congress, but also to weed out 
from the hsiang, ch1#, hsien "and even up to the provincial- and 
central -levels11, those people who were "corrupt, passive, not 
actively struggling against the warlords"and rich peasants, or who 
oppressed the workers and peasants."-5 Those not suitable for 
candidacy also included "all landlords, capitalists, compromise^ 
elements, those with corrupt behaviour or commandist work methods.
In addition to class background, political behaviour was clearly 
an important criterion for election, as was the attention paid to 
those "who work industriously for the revolution, especially those
^ Hsilan-ch# Yiln-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p, 7.
2 Ibid*
 ^Yung-hu ti-erh-tzfu chi#an-su ta-hui hstlan-ch!uan ta-kang, 
(Propaganda Outline for the Support of the Second All-Soviet Congress), 
published by the Central Bureau Propaganda Department, September 1, 
(1933). SSC 15.
^ Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.
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elements who can really represent our worker and peasant masses 
in speech and action."^- However, ability to work had also to be 
considered, for apparently in the past "in several places we 
only looked at class origins, not at ability, and elements v\eak in 
ability were admitted into the government."^ The people were 
therefore encouraged to "raise opinions to oppose bad elements, for 
if we do not raise our own opinions during the election period, 
this would be to abandon our own rights."^ In this way the soviet 
authorities hoped "to know who is good and who is bad, so that we 
can elect the good but not the bad*"^
A concrete example of this was provided by the case of Ts'ai- 
hsi ch where it was claimed that the process had obtained great 
success .5 The candidates'name list was submitted by all the 
Party and Youth League branches, Poor Peasant Oorps and female 
delegate meetings. The list received immediate criticism by the 
masses in some places* Por example, in Shanghang, one Wang Pao- 
tzu who had collected taxes before the arrival of the communists, 
appeared on the candidates list, was criticised by the masses, 
and removed. He was also deprived of his electoral rights. Another 
man, lan Kuang-fa was discovered to be a Red Army deserter and was
^ Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'ttan-su ta-hui hsdan-ch'uan ta-kang, 
op.cit.
2 Ti nien-erh hao, loc*cit.
5 Yung-hu ti-erh-tz!u ch'tian-su ta-hui hsttan~ch'uan ta-kang, 
op1* cit*
^ "Tsen-yang chun-pei hou-hstian ming-tan", (How to prepare 
electoral candidates' names list), Hsttan-chtt Yiln-tung Ghou-pao* No. 2, p
5 HSCH, Ho. 126, p. 3.
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not allowed to be a delegate. A woman was similarly removed, for 
it was found that although she came from a poor peasant family, 
she had lived in a landlord and bad gentry family for a long time.**-
In the case of T*ung-hsien hsiang (in Ts!ai-hsi chftL) however, 
no-one offered criticism of the candidates list, and the hsiang 
electoral committee had to mobilise the people to action. As a 
result of the ensuing criticism, the secretary of the Party branch 
was discovered to have stolen good land for himself during the 
field investigation movement, and the chairman of the hsiang 
soviet was found to have embezzled soviet funds, "so that he ate 
good food, better than others." Neither of these two people were
o
elected as delegates. Ts!ai-hsi ch’ti. was most probably not 
typical of the average soviet electoral unit, but it is illustrative 
of the kind of model the soviet leaders wished the election to follow.
The overall responsibility for the election rested with the 
Internal Affairs Commissariat of the CPC, headed by Liang IJo-t'ai, 
a man who had specialised in "soviet construction work" since 
early 1932. In September 1933 the Internal Affairs Commissariat 
requested the soviet presidia at all levels of the government to 
transfer work personnel to the local Internal Affairs Departments,
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 See HSCH, Ho. 9, (February 10, 1932), p. 8.
so as to strengthen these departments and improve their guidance 
of the election campaign.b The Internal Affairs Commissariat 
was also jointly responsible with the Education Commissariat for 
propaganda incitement work.^ The mass organisations in the soviet 
areas had first to mobilise the masses within their own organisa­
tions, and to discuss with them in detail the work for the Second 
Congress.5 Then the masses had to be brought to inspect and 
criticise the work of the government, to collect material on how 
the decrees of the government were being carried out, and forward 
these, at the end of August, to the Preparatory Committee for the
Second Congress.4
In addition, the mass organisations had the task of encouraging
"young comrades" to take part in the work of the electoral committees 
and of inducing "capable worker comrades to strengthen proletarian 
leadership at the electoral conferences."^ The masses were also to 
examine soviet work over the previous two years, and to send reports
Kuan-yil hs&an-chd y&n-tung ti chih-shih, op.cit.
 ^Ti nien-erh hao, p. 4. The Propaganda Committees of the CCP 
also worked for the Second Congress. (Hung Ghfi Chou-pao, No. 59,p.
 ^ "Su-cldii ch’tln-chung t'uan-t’i ehin-hsing yung-hu ch'dan-su 
ta-hui kung-tso", (Soviet areas mass organisations carry out work of 
supporting the All-Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 101, (August 13, 1933)
p . 2.
 ^Ibid., section 4.
5 Ibid.
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to the delegate conferences for discussion*
The reports of the soviet government to the voters, on how 
the work of the government had progressed, were an important 
part of pre-election propaganda* One of the defects of past work 
was that they had often been omitted, Their main purpose was to 
inform the people of the government's policies and get their criticism 
in return* Initially, one week before the hsiang election, voters 
meetings would be convened, talcing the house or village as the 
unit, at which the experiences of the government would be put 
forward, and the opinions of the voters welcomed. Similarly, pro­
gressing up the administrative ladder, the ch'tl government sent 
delegates to report on its work to the hsiang and shih conferences, 
as did the hsien to the ch'd and so on. Simultaneously, the Executive 
Committee at each level made a report to its own conference. The 
opinions of the voters and delegates were to be transmitted up to 
the central government "so that they will understand the masses* 
situation and needs."
In the case of Ts'ai-hsi ch1 il, their report dwelt on the land 
problem, labour protection, the task of mobilising for the war,
1 "Chung-kung chung-yang tsu-chih-chil kuan-yii ti-erh-ts'u ch'tian 
su ta-hui chun-pei kung-tso ti chdeh-ting", (Resolution of the GCP 
Central Organisation Bureau concerning preparatory work for the 
Second All-Soviet Congress), dated August 1, 1933, inJBCH, Bo. 108, 
(September 6, 1933), p. 3*
p Ti nien-erh hao, p. 7.
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expanding the Red Army, economic mobilisation etc* The successes 
and defects were pointed out, mass criticism was launched, "and 
the Ts!ai-hsi masses firmly struggled against the incorrect 
tendencies, and criticised the soviet."-*- The central government 
made a report to the whole soviet area on November 15 in which it 
summarised the work situation of the last year. With a rather 
optimistic view, the report spoke of the great strengthening and 
expansion of the Red Army, the victories won in the Fourth and 
Fifth Campaigns, and the expansion and consolidation of the soviet 
areas.^ However, the report went on to say, even further expansion 
of the Red Army was needed to defeat the Fifth Campaign, the new 
soviet areas needed to be more speedily developed and consolidated 
than they had been, and the field investigation movement should be 
further developed.^
On top of these multifarious activities, the propaganda outline 
issued by the Central Bureau laid down that "the election movement 
must be coordinated with the current main work",^ such as the field 
investigation and class investigation movement, and the tasks of 
actively expanding the Red Army, resisting the attacks of the 
capitalists, selling economic construction bonds and joining the
1 HSCH, No . 126, p. 3.
Q
ChTih~fei wen-chien hui-pien, loc.cit.
5 Ibid.
Yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u oh'ttan-su ta-hui hstlan-ch'uan ta-kang,
op.cit.
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c oop erative s.
With reference to the field investigation movement, the mass 
organisations were instructed to "penetrate deeply" (shen^ju) 
during the election campaign. Indeed, said the Party, it was
p
impossible to separate the two, since the field investigation 
campaign would discover hidden landlords and kulaks (rich peasants) 
who had hitherto thieved election rights to which they were not 
entitled, and would deprive them and other corrupt elements of the 
rights they had illegally usurped, and cleanse them from the 
soviet organs.^ The field investigation movement was under the 
control of the 0P0 and the land Commissariat. It also had the 
task of ensuring that the poor and middle peasants received, and 
exercised, the rights to which they were entitled under the 
election l a w . 4 Chiu-pao ch!tL in Juichin hsien for example, 
inspected more than 200 landlords and rich peasants.5
1 Ibid.
2 HSCH. Ho. 108, (September 6, 1933), p. 3.
^ Mao Tse-tung, "Significance of this year's soviet election",
Chinese Workers Correspondence, No. 1, pp. 5-6.
^ Ti nien-erh. hao. p. 4. Por an analysis of the land policy 
of the investigation, and Mao,*s direct connection with the move­
ment, see Schram, Mao fee-tuna, pp. 166-168*
 ^ "Chiu-pao ch'tl ti hsllan-chii ytin-tung", (The Election Campaign 
of Chiu-pao ch'tt), HSCH. No. 116, (October 6, 1933), P- 3.
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Although it had overall responsibility, the Internal Affairs 
Commissariat was not the only government department to be involved. 
As already mentioned, the Education Commissariat was concerned with 
propaganda work, and the Land Commissariat with the field investi­
gation movement. In addition, the Judicial Commissariat issued 
orders to the Adjudgement Departments (ts!ai-p fan-pu) at all levels, 
to ensure that those people who had been deprived unjustly of their 
electoral rights in the past should not be excluded this time.*1*
fhe Labour Commissariat was ordered to guide the Labour Depart­
ments at the various levels of government in investigating how well 
the Labour Law was being implemented. Ihe Labour Commissariat was 
also required "to develop the struggle between the workers and the 
capitalists, protect the daily interests of the workers, mobilise 
the workers to actively participate in the election and perform a 
leadership function during the election campaign.
The Workers1 and Peasants1 Inspectorate was required to launch 
a self-criticism movement to oppose corruption and passivity in 
carrying out the field investigation and labour Law implementation 
movements and commandism in electoral work.^
Other tasks of the election campaign included encouraging 
people to join the Red Army,^ getting deserters to return to the
^ fi nien-erh hao. p. 7*
 ^Ibid., p. 4*
5 Ibid.
^ 47 joined from Tsfai-hsi ch1# (HSCH, No. 127, p. 3.)
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ranks, giving preferential treatment to Red Army dependents, sell­
ing economic construction bonds and developing cooperative 
societies*"*"
With, reference to the actual timing of the elections, Liang 
Po-t'ai decided that on August 26 in ICiangsi, in Posheng hsien 
there would be summoned the election campaign conference of all 
the heads of Internal Affairs Departments at the ch Ttt level and
p
above* On September 5 a similar group was to assemble in Juichin, 
drawn from the Kwangtung-ICiangsi area, Fukien, and the hsien 
directly controlled by Juichin*^ In both cases they were to 
discuss electoral work, the organisation of the Internal Affairs 
Departments, and in particular, the “shattering of the enemy's 
Fifth Encirclement C a m p a i g n . A t  the latter meeting, which lasted 
for four days and drew officials from 17 hsien, it was Mao Tse-tung 
who spoke on the KMT's Fifth campaign, and Liang Po-t'ai who reported 
on the election law and the work of the Internal Affairs Departments*5
In a directive letter probably written on the basis of the
1 For further details, see ibid*, and HSCH, Ho* 116, p* 3*
 ^"Ghiang-hsi ch'ilan-sheng chjil i-shang nei-wu pu-chang hsilan- 
chti yiin-tung ta-hui ti tsung-chieh“, (Summary of the election campaign 
conference of heads of Internal Affairs Departments of ch'tl and above 
in Kiangsi province), in HBdan-chd Y&n-tung Chou-pao, Ho. 2,
(September 10, 1933), p. 4.
 ^Ibid*, pp. 4-5.
4 Ibid.
 ^ “Fu-chien Ytteh-kan liang-sheng chi Jui-chin chih-shu hsien 
ch'tl i-shang nei-wu pu-chang hsilan-chd y&n-tung ta-hui k'ai-mu",
(The opening of the electoral movement meeting of the heads of 
Internal Affairs Departments from the ch1 il and above levels of Fukien, 
Ytiehkan and the hsien under the direct jurisdiction of Juichin), Hstlan- 
chD Yiln-tung; Chou-pao» Ho. 2, p, 5*
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experiences gained at the two meetings of local officials, Liang 
decided that by September 25, all the electoral preparatory work 
should be completed in Kiangsi, and that at that time the election 
itself could begin, and that at the shih and hsiang levels, the 
election could be completed by October 5.^
However, probably because of the lack of understanding of the 
electoral law caused by its complexity, plus the lack of competent 
personnel, and other shortcomings previously described, the central 
government issued a directive at the end of September 1933 to all 
levels announcing that the date of the elections was to be post-
p
poned by one month. Up to this time all delegate confernnces up 
to provincial level were to have been completed by November 15, 
but the new completion date was December 15.^ The official ex­
planation for the delay was that the work of demarcating the administra­
tive areas had not been finished on time, and this no doubt was a 
major factor in the decision, although the apathy at the grass roots 
level meant that elections could not adequately be run from 
September 25, as was originally planned.^
Red China published a report by Liang 3?o-tfai dated September 20 
which said that the wnrk of re-demarcation, scheduled for completion 
at the end of August, had still not been finished. Liang stated
Hstlan-chU Ytln-tung Chou-pao, No. 2, p. 6.
2 "Kuan-ytt hstlan-chii ti jih-ch’i", (Concerning the election date), 
HSCH, No. 113, (September 27, 1933), p. 1.
5 Ibid.
4 HSCH, No. 90, p. 6.
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that this was an obstacle to soviet work, and that the demarcation 
should be concluded by the end of September
The new schedule laid down that preparatory work should be 
carried out between September 20 and October 15* During this 
time, the administrative regions would be completely demarcated, 
electoral committees organised, and a voter list would be drawn 
up.^ The actual elections (at the hsiang and shih levels) were 
re-scheduled for October 16-25*^ following these, the ch1 con­
ferences were arranged for October 26-November 10, the hsien con­
ferences from November 11-30 and the provincial conferences from 
December 1 - 1 5 In the case of the Red Army, the G-eneral Political 
Department announced that they were held from December 1-10.^
Prom the point of view of voter participation, it was clearly 
essential that the size of the electoral unit at the hsiang level 
be kept small, and this was the basic idea behind the re-demarcation 
of the administrative areas in the summer of 1933* One article,
"1
Kuan-yti hua-fen hsing-cheng. ch'tt-ytt fa-chan ching-chi chien- 
she ytl she-li chen-liao-suo wen-tTi,(Concerning the problems of 
demarcating the administrative areas, developing economic construction 
and establishing clinics), Notice No. 5 of the Internal Affairs 
Commissariat, dated September 20, 1933, SSC 10.
2 HSCH, No. 113/, p. 1, section. 1.
3
Ibid., sec'tion 2.
 ^Ibid., section 3*
1 Chung-yang-chdn hsdan-chd yttn-tung chung ti pien-tuan", (An 
episode in the central army electoral movement), n.d., Hung Hsing,
No. 22, (December 31, 1933), p- 3.
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for example, said that a distance of 10 la was too far to travel 
to the election meeting, and certainly meant that voters would not
"i
be able to attend with their whole families. Repeating the
election law, the article stated that peasants should take their
village (or groups of villages) as the unit, with workers in the
cities using their place of production or trade union organisation,
or, if this was inapplicable, they could use one or two streets 
2as a unit.
Rive days before the hsiang election, the electoral committee 
published the lists of votei^ those deprived of the vote, and the 
candidates lists.^ Voters in each area were to be informed of the 
place and time of the meeting three days in advance.^ (The meeting 
was convened by first sounding a gong and then letting off firecrackers,5 
and the registrar took the names of the voters as they entered the 
meeting hall.^ The electoral meeting was in the hands of a Presidium 
of three, two of whom were elected by the meeting, the third being 
the representative of the electoral committee, who was to be the
7
chairman. He was trained beforehand for the post, nso as to avoid 
an uneasy attitude at the meeting which would cause bad guidance.
1 HSCH, Ho. 116, p. 3.
 ^Ibid.
 ^ Su~wei~ai chan-hsing hsttan-chtl-fa, article 51.
4 Ibid.
5 HSCH., Ho. 105, (August 25, 1933), p. 1.
6 Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsiflan-chtt-fa, loc. cit.
 ^Ibid., article 16.
® Kuei-ting ko-clii cheng-fu hsiian-chd .jih-ch1! ti chih-shih- 
shu, (A directive stipulating the election dates at the various levels 
of the government), n.d. SSC 10.
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The meeting could only begin if the number of voters present
was over 50% of the total possible. If less than 50% were present,
the meeting was to be convened again at a later date.*** If at the
second meeting, a quorum was still not present, the election was
o
nevertheless to go ahead. The first item on the agenda was for 
the chairman to announce the number of voters present, and whether 
there was a quorum or not.^ Then followed the election of soviet 
delegates, first the formal and then the candidate delegates.
These were to be voted on separately, and not as batches.^ The 
names were to be proposed one at a time for discussion, and the 
voters were encouraged to give their opinions on the candidates 
l!so as to cause the revolutionary democratic spirit to be fully 
manifested. l*5 Voting was by a show of hands, ,!for only in this 
way can we select the delegates...who are supported by the real 
majority of the p e o p l e . i f  it appeared that the majority of the 
voters opposed one of the candidates, then he was to be removed, 
and another suitable candidate proposed.^ The ratio of workers
■* Su-wei~ai chan-hsing hstlan-chd-fa, article 13.
p
Ibid., article 14.
 ^Ibid., article 17.
^ Ibid., article 18.
 ^Ti nien-erh hao, p. 5.
6 HSCH, Ho. 116, p. 3.
 ^Ti nien~erh hao, loc.cit.
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to peasants among the delegates has already been discussed in
connection with the Election Law* Subsequent directiYes also
added that !,labouring females" should constitute 25$ of the
1representatives.
Following the election of delegates to the hsiang and shih 
soviets, the final item on the agenda was the passing of the 
voters' proposals* The draft proposals, concerned with the 
economic situation, the policies of the government, and the war, 
had been prepared well beforehand, and the opinions of the 
electorate had also been sounded*^ Delegates in Manchuria for 
example, proposed that troops be sent to liberate Japanese held 
territory, and that guerrilla warfare should be organised in 
Manchuria,^ The Red Army Third Army Corps requested that more 
worker cadres should enter the Red Army, and that Red Army soldiers 
under 16 should have electoral rights*^"
After the close of the meeting, the records were signed by 
the Presidium and the secretary, and sent for inspection to higher 
level soviets*^
In the case of the hsiang electoral meetings of Ts'ai-hsi 
ch'd, it was reported that there was usually a more than 90$
^ Ruan-vd hsflan-chll yftn-tuiig ti chih-shih, op *cit«
2 Ti nien-erh hao, p* 6.
 ^ "Ko-ti tai-piao ti chung-yao t'i-an", (important proposals 
of delegates from various areas", HSCH, Ho. 145? (January 19, 1954),p.2*
4 Ibid.
5 Su-wei-ai chan-hsing hsilan-chtUfa, articles 19-20*
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attendance, with only the aged and ill being absent* Female 
representatives often constituted more than 30% of the delegates, 
but worker representation was often too low, because they did not 
announce the total number of people in their families, on which 
basis their allowable number of delegates was to be calculated* 
Nevertheless, it was said that Is'ai-hsi c h is "our model for 
an election* We want every ch HI, hsiang and hsien to learn from 
this •
On the completion of the election of hsiang soviet delegates 
a plenary session of the new hsiang soviet was convened, which 
selected a chairman and vice-chairman, and elected delegates to 
attend the ch'd soviet conference,2 Conferences at the ch1 ti, hsien 
and provincial levels were convened by their respective Executive 
Committees, and followed a similar patternt:o>their lower-level 
counterparts, with the agenda announced two weeks beforehand.3 
Careful investigation was to be made of those people elected to 
the new E.C.'s as well as those elected as delegates to higher level 
soviets.^
It is clear that each level's conference was organised and 
controlled by the level immediately superior to it. Thus the pro­
vincial soviet was ordered to designate capable people to attend the
1 HSCH, Ho. 127, p. 3.




1hsien conference and direct its work, Hsien conferences were 
held in groups of 7-10 hsien to speed up the process, and the 
provincial soviets were warned to make sure that these conferences 
were not all held at the same time, so risking the chance that 
they could not send men to supervise them all*^ The hsien 
soviet officials, in their turn, were to do the same for the chfil 
conferences, and the chTil officials for the hsiang conferences,^ 
thus ensuring Party control over the final result:;.- the delegates 
and resolutions forwarded to the Second Congress,
Since the elections were postponed, it was inevitable that the 
date originally set for the Second Congress, December 11, 1933? 
would have to be set back* In October, it was announced that it
would now convene on January 1, 1934*  ^ In the last few weeks
before the Congress, meetings of mass organisations were to be 
held to discuss the event, and oral propaganda and wall newspaper 
propaganda teams were to be organised* The workers and peasants
1 HSOH, Ho. 113, P. 1.
2 Ibid.
5 Ibid-
"Erh-tz'u ch'ttan-su ta-hui tsai hung-chtln chung teen-yang
chin-hsing hstian-chtl", (How the election for the Second National 
Soviet Congress will be carried out in the Red Army), n.d., Hung 
Hsing, No, 12, (October 22, 1933), p. 3*
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were asked to donate gifts of local produce and cloth to delegates.
On the day the Congress was to be convened, Party and Youth league
members were instructed to attend hsiang meetings, and parties
were to be held in the evening to provide an enthusiastic atmosphere
for the Congress.•*
Great efforts were also made on behalf of the election
campaign in the other soviet districts apart from the central
soviet area. This effort, in conjunction with work in the KMT
areas, was designed primarily to get the other soviet areas and
non-soviet territory to hold elections for the sending of delegates
to the Second Congress so that it might in reality become a Congress
2
representing all China. In the case of soviet areas outside the 
central soviet district, the Central sub-bureaux and provincial 
committees of OytLwan,^ Hsiangosi,4 Szechuan, Minchekan,^, Hsiangokan,^ 
and Hsiangkan? were instructed to lead the electoral movement in
Q
their areas. In addition, the central government decided to send 
delegations or observer corps to Minchekan, Hsiangokan, and Hsiangkan 
"to help this movement".9
ICuan-vtt vung-hu chYdan-su ta-hui ti wen-t’m  (On the question 
of supporting the National Soviet Congress), December 7, (1933). SSC 4.
2 HSCH, Mo. 108, p. 3.
 ^Hupeh-Honan-Anhwei Border Area.
4 Western Hupeh-Hunan Border Area.
 ^Pukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi Border Area.
Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi Border Area.
7 Hunan-ICiangsi Border Area.
8 HSCH, Ho. 108, p. 3.
9 Ibid.
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Mao Tse-tung, speaking at an election meeting in September 
1933, announced that "in the crushing of (the) enemies' fourth 
offensive, the soviet dominion has been greatly extended, and we 
are seeing this year that the soviet election takes place in ten 
provincial units." In addition to the six areas mentioned by
p
the OOP Organisation Bureau, Mao spoke of a further four - the 
Kiangsi (soviet area), the Fukien (soviet area), the Kwangtung- 
ICiangsi Border (area), and the Fukien-Kiangsi Border (area),^
The question then arises as to whether these ten soviet areas 
existed as anything other than names on paper, and if so, whether 
they did in fact bestir themselves to send representatives to the 
Second Congress, providing of course that the military situation 
and communication problems allowed them to do so.
In the case of the Oyiiwan soviet, it is most unlikely that 
there was any organised electoral activity. Chlang Kai-shek's 
Encirclement Campaign of August 1932 forced Chang Kuo-t'ao and the 
Red Army's Fourth Front Army under Hstl Hsiang-ch’ien to flee to 
Szechuan, which they reached in December 1932.^ Some troops (which 
later formed part of the 25th Army) were left behind, where they 
remained until September 1934, but it is unlikely that their 
guerrilla operations permitted elections to be held.-*
Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Y/orkers Correspondence, loc.cit.
2 HSCH, Ho. 108, p. 3*
 ^Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Workers Correspondence, loc.cit.
 ^Hym Y/ales, Red Dust, p. 158.
 ^Ibid. See also Ho Kan-chih, A History of the Modern Chinese 
Revolution, p. 263*
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There was however one representative of the Oyilwan soviet
present at the Congress, The name of Ch’eng Eang~wu appears in
the list of delegates elected to the Presidium of the Congress 
coupled with the information that he was from OyHwan.^ Ch’eng 
was also elected to the Central Executive Committee. It is 
possible that Ch!eng was not a delegate from Oyilwan at all, but 
was deputed to be their representative, possibly because he
might have had some contact with the area in the past.2 A
communist source, listing the areas sending delegateSjmakes no 
mention of any from Oytlwan, either having arrived, or being 
awaited.^
CRBRD, p. 652. See also HSCH, Special Edition for the 
Second Congress, Ho. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2. Por full list 
see Table VIII.
2
In spite of a Party injunction that “every delegate must 
be elected by a mass conference, and is not permitted to be 
deputed", I" “Chung-yang kuan-yii chao-chi su-ta-hui ti fung-chih", 
(Hotice of Central convening the Soviet Congress), dated August 13, 
(l933), Hung Ch!i Ohou~pao, No. 59, (August, 1933), P* 8*„/
3 “Tsai ti-erh-tz!u ch'ttan-su ta-hui ch'ien-nien", (Before 
the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, No. 145, (January 19,
1934), p. 2.
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T A B L E  VIII
1Presidium of the Second National Congress of Soviets
delegates from Kiangsi (16)
Mao Tse-tung















Delegates from Pukien (6)






Delegates from Yuehlcan (6)



























T A B L E  Till (coirtd.)
Delegates from Minkan (3) Delegate from Shensi
Ku Tso-lin Chi a Yitan
Eu Teh-Ian Delegate from Honan
Chu Wei-yilan Wang Mu
Delegates from Minchelcan (3) Delegate from East River
Wang Chin-hsiang Hstt Ch’eng
Chang Tung-hsiu
Hsil Bi-ch’eng Delegate from Hongkong




Chang Yttn-hsien Wang Hui
Chang Chin-1ou Delegate from Szechuan
Delegate from Hsiangkan Miu K'un
T ' an Yii-pao Delegate from Shantung
Delegate from Ki-an Wang Sheng
Wang Jui-chang Delegate from Korea
Delegate from Oyttwan Pi Shih-t1i
Ch’eng Eang-wu Delegate from Java
Delegate from the Hupeh-Honan Border Chang Jan-ho
Chang Hsing Delegate from Taiwan
Delegate from Shanghai Ts'ai Kan
Chu Ch1i Delegate from Annam
Delegate from Manchuria Hung Shui
Ho Teh Delegate from the Arsenal
lu Tsung-ch'ang
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T A B L E  VIII (contd.)
1 According to CRBRD, p. 651, Es’ai Gh!ang, a delegate 
from Kiangsi, proposed that the Congress select the above 
Presidium from the more than 700 delegates and 1,000 observers 
present at the Congress. The number is given as 75, but only 
73 names are listed, with no explanation for the missing two.
Robert Elegant refers to Ch’H Ch’iu-pai as being elected to the 
Presidium from the Kiangsi delegation. Elegant gives no source, 
and Chfil does not feature as a member of the delegation, but he 
was in Kiangsi and present at the time, and this might explain 
one of the missing two men. / Elegant, China1s Red Masters,
(Few York: Ewayne Publishing Co., 1951), p. 170^7 This was 
probably taken from HSCH, Special Edition of the Second Congress,
No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2., from which the list is drawn, 
which also states that there were 75 members, but lists only 73.
Wang Chien-min, op.cit., p. 312, repeats this error. McLane is 
mistaken when he says that none of the three principal speakers 
at the CCP Eifth Plenum (Lo Eu, Ch’en Yitn, Po Ku), wers "elected 
to active membership on the soviet presidium", whereas they "were 
elected honorary members". All three were on the working presidium. 
McLane confused this with the honorary presidium. /""Charles B. 
McLane, Soviet policy and the Chinese communists, 1931-1946,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 41._7
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The same Encirclement Campaign (Chiang Kai-shek1s fourth),
destroyed Ho lungTs soviet base on the (western) Hupeh-Hunan
border, from whence they were driven to the borders of Hupeh,
1Hunan, Szechuan and Kweichow.
Although it is most unlikely that there were elections in
the area, two representatives were elected to the Presidium of the
Congress, one, Chang Using, from the Hupeh-Honan border.j and the
other, Wang Mu, from Honan. Neither appear to have played a
major role in the Congress proceedings.
After the collapse of the Oyttwan base, the Fourth Front Army
headed for Szechuan, where they arrived in December 1932.^
According to the commander of the Fourth Front Army, Hsii Hsiang-
ch’ien, a soviet delegates conference was held in May 1933, at
Pa-chou, where 3,000 delegates gathered - representing one million
people living in the fourteen hsien which made up the new Szechuan-
•g
Shensi soviet area.-' There are no records of this conference, 
which was in any case held too early to be aware of the forthcoming 
Second Congress. Both Hsii Hsiang-ch!ien and. Chang Kuo-t’ao were 
elected to the Central Executive Committee, but neither were 
actually present at the Congress. One delegate, fiu K ’un allegedly 
from Szechuan, was elected to the Presidium of the Congress.^
-1- Jerome Ch'en, op .cit., p. 176.
2 Nym Wales, Red Dust, p. 158.
 ^Ibid.
4 CRBRD, p. 652. HSCH, No. 145, p. 2, refers to delegate(s)
from Szechuan having arrived in Juichin*
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The Kiangsi-Kwangtung (Yitehkan) soviet area was set up in the 
summer of 1933 on the basis of a decision taken at the 48th. meeting 
of the Council of People*s Commissars on August 16.1 The area held 
its first Party Congress in November 1933? and although mention 
is made of the soviet election movement taking place, no details 
are available. Two sources however refer to delegates from ,lthe
rz
East River of Kwangtung’*, and the Presidium of the Congress has 
six men listed as representing Yttehkan*^
The Minchekan (Pukien-Chekiang-Kiangsi) soviet area held its 
third Congress in November 1933? at which it was proposed to elect 
delegates to attend the National Congress*5 A delegation from the 
area did arrive in the central soviet districts,6 and Minchekan 
had three representatives on the Congress Presidium one of whom,
1 HSCH, No* 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5*
2 lo Mai, "Tsai Yilleh-kan sheng ti-i~t2!u tang tai-piao hui-i
ti ch'ien-mien", (Before the Pirst Party Congress of Yilehkan Province), 
dated November 4, 1933; printed in Tou-cheng, No. 34, (November 12, 
1933), PP- 1-5.
5 HSCH, No* 145, p* 2. CRBRD, loc.cit., refers to one delegate 
from "East.’River".
4 CRBRD, p. 651. The six were: lo Mai, Ch'en Ytin, liu Kuo-chu,
Pu Ts'ai-hsiu, Chou Yi-k*ai and Chung Shih-pin*
5 HSCH, No. 127, (November 20, 1933), p. 3.
6 HSCH, No. 145, p. 2.
240
Wang Chin-hsiang, was later elected to the Central Executive 
Committee •-*-
The Minkan (Pukien-Kiangsi) soviet area held its first 
workers, peasants and soldiers delegate conference in December
p
1933* Very limited information is available concerning this 
meeting, but it is probable that arrangements were made to have 
the soviet represented sb the National Congress* Chu Wei-yttan, 
who was elected to the formal Presidium of the Minkan Conference,^ 
was also elected to the Presidium of the National Congress, together 
with two other delegates from Minkan, Ku Tso-lin and Hu Te-lan.^
On October 30, 1933 there was convened the third delegate 
conference of the Hsiangokan (Hixnan-Hup eh “Kiangsi) soviet area,^
The record of the proceedings does not refer to the election of 
delegates to attend the National Congress in Juichin, but this 
probably took place* Chang Chin-lou, one of the two vice-chairmen 
of the Hsiangokan presidium set up at the conference, was subsequently
^ CRBRD, loc.cit. . The other two were ^hang Tung-hsiu and 
Hsil Li-ch!eng*
 ^Ta-hui T fe“k'an, (Special Publication of the Congress),
No. 2, (December 14, 1933)? P* 1* Parts of this are illegible.
SSC 9* (No. 1 is not available.)
5 Ibid*
 ^CRBRD, loc.cit* Chu Wei-ydan and Ku Tso-lin were both to 
be put on the CEC*
5 Article dated November 17, 1933 in HSCH, No. 128, (November 23,
1933), P. 1.
241
elected to the Presidium of the Second Congress*-1- Pour members 
of the Hsiangokan presidium, including the Chairman, Ho Chen-wu, 
and the two vice-chairmen, Chang Chin-lou and K fung Ho-chfung, 
were made members of the CEO at the Second Congress.2 The 
Hsiangkan (Hunan-iCiangsi) soviet is known to have sent a delegation 
to the Second Congress,5 and to have carried out an election cam­
paign within its territory.^ T fan Yil-pao represented the area on 
the Congress Presidium, and was later elevated to the CEC.^
Pukien was represented on the Presidium of the Second Congress 
by a very strong delegation, six in all, who were all elected to 
the CEC.6 (The six included Chang Wen-tfien (Lo Pu) and Teng Pa, 
both COP Politburo members.
Prom Kiangsi came the strongest delegation of all, which 
might be expected as the province housed the soviet capital, and 
was the most secure of all the communist controlled territories.
See ibid., and CRBRD, loc.cit. As was Chang Yiln-hsien, a 
member of the Hsiangokan presidium. The third member of the 
delegation was Huang Kuang-lu.
^ HSCH, Ho* 128, p. 1. The fourth member was Chang Yttn-hsien.
3 HSCH, Ho. 145, p. 2.
4 Hung-se Hsiang-lcan, (Red Hunan-Kiangsi), Ho. 21, (Hovember 15,
1935), p. 6.
_  3 CRBRD, pp. 651-652. T 1an was the Chairman of the soviet.
/ Hung-se Hsiang-kan, Ho. 25, (March 8, 1934), p. 3 . _ 7
6 CRBRD, p. 651.
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Two hundred and fifty delegates were sent to Juichin to attend 
the Second Congress.'1* They were elected at the Second Conference 
of the ICiangsi Provincial Soviet, held in December 1933*^
The Presidium of the Second Congress had its largest dele­
gation from Kiangsi - 16 in all, including the Chairman of the 
Kiangsi Provincial soviet Liu Ch'i-yao, and the vice-chairman 
Tseng Shan* Mao Tse-tung, head of the soviet government was 
included, as well as one ofthe vice-chairmen Hsiang Ying, and a 
leader of the ^Russian Returned Student1' group Po Ku (Ch'in Pang- 
hsien).^ Of the 16, no less than 12 were to find their way onto 
the CSC.
In addition to its own delegation from Kiangsi the central 
soviet area was strengthened by a separate body of delegates 
elected from the soviet capital itself. Juichin hsien held its 
fifth workers1, peasants' and soldiers' representative conference 
just prior to the Second Congress, to which it sent 70 delegates.^ 
It had a membership of eight on the Congress Presidium, all of 
whom were made members of the CEC.
1 "Chlang-hsi ti-erh-tz'u sheng-su ta-hui chan-tou ti ch'eng- 
kung-le", (The Righting Success of the Second Kiangsi Provincial 
Soviet Congress), HSCH, Ho. 140, (January 4, 1934), p. 3.
2 Chiang-hsi sheng su-wei-ai chih-hsing wei-yttan-hui pu-kao 
ti-i-hao,(Announcement Ho. 1 of the kiangsi Provincial Soviet 
Executive Committee), Pebruary 5, 1934. SSC 16.
3 CSBRD, loc.oi-t.
4 HSOH, No . 143, (January 13, 1934), p. 3.
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One can therefore conclude that in their efforts to make the 
Second Congress representative of all the soviet areas, the CCP 
and the soviet government met with some measure of success. All 
the soviet areas mentioned by Mao in his election speech were 
present at the Congress, This fact must be tempered however, by 
the knowledge that the overwhelming weight of soviet area delegates 
came from the central soviet Kiangsi/Pukien area. One report 
says that over 700 delegates arrived,-** although apparently pro­
visions were made for more than 2,000.^ Of the 700, no fewer than 
320 were known to have come from Kiangsi or Juichin, and this does 
not include those from Pukien or from the Red Army operating in the 
central area,^
The same argument applies, a fortiori, to the Presidium of the 
Congress, The delegates from the Red Army were mainly active in 
the central soviet district, and together with those from Kiangsi, 
Pukien and Juichin, they gave the men from the central area an 
absolute majority on the Presidium.^
The Communist Party, in addition to seeking representation 
from all the soviet areas, sought to establish the Chinese Soviet 
Republic as an alternative state to the Kuomintang regime, and 
therefore exerted considerable efforts to encourage delegates to
1 CRBRD, loo.cit.
p
HSCH, Ho. 145, p. 2. This figure probably included observers 
in addition to official delegates.
 ^HSCH, Ho. 140, p. 3* (250 from Kiangsi and 70 from Juichin).
4 The Presidium was a form of Steering Committee for the Congress, 
and it can be assumed that its members were present at the time, unlike 
those ^nominated to the Honorary Presidium.
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come to the Second Congress from the KMT-controlled parts of the 
country - particularly from the industrial centres. The CCP 
ordered its members to convene mass meetings "especially among 
workers in large factories",^ so that they might send delegates 
to Juichin.
Party branches were required to send production workers from 
all the centres of production - Kiangsu, Hopeh, Wuhan and Manchuria.2 
Particular attention was paid to Shanghai, where the Party members 
were told to liaise with the trades unions in sabotaging and 
confiscating imported munitions.5 Anti-imperialist organisations 
in the city were to spread propaganda concerning the Congress.4
The CCP made some headway in Shanghai, for it was later 
reported that on November 6 the dockers had carried out some 
propaganda activities by holding meetings, passing out leaflets, 
hanging up red flags and the like, and that they had also elected 
some 25 peasants and 24 dock workers to attend the Second Congress.^
1 HSCH, Ho. 108, p. 3.
 ^Hung Ch1! Chou-pao, Ho. 59? p. 7.
 ^Ibid* 9 P • 10.
4 Ibid., p. 9. Exhibitions and "mobile art units" were to be 
set up, and left wing writers were to be "mobilised".
5 "Shang-hai kung-nung tsai fan fa-hsi-szu tou-cheng chung 
hsiian-chtl ch!u-hsi erh-su ta-hui tai-piao", (Shanghai workers and 
peasants in the anti-fascist struggle elect delegates to the
Second national Soviet Congress), HSCH, Ho. 128, (November 23, 1933),
p. 1*
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Six more delegates were said to have been selected elsewhere in 
Shanghai, and the Seamen's Club sent a further three,^
Apart from the soviet areas, and the industrial and 
commercial centres in the KMT districts, the CCP leaders had a 
third main target in creating propaganda and dissaffection in the 
White (KM11) armies. Party members were told to use any methods 
to infiltrate into enemy units taking part in the encirclement 
campaign, and to incite the soldiers to insurrection.^ This was 
particularly important in view of the GCP policy of breaking the 
KMT's economic embargo on the soviet territories, which was 
having a severe effect on the soviet economy.^ Guerrilla districts 
in the White areas were also instructed to elect and send delegates 
to the Second Congress.^
Overall, it is clear that the Party made much greater efforts 
to secure representation from outside the soviet areas than they 
did in the case of the Pirst Congress of 1931. Delegates to the 
Second Congress reportedly came from areas such as Manchuria, 
Shensi, Amoy and Shantung, as well as further places like Hong 
Kong, Korea, Java, Annam and Taiwan,5
1 Ibid.
 ^Hung Ch1! Chou-pao. Ho. 59> pp. 9-10.
 ^Ibid., pp. 10-11.
4 Ibid.. p. 8.
5 See Table VIII.
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Immediately prior to the opening of the Congress, the Fifth 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CCP convened in Juichin.
In addition to members and alternate members of the CC being 
present, there were also representatives from the provincial
•i
committees. Whether Mao actually attended the Plenum or not is
unknown, but if he did he certainly was not chosen to deliver
any one of the three major reports adopted by the Plenum. In
fact, he was apparently attacked by Po Ku for his "countryside"
policy. It was Po Ku who reported on the current situation and
the Party's tasks, followed by Ch'en Yiln on the economic
struggle in the KMT areas,4 and Lo Pu on the soviet movement,5
Lo Pu's report was later to be termed the "Instructions of the
Fifth Plenum to the Party Corps at the Second National Soviet Congress",
x "Chung-lcuo kung-ch fan-tang chung-yang cheng-chih-chtl t'ung-chih", 
(Notice of the CCP Central Politburo), dated February 10, 1934; printed 
Tcm-cheng, No. 47, (February 16, 1934), p. 1. SSC 18,
2 R. C. North interview with Chang ICuo-t'ao. (Hoover Library 
Microfilm.)
 ^ "Mu-ch'ien ti hsing-shih yil tang ti jen-wu chileh-i", (Resolu­
tion on the current situation and the tasks of the Party), adopted 
by the Fifth Plenum on January 18, 1934; printed in Tou-cheng, No. 47, 
(February 16, 1934), pp. 1-16. SSC 18.
4 11 Wu-chung chiian-hui kuan-ytt pai-se ch'U-ytt chung ching-chi
tou-cheng ytl kung-hui kung-tso ti ohtieh-i", (Resolution of the Fifth
Plenum on economic struggle and trade union work in the white areas);
printed in fou-cheng. No. 50, (March 11, 1934), pp. 1-12. SSC 18.
 ^ Tou-cheng, No. 47, p. 1.
 ^ "Wu-chung ch'ttan-hui kei erh-tz'u ch'&an-su ta-hui tang-t'uan
ti chih-ling", printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u
ch'ilan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 9-21.
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which laid down the line the Central Committee wished the Congress 
to follow, This line, expressed in general terms by the Instructions 
to the Party Corps, said that from the time of the Fourth Plenum 
the Chinese soviet regime had been greatly consolidated and developed, 
soviet territory had been expanded, a strong Red Army created, 
and centralised leadership of the soviet government established, 
so that the regime was now a major factor in China’s revolutionary 
situation. Since the immediate aim of the regime was to achieve 
initial victories in one or more provinces, the Second Congress 
had to strengthen political and military leadership over the 
soviet ai'eas, and join them together. Furthermore, to build up 
the Red Army to one million men, and establish the absolute 
leadership of the Party over the Red Army, so as to wipe out the 
tradition of guerrilla-ism. Within the soviet areas, the solving 
of the land problem and the improving of economic conditions was a 
guarantee of victory in the war, and the task now was to take the 
field investigation movement from the advanced to the backward soviet 
areas. In line with Comintern instructions, Lo Fufs report con­
demned the nationalisation of land as mistaken at the current time. 
The Party was instructed to strengthen its leadership function in 
the soviet areas so that all personnel would have "a deep under­
standing that the soviet regime is only consolidated and developed
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under the leadership of the Party, and that the Party carries 
absolute responsibility for all the work of the soviet government,
The strengthening of proletarian leadership in the soviet regime 
provides the necessary conditions and guarantee for the future 
change of the soviet revolution into socialism'1.1 These general 
principles and sentiments were all followed and made more concrete 
at the various speeches presented to the Second Congress.
Many of the proposals and resolutions of the Plenum were later
attacked by Mao, although he agreed with them at the time. Writing
in 1945, Mao condemned the Fifth Plenum as marking "the peak of the 
development of the third 'Left1 line",2 under the leadership of the 
Returned Students Ch'en Shao-yil, and especially Chang Wen-t'ien and 
Ch'in Pang-hsien, (Po Ku).^ The conclusions of the Fifth Plenum 
diagnosed the existence of a revolutionary situation in China.^
This was in harmony with the so-called "forward and offensive line" 
which had been the policy of the Returned Student group since late 
1931.5 Over-optimistic in their vision of the revolutionary prospects
1 Ibid., p. 21•
2 RCQHP, p. 191*
5 Ch'en Shao-yil was in Moscow at the time. Po Ku was re-elected 
Secretary-General. He and Chang Wen-t'ien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, 
and Ch'en Tun formed the new Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
Issues and Studies, Vol. IV, Ho. 1, (October 1967), p. 38.
 ^Po Ku, "Chung-kuo kung-ch1 an-tang chung-yang wei-yiian-hui ti- 
wu-tz'u ch'tlan-hui t sung™ chi eh", (Conclusions of the Fifth Plenum of 
the CCP Central Committee), Pou-cheng, Ho. 48, (February 23, 1934), 
p. 3. SSC 18.
5 Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., pp. 490-492.
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for China', the Returned Student leaders urged positional warfare
against Chiang Kai-shek rather than reliance on Mao’s guerrilla
methods. The "forward and offensive line” was reinforced by the
Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI, which affirmed the existence of a
revolutionary situation in China. Mao later condemned this line,2
but voiced his agreement with it at the time.3 in 1945, he also
commented that "the Fifth Plenary Session blindly concluded that
’the revolutionary crisis in China has reached a new acute stage’
...”,4 and that this was just to repeat the views of the Li Li-san 
5line•*
-i
Ibid., p. 652. Also, Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist Inter­
national, 1919-1945* III, p. 222.
2 RCQHP, p. 203.
 ^See for example his "Fen-sui wu-tz'u ’wei-chiao1 yd su-wei-ai 
ching-chi chien-she jen-wu”, (Smashing the Fifth Encirclement Campaign 
and the tasks of the soviet economic construction), HSCH, Ho. 102, 
(August 16, 1953), pp. 2-4.
4 RCQHP, p. 191.
IbicU In addition to these points, Mao may also have been 
at odds with the Politburo over the question of the "Fukien revolt”, 
which refers to the rebellion of the KMT's nineteenth Route Army 
in Hovember 1933, occurring after a preliminary agreement with the 
CCP. The Politburo however, gave little support to the rebels, 
refused to aid them militarily, with the result that they were 
crushed by Chiang Kai-shek in January 1934. Mao later denounced 
this policy as erroneous, and said that the CCP should have allied 
themselves with the rebels. (Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, p. 186). 
The question arises as to what was Mao’s position on the Fukien rebels 
at the time. All the indications are that he opposed collaboration 
with them. See Mao’s denunciation of the Fukien government in his 
report to the Second Congress, pp. 40-41. /, See also Stuart Schram,
Mao Tse-tung, pp. 172-175. For a survey of the documents, see 
Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 248-260} and II, pp. 676-688* For 
a differing viewpoint, see John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in opposition, 
1927-1955, pp. 260-261._/
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The Returned Students, having supervised the electoral 
campaign from start to finish, having organised a network of 
Party factions in each delegation, and having re-affirmed their 
line at the Pifth Plenum, were now ready to go ahead with the 
Second Congress and formally establish their control over the 
organs of soviet government. The CCP however did not rely on a 
very formalised institutional structure to control the soviet 
governmental apparatus. There is no indication of the "double 
track1 system of parallel Party and government committees which 
existed in the USSR at that time, and were imported into China 
after 1 9 4 9 Under this system, a hsien soviet for example would 
have been under the jurisdiction of both the Party committee on its 
own level (the hsien Party committee) and its superior soviet organ 
(the provincial soviet). Instead, the Party maintained control by 
having a loyal official (Liang Po-t'ai) as head of the CPC!s 
Internal Affairs Department, which had jurisdiction over all soviet 
construction and soviet elections, and by CCP participation in the 
electoral committees to create a Party Corps in each delegation to 
the Second Congress.^
Michel C. Oksenberg, "Aspects oiT Local*'Government and 
Politics in China: 1955-5811, Journal of Development Studies»
Vol. IV, Ho. 1, (October 1967JY PP* 28-3:1.
^ The Party Corps (tang-t fuan). were groups of Party members 
within non-Party organisations, who had the responsibility of 
ensuring that these organisations conformed to Party policy. Por 
an outline of their activities, see Hsiao, II, op.cit., p. 189.
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The Proceedings of the Congress
t
The Second National Soviet Congress officially opened on 
January 22, 1934, and lasted for eleven days.*^
In the afternoon of Januarjr 22, ^ following a salute of three 
rounds of gunfire,^ Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the soviet govern” 
ment, formally proclaimed the Congress open.^ This proclamation 
was followed by thunderous applause, and a "magnificent military
The date of January 22 is given by Hung Hsing, No, 26, (January 28 
1934), p. 1; in HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, (January 24, 1934), p. 2; 
and CRBRD, p. 651. An official copy of the Proclamation of the CEC 
gives the date of January 21. See Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo 
chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yflan-hui pu-kao, ti-i hao,(Announcement 
No. 1 of the CEC of the Chinese Soviet Republic), February 5, 1934,
SSC 16, as does the reprint of the Announcement in HSCH, No. 148, 
(February 12, 1934), p. 2.
2 Before the formal opening of the Congress however, Mao, Chu 
Teh and Ts!ai Ch'ang had reviewed troops early that morning.
"Ta-hui tai-piao ydeh-ping? (illegible)-sheng", (Congress Delegates 
Keview_JTroops), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, (January 24, 1934), 
p. 4._/ The troops included those from the Red Army Academy, the 
First and Second Infantry School, and others. / See "Wei-ta ti- yi™ 
t ’ien", (A Great Day ), Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1J
5 "Erh-su ta-hui k !ai-mu tien-lin, (Opening Ceremony of the 
Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p.2.
/""HSCH, ran a series of special numbers for the Congress - seven in 
all - which are located 011 SSC 17*_/ See also Hung Hsing, No. 26, 
p. 1. The gunfire was followed by firecrackers, and "the souP-ds of 
the gunfire and the firecrackers shook the colonies of the 'East".
(HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, loc.cit.)
 ^Mao made a brief and formal speech which did not add anything 
of substance to the HSCH opening editorial of that date. See "Mao 
chu-hsi chiang-tz'u ti su-hsieh", (Shorthand Copy of the Speech of 
Chairman Mao), HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 1.
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1march was struck up". The Congress was held in a new auditorium 
which could hold 1,000 people.*^ It was bedecked with red and green 
flags, which had written on them slogans such as''"Only the Soviets 
can save China" and "Develop and Consolidate the Soviet Areas."^
Delegates to the Congress came from the various soviet areas 
then functioning within China, from many provinces in the White areas, 
and from neighbouring countries*^ The official list of delegates, 
gives a total of 693 full delegates and 83 alternates. (Plus 
approximately 1,500 observers.) The breakdown in terms of numbers 
and origin is as on Table IX. The Chart therefore refers to a total 
of 776 full or alternate delegates.^
These figures are not always in agreement with others cited 
earlier. Por example, the Second Congress of the ICiangsi Provincial 
Soviet was reported to have sent some 250 delegates to the National 
Congress,^ not 222 as listed. Nor is there any mention of the 70 
delegates from Juichin.^ Possibly the "surplus" delegates were
1 HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 2, p. 2.
p f
"Hung-se chan-shih san-chi", (Scattered Reminiscences of 
Red Pighters), Hung-OHi ptjao-p'iao, No. 8, (July 1958), p. 97.
Obviously not all the people concerned could be accommodated, since 
there were said to be 700 delegates and over 1,500 observers. One 
source enlarged the capacity of the hall to 10,000. See Chieh Hua, 
Inprecor, No. 32, (June 1, 1934), p. 844.
 ^HSCH, Special Edition No. 2, p. 2.
4 This point has already been discussed to some extent in my 
section dealing with the preparatory work of the Congress, and the 
efforts of the government to ensure that the Congress was representative 
of all China.
5 Two secondary sources are therefore incorrect in reffering to 821 
delegates. (See Pavel Mif, Heroic..China« p.75* Also Charles B. McClane, 




T A B L E  IX
Delegations to the Second Congress-*-
Delegation Full Alternate
Hsiang-kan 43 0
Local armed forces 13 9





Central Level 48 0
Rational Minorities 3 0






Congress), Hung Hsing, Ho* 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1* The chart 
can also be found in HSGH, Special Edition Ho* 2, p. 3*
254
subsumed under the heading of "observers", and that these, and
similar discrepancies in the figures can be thus explained. A
probable alternative explanation is that many of the delegates
elected in 1933 were either called to the front to counter the
Fifth Encirclement Campaign, or that they were intercepted on their
1way to the Congress. In the case of Juichin delegates, they 
might well have been listed under "Central Level". In addition, 
some of the delegates listed as members of the Presidium of the 
Congress, represented areas which do not appear in the Chart of 
those attending the Congress, There is no mention in the chart, 
for instance, of delegates from either Shensi or the Hupeh-Honan 
border area, both of whom were on the Presidium. Possibly these 
delegates came under the heading of the "Red Army", or "Local 
Armed Forces". Presidium members marked as representing such 
places as Shanghai and Hong Kong were probably grouped under the 
title of "White Areas". If one includes areas referred to in other 
sources as having representation at the Congress, then the chart 




1 Por example, it was reported that three delegates from Foochow 
in the White Areas were arrested en route by KMT "executionist thugs". 
("Chui-tao_wo-men ti hsi-sheng-che", /^“Mourn our Sacrifices_/, HSCH, 













A Russian source also mentions Java, This now brings the 
listing into close agreement with the representation on the 
Presidium.
A subsequent edition of Red Star carried a breakdown of the 
delegates into their Party membership and class origin*^





1 "Ohan-eheng tung-yiian chung ti tai~piao sheng-huon? (life 
of the Delegates during War Mobilisation)? HSCH, Special Edition 
No. 6? (February 1, 1934)? p. 3.
p
Chieh Hua, Inprecor, loc.cit*
5 l,Tai“piao ch’eng-fen tiao-ch’a piao" , (Delegate Component 
Investigation Chart), HSCH , Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), 










The total numbers (l,579) so much exceed the total number of 
delegates (776) that it can only be assumed that observers were
t
included in the figures* (Or it is possible that there was an 
element of doubletsounting present, with peasants who were Party 
members being subsumed under both headings.) It is surprising 
that the soviet government published such figures showing that a 
tiny number of eight men out of 1,579 were drawn from the ranks 
of the industrial workers, since they usually took pains to 
emphasise the predominance of the proletariat.^ Indeed, one report 
stressed that of 75 delegates from Hang-ts!ai ch!d in Pukien, 35 
of them or 46.5$ were workers.^ No breakdown is given of the
^ The middle figure is illegible on the above reference, but, 244 is 
given by Pavel Mif, loc.cit., who refers to the handicraft workers as 
"artisans11. He only lists 2 "shop assistants", and describes the 64 
"others" as "small shopkeepers, students, professional people and 
others", ibid. He makes no mention of Youth League or Party members,nor 
does Mciane (op.cit., p. 25), who took his figures from a Soviet source.
o
Por an analysis of the methods by which the CCP tried to 
camouflage its primarily peasant membership, see Schwartz, op.cit., 
especially pp. 191-199.
3 Hung Yi, "Hsien kei ti-erh-tz^ ch*iian-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta- 
hui", (Dedicated to the Second National Soviet Congress), Tou-cheng.
No. 44 (January 26, 1934), p. 7. The fact that there were supposed to 
be 35 workers from Pukien alone, whereas only 8 appear as industrial 
workers on t£e chart is no doubt because these so-called "workers" 
were handicraft or shop workers.
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class membership of the Party and Youth League members, probably 
because they themselves were mainly peasants or handicraft 
workers. However, they made up nearly $0% of the total.
According to an editorial published on the front page of 
the first special edition of Red China celebrating the Second 
Congress, the Congress was to perform the following functions:
1) In the two years since the Pirst Congress (November 1931), 
the Chinese soviet movement, under the correct leadership 
of the CCP, the support of the workers and the peasants, 
and the struggle of the Red Army, had been greatly developed 
and consolidated. All forces had been centralised to smash 
four of Chiang Kai-shek's Encirclement Campaigns. The soviet 
regime was now the only leader and organiser in China of the 
anti-Japanese, anti-imperialist movement. The Second Congress 
had therefore been convened to sum up the rich experiences of 
the last two years, and to plan the future struggle against 
Japan and imperialism.
2) The Second Congress was being held at a time when the Pifth
i
Encirclement Campaign was being launched, and also at a time 
of transition in the great world revolutionary struggle. It
"Ying-chieh chung-kuo su-wei-ai sheng-li ti ta ko-ming", 
(Yfelcome the Great Revolution of the Chinese Soviet Victory), HSCH, 
Special Edition No. 1, (January 22, 1934), p. 1. This is not in 
Special Edition No. 7, as stated in Hsiao Tso-liang, I, op.cit.,
p. 268.
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was a time of crisis in the battle between the soviet road 
and the colonial road, and the soviet regime was on the eve 
of a great revolutionary* victory. The Second Congress was 
therefore of great historical significance.
3) During the Congress, the Party must ensure that the regime 
fulfil the slogan of building a Red Army of one million men, 
mobilise the masses, seize key cities and win initial victories 
in one. or more provinces. (it is clear from the above points 
that the Congress was dutifully echoing the line of the Pifth 
Plenum. )
4) The editorial pointed out that although there had been 
achievements in economic work, these still did not meet 
requirements. The Congress was therefore to discuss measures 
for raising the level of trade, and of agricultural and 
industrial production. In pursuit of this aim, it was necessary 
to carry out a fierce class struggle, to attack the feudal 
remnants, the reactionary plots of the rich peasants and 
capitalists, and in the new and border areas, to liquidate the 
landlords, oppose (fan-tu:l) the rich peasants, ally with the 
poor peasant and link up with the middle peasant. It would 
also be necessary to weed out from soviet area organs all 
counter-revolutionary elements who attempted to sabotage 
soviet work and the Red Army.
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5) It was pointed out that the weakest link in current work was 
the consolidation of the new areas and the border areas, that 
the land question in these areas needed to be speedily resolved 
together with the suppression of reactionary armed forces*
6) Weaknesses were also reported in the work of the provincial
soviets of Kiangsi and Pukien. leading comrades had become
1bureaucratic and divorced from the masses.
On the same opening day of January 22, after Mao had declared
2the Congress open, there were brief opening speeches by Po Ku, ^ho
3
spoke representing the CCP Central Committee; liu Shao-ehfi, who 
represented the All-China Federation of Trade Unions; Chu Teh^ for 
the Red Army; and Iio K'o-ch’ilan on behalf of the Youth League. Chu 
Teh claimed that the Red Army had smashed half of the Fifth Encircle 
ment Campaign, and that they were confident of dealing similarly 
with the other half.^ In the main however, none of these brief 
remarks added anything to the opening editorial of Red China.
Following the opening speeches, the Congress, acting on a 
proposal by Ts'ai Ch'ang, a delegate from Kiangsi, elected a 75-man
1 Ibid.
2 "Po Ku t'ung-chih chih-tz'u ti ehieh-lu", (Excerpt from the 
Speech of Comrade Po ICu), HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 2, (January 2-4,
1934), p. 1.
3 There is no record of the content of Liu’s remarks.
4 uChu Teh t ’ung-chih chih~tz ’u”, (Speech of Comrade Chu Teh), 
HSCH, Special Edition I\To. 2, p. 2.
5 Ibid.
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1Presidium, This body was in the nature of a steering committee, 
and no doubt dealt with the order of the agenda etc,2 Po Ku pro­
posed that an Honorary Presidium should be elected. This was 
approved, and the Honorary Presidium consisted of Stalin, Kalinin, 
Molotov, ThMlmann and Okano.^ Further preliminary business 
followed the election of the two Presidia* The assembled delegates 
first elected six.committees, and then chose Liang Po-tTai as 
Secretary General.^ The six committees were as follows
1) Credentials Committee
2) Committee for the Resolution on the Work Report of the
5) Committee for the Resolution on Red Army Construction
4) Committee for the Resolution on Economic Construction
5) Committee for the Resolution on Soviet Construction
6) Laws and Decrees Committee
1 See Table VIII.
p
The Presidium may also have dealt with the financial arrange­
ments for the Congress. Most of the funds seem to have been extracted 
from the landlords and rich peasants. See “Chiu hsien p !in-nung~t'uan 
tai-piao ta-hui yung-hu ti-erh-tz'u ch'dan-su ta-hui t !ung~tienn, 
(Congress of Poor Peasant Corps in Nine Hsien send a Telegram Supporting 
the Second National Soviet Congress), HSCH, Ho. 101, (August 13, 1933), 
p. 3. (The orders of Central were that delegates' travelling expenses 
were to be met by "sympathetic subscriptions solicited from the masses". 
See Hung -Ch1 i Chou-pao, Ho. 59, p. 8.)
 ^HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 2, op.cit., p. 2. (Okano becomes 
Hagaoka in Inprecor, 32, loc.cit.)
4 Ibid.
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The delegates also passed the agenda, Finally, Liu Shao- 
ch'i proposed sending a telegram to the Heroic Red Army of the North" 
Bast; Ho K'o-ch'ilan suggested a similar telegram to the revolutionary 
fighters in the KMT areas; and yet another was despatched to the 
workers of the USSR. K'ang K'o-ch'ing (the wife of Chu Teh) suggested 
sending gifts to the wounded soldiers in hospital.^
The Congress agenda consisted of the following six items
1) Report on the last two years1 work of the CEC (to he delivered 
hy Mao Tse-tung)
2) Resolution on Red Army Construction (Chu Teh)
3) Resolution on Soviet Construction (Wu liang-p'ing)
4) Resolution on Economic Construction (Lin Po-ch'tt)
5) Adoption of a Constitution and other Laws
6) The election of a new CEC
p
Ibid. That evening, there was a torchlight procession, 
and a party organised by the Drama Society (ibid. ). Li ICfo-nung, 
who was active in the Political Security Bureau, played the part 
of a local bully (t1u-hao) in one of the Society's productions.
(See Ch'eng Tz'u-yil, "I-ke ching-ts’ai tl wan-hui". (A Golourful 
Evening Party), HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 2, p. 4.)
 ^Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1 and HSCH, No, 145, 
(January 19, 1934), p. 2. This agenda had been imder discussion 
for some time - at least since August 12, 1933, when the Congress 
Preparatory Committee met to draft an agenda. /~Hstlan~chU YUn-tung 
Chou-pao, No. 1, (August 25, 1933), p. &•„/ The six items were 
decided on at the 48th. meeting of the CPC_held on August 16, 1933•
/ HSCH, No. 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5
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On the day after the opening of the Congress, there were no
1 omeetings* On the afternoon of the 24th., Mao began his summary 
of the achievements in soviet work since the First National Soviet 
Congress*^ He continued his speech to its conclusion on the morn­
ing of January 25. Overall, Mao's report followed the lines laid 
down by the Fifth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee. Echoing the 
ECCI's Twelfth Plenum, he stated that the Chinese revolution had 
taken a more acute t u r n ,4 and that China was now in a decisive 
historical stage of struggle between revolution and counter-revolution,
^ Hung Hsing, No* 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1*
2 The timetable of the Congress is included in "Erh-su ta-hui 
sheng-li ti pi-mu-le", ("Victorious Conclusion of the Second Soviet 
Congress), Hung Hsing, No* 27, (February 4, 1934), p. 1*
5 Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei- 
yitan-hui yd jen-min wei-ydan-hui tui ti-erh-tz'u ch'dan-kuo su-wei- 
ai tai-piao ta-hui ti pao-kao, (Report of the Central Executive 
Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic to the Second National Soviet Congress), px*inted 
in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'dan-kuo tai-piao 
ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 22-124 (not pp. 122-24, as stated 
in Hsiao, I, op.cit*, p. 270). Henceforth referred to as CEC Report.
Also to be found in HSCH, Special Edition No. 3, (January 26, 1934), 
pp. 1-12 (pp. 5-8 are missing on the SSC microfilm copy). For a 
listing of where extracts of the CEC Report may be found, together 
with the origins and deficiencies of these extracts, see Hsiao, I, 
op.cit., pp. 270-271. In addition, extracts can be located in Wang 
Chien-min, op.cit., pp. 294-311; a short excerpt, dealing with economic 
policy, incorrectly datelined January 25, 1934, is in Mao Tse-tung, 
Selected Works, I, pp. 141-145; a summary of the speech can also be 
seen in Inprecor, No. 37, (June 29, 1934), p. 957, and No. 38,
(July 6, 1934), pp. 977-8._/
CEC Report, p. 23. (All references are drawn from Chung-hua 
su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch!dan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen- 
hsien.y* For the line of the EC Cl Twelfth Plenum, see, for example, 
To'u-cheng, No. 21, (August 12, 1933), p. 1. With reference to the 
Chinese revolution "taking a more acute turn", Mao was later to 
denounce the Fifth Plenum for "blindly concluding" that this was 
the case. (See RCQHP, p. 191).
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between the soviet regime and the KMT regime*1 This struggle 
would be decided by the victory or defeat of the latest "Encircle­
ment Campaign11 of Chiang Kai-shek. Mao went on to describe the
great victories of the Red Army over the fourth Campaign in the
2
first half of 1933? which led to the expansion of soviet territory 
in Szechuan, north-west Eukien, east Kiangsi, and the new Min-kan 
s o v i e t *3 These territorial acquisitions expanded the population 
of the soviet areas by nearly one million people*^ Mao made a brief 
reference to the appearance in Pukien of a People's G-overnment, but
1 Ibid., p. 26. Mao later claimed to have opposed this idea.
(RCQHP, p. 200).
 ^In his Report, Mao attributed the defeat of the KMT's fourth 
Campaign as being due to the Party's "forward and offensive line", which 
had in fact been used for the first time instead of Mao's traditional 
guerrilla tactics. In 1945 however, he claimed that victory was due to 
the use of his own tactics, and denounced the "forward and offensive 
line". (RCQHP, p. 190) The success of the Party's new strategy over the 
fourth Campaign reinforced their belief that "guerrilla-ism" was obsolete* 
According to Mao, this led to defeat in the fifth Campaign, and the loss 
of the revolutionary base areas. It is unlikely however, that guerrilla 
tactics could have done more than postponed defeat against the KMT's 
blockhouse techniques and superior numbers. (See RCQHP, pp. 190-191, 
p. 204 and p. 207. Also Selected Works, I, pp. 206-207, 220-221,
247-248.)
 ^ QEC Report, p. 37. ^~The new Minkan soviet area held its 
first Congress on December 14, 1933* See Ta-hui t1e-k'an, (Special 
Publication of the Congress), Ho. 2, SSC
^ Ibid. According to one communist source, the central revolu­
tionary base area had a population of three million at this time.
^^Kung Yung-kang, "The Revolutionary Bases in the Countryside, 1928- 
1933n, People's China, Ho. 8, (April 16, 1957), p. 36jJ7 The total 
area of the Republic was alleged to be 1,348,180 sq. Inns., of which 
681,255 sq.kms. represented stable districts. (Wang Ming and IC'ang 
Sheng, Revolutionary China Today, p. 10.)
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again echoed the line of the Fifth Plenum in denouncing them.1 With 
reference to the work of the government in the soviet areas, the 
report enthused on the mob ilisation of the masses under the soviet 
regime, and went into some detail on the workings of soviet democracy. 
Mao stated that because the soviet regime depended on the people,
"its enormous strength is not able to be compared with any other 
state form in history", and that although it used strong power to 
deal with "class enemies", towards its own class basis (workers 
and peasants) "it employs no force but demonstrates only the broadest 
democracy". Mao said that soviet democracy was first of all mani­
fested in its own elections. He summarised electoral procedures 
and stated that the electors now realised the connection between 
the elections and their own lives, so that in the 1932/5 elections, 
in many places more than 80% of those eligible voted.^ Great 
success had been obtained, reported Mao, in putting forward women 
as soviet delegates, so that in Ts!ai-hsi hsiang, about 60% of the 
delegates were female.^ The Report then summarised soviet organisa­
tion at the grass roots level and discussed the work of the hsiang 
committees, by which "soviet work is organised into a complete net­
work in which the broad masses can directly participate."^ Government
1 Report, pp. 40-41.
 ^Ibid., pp. 52-53*
 ^Ibid.> P• 54.
4 Ibid. .
 ^ Ibid., pp. 55-56.
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work personnel, said Mao, were all appointed by election, and if 
they were incompetent, they could be recalled by public opinion, 
so that the solution of all problems was based on public opinion.
The democratic nature of the soviets was further manifested by 
the rights of speech, assembly, association, publication and strike, 
for which facilities such as meeting places, paper and print shops 
existed, by contrast to their suppression in the White areas by 
"KMT fascist terror".^
Mao also spoke of the labour Law, which was the only major law 
passed by the First Congress which had been superceded by a revised 
law prior to the Second Congress.5 The new Labour Law was being 
implemented everywhere, and had resulted in a better standard of 
living. Mao also gave figures for the number of workers belonging 
to trades unions in the soviet areas, and claimed that in the 
central soviet district, over 95% belonged.4 On agrarian policy, 
the Report reiterated the class line of annihilating the landlords, 
relying on the hired farm hands and poor peasants, and allying with 
the middle peasant, which was the line of the editorial of the first 
Special Edition of Red China,^  and of the Fifth Plenum. In the
1 Ibid., P. 57.
2 Ibid., p. 57.
 ^Ibid., pp. 64-74* ^he new Labour law was passed in October 
1933. It can be found in Su-wei-ai fa-tien, (The Soviet Code),
Vol. 2, pp. 3-40. SSC 16.
4 Ibid*, P. 72.
5 Supra.
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case of the rich peasant however, Mao’s Report was more moderate 
in its language towards them than either the Red China editorial 
or the Fifth Plenum, hoth of which used the term "to oppose'*
(fan-tui )-*• the rich peasants, while Mao employed "exploit" or 
"squeeze" (po-hstieh) * ^
Charles McLane erroneously states that the line of the Fifth 
Plenum was to liquidate the rich peasants, and that Mao opposed 
this in his Report to the Second Congress.^
Mao then spoke of the land investigation movement. He 
emphasised that redistribution was to be carried out quickly, and 
once complete, was not to be carried out all over again, for fear 
of alienating the peasants.^ The Report noted that, after re­
distribution, agricultural output usually increased over what it 
had been before, so that in some soviet areas, production was 15- 
20$ higher in 1933 than 1932,^ Having discussed the progress of 
the educational system in the soviet a r e a s a n d  the effectiveness
Hsiao, II, op»cit., p. 699 and p. 697.
 ^Ibid., p. 716. There is room for disagreement however on the 
precise shades of meaning of these two terms, and the relationship 
between them.
 ^Charles McLane, Soviet Policy and the Ghinese Communists, p. 41. 
McLane places considerable reliance on this Incorrect view of the line 
of the Fifth Plenum, in support of his argument that Mao was in Command 
of the soviet government, so that the CCP Central organs were "mere 
shells of authority". (p. 42) In fact, it is clear that the CCP 
Central organs laid down the line for the Second Congress, to which 
Mao was forced to adhere.
^ CEC Report, pp. 77-78. For some comments on the land investiga­
tion movement in the soviet areas, see Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp.166-168.
5 Ibid., p .  85.
6 PP. 90-96.
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of the Marriage Laws passed in 1 9 3 1 Mao turned to the question 
of the Red Army.^ Most of his comments were . concentrated on the 
need to expand the Red Army, under the slogan of creating "a one- 
million-strong iron Red Army”, and the need to raise the level 
of political education of Red Army soldiers.
In order to raise economic, and particularly agricultural 
production, Mao spoke of organising mutual-aid societies and 
ploughing teams, which was to be carried out by the Commissariat 
for National Economy.^ The work of the Grain Commissariat was also 
to be linked with this, so as to maintain the supply of grain to 
the masses and to the Red Army.^ Mao also urged the development
of co-operatives, and the possibility of setting up state-owned
enterprises in certain cases.^ He concluded this section of his 
speech on economic construction by pleading for the smashing of the 
enemy's economic blockade, and the development of external trade.^
In his discussion of soviet work, Mao said that although it had 
achieved glorious successes, it could still be improved. The work
1 Ibid., pp. 96-98.
 ^Ibid., pp. 107-111.
5 Ibid., pp. 107-109.
4 Ibid., p. 112.
5 Ibid.




of the CEC and the CPC should he differentiated, and there must be •
an increase in the number of work personnel in the local people’s 
commissariats, Soviet workers should struggle against bureaucratism 
and coramandism, which led to a gulf being created between the soviets
P t
and the masses, Finally, Mao called on the soviets to strengthen j
iI
their leadership of the anti-imperialist struggle, to call on the
masses to fight for the independence of China, and to defeat the
KMT and Japanese imperialism.
On January 26 and 27, the delegates divided themselves into 
groups to discuss Chairman Mao's Report*4 The summary of their 
discussions in Red China disclosed only that they were all in 
agreement with Mao's Report, and that the groups tended to concentrate 
their discussion on the parts of the Report containing problems 
particularly relevant to their own areas. Some criticisms of 
individual delegates appeared - "for only repeating what Chairman 
Mao said", and for "not understanding the false revolution of the 
Pukien people’s government". In addition, Pukien delegates violently 
criticised "the work style of aimless-talk-ism and bureaucratism in 
the Pukien provincial soviet", and the Minchekan delegate raised the 
problem of whether opium smokers should be allowed to join the guerrilla
^ Ibid., p . 115•
2 Ibid., p. 118. These themes were developed in greater detail
by Wu Liang-p’ing in his Report on Soviet Construction.
 ^bbid., pp. 122-123.
4 "Pen-tau t'ao-lun su-wei-ai kung-tso pao-kao ti ching-kuo", (Divid­
ing into Croups to Discuss the Soviet Work Report), HSCH, Special Edition 
Ho. 4, (January 28, 1934), p. 3. See also "Victorious Conclusion of the 
Second Congress", Hung Hsing, Ho. 27, p. 1. Discussion on the 27th only
is referred to in "Ta-hui chung-yao fa-yen ti i-p'ieh", (a Glance at the 
Important Speeches of the Congress), HSCH, Special Edition Ho, 5,
(January 31, 1934), p. 3. J
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forces, although no decision on this question was reported.
Red China, in reproducing a selection of the speeches made 
by delegates during discussion, also noted that no-one revealed any
p
opinions contrary to those expressed in the Report, The Kiangsi 
and Fukien delegates, Liu Ch'i-yao and Fan Lo-ch'un, both accepted 
Mao's criticisms of bureaucratic errors in the soviet work of their 
areas, and said that measures were being taken to struggle against 
bureaucratism.^ Liu also referred to the fact that the struggle 
against opportunists such as Ku Po and Hsieh Wei-chtln had not been 
started as soon as should have done.4 Phis is interesting because 
Ku and Hsieh were both allied with Mao's brother Mao Tse-t'an, as 
followers of the "Lo Ming Line", alleged to be pessimistic and 
defeatist by the Returned Student leadership. Although Liu did not 
mention Mao's brother personally as an opportunist, this was a 
thinly disguised attack on the Chairman.^
The Minchekan delegate Wang Chin-hsiang admitted the error of 
conservatism in the work of his area, and also the existence of 
opportunism which had caused some personnel to take difficulties 
of supply as a pretext for abandoning recruitment for the Red Army.^
1 Ibid.
 ^HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 5, p« 3*
5 Ibid.
4 Ibid*
 ^ Ibid., The Hsiangkan delegate T'an Yd-pao also „,:ioin3d in 
condemning the "Lo Ming Line".
6 Ibid.
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The Hsiangkan delegate also spoke of opportunism in his area,
manifested in a poor performance with respect to expanding the
Red Army, and lack of contact between the soviets and the masses.^
Problems with the Red Army were also referred to by Lin Jung-k'un,
the representative of Juichin, where there was a serious problem
owith deserters.
Another major focus of attention in the speeches was the work 
being carried out in the border soviet areas. Liu Ch*i-yao acknow­
ledged that the Kiangsi provincial soviet had been remiss in this 
respect. Kiangsi had neglected the work of the Red Guards and Toung 
Pioneers in these areas, had not sent them good cadres from the 
central area, and the work of eliminating "counter-revolutionaries** 
was weak, so that "Chiang Kai-shek spies** had penetrated into 
Hsingkuo hsien. furthermore, it transpired that "some comrades’* 
were confiscating the land and houses of those peasants who had 
been forced to follow the gentry and landlords to the white areas 
and were now in the soviet border areas. In the future ,said Liu, 
they should not be treated as traitors.^ Tseng Ch*ao-sheng, a Red 
Army delegate, also emphasised that in the new and border areas 
the work of Red Army recruitment was weak, and that some "opportunist 
elements1’,, simply said that "the border areas are unable to mobilise’*.
^ Ibid., p. 4.
2 I k M -
3 Ibid., p. 3-
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These viewpoints, said Tseng, should be given "merciless blow^l^
The connection between the soviet organs and the people was 
another major area of concern to delegates* Chou Tseng-ts'ai, 
speaking for Hsingkuo hsien, was enthusiastic about the close 
relationship in his area between the soviets and the mass organisa­
tions. In one hsiang, he reported, more than 30 committees had 
been formed, all the people had been organised, meetings were held 
three times a month, and each delegate supervised 30-50 people, so 
that over-all their work met with success.^ The female delegate 
from Kiangsi, Hsieh P'ei-lan, spoke about the role of women in 
encouraging mass participation in soviet work, especially with 
regard to Red Army recruitment and morale. However, she said, some 
women wavered on this last point by preventing their husbands from 
joining the Red Army. This Was to be opposed as sabotaging the 
expansion of the Red Army.^ Other delegates whose speeches were 
reported included: Ch'eng Rang~wu (Oyttwan), Chu Ch'i (Shanghai),
Ho Teh (Manchuria), and Ch'en Teh-ch'in (Korea).4 After the 




4 Ibid *, p. 4 *
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concluding remarks.I Mao began by correcting "some comrades" who 
he said, had included incorrect views in their speeches. This 
-included those who believed that the Fifth Encirclement Campaign 
had already been shattered, and those who said that the Red Army 
was barely in the process of destroying it. The former view, said 
Mao, was "an exaggerated estimation of our own victory", while the 
latter "disregarded the serious attacks launched by the Red Army 
against the enemy", in which the Red Army had already achieved the 
first stage of victory.  ^ Mao went on to dismiss the opinion of 
"one comrade who said that the Fukien People’s Revolutionary Govern­
ment was not completely counter-revolutionary in nature".^ "Another 
comrade", (possibly Pan Ho-ch’un), was ridiculed for claiming that 
"all the work personnel in Fukien were opportunists."4 Mao admitted 
the existence of some opportunist elements, "but as for what the 
comrade says, it is a slander directed at .the soviet."5
 ^ "Kuan^yd chung-yang chih-hsing wei-ydan-hui pao-kao ti chieh- 
lun", (Conclusion Concerning the Report of the_CEC), HSCH, Special 
Edition Ho. 5, (January 31, 1934)? pp. 1-2. Also printed in Chung- 
hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz’u ch’dan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen- 
11 si en, op.cit., pp. 125-139. A section can be found in Selected 
Works, I, pp. 147-152, under the title "Be concerned with the well­
being of the masses, pay attention to methods of work". There are 
numerous omissions from the original Chinese text. J
p «—
Ibid., p. 1. ^ The Returned student leaders agreed. In Moscow,
Wang Ming spoke in opposition to "pessimistic views about the chances 
of the survival of the soviet regime in the face of KMT attack." He 
also attacked those who considered the KMT to be "nothing but a dead 





In a move designed to bolster Red Army morale, Mao declared
that divorce was not available to wives of Red Army men unless
they had the consent of their husbands, or unless they had not
heard from their husbands for two years, Mao refused to accept
proposals put forward by some delegates that the minimum marriage
age (20 for men, 18 for women) should be lowered."*'
Mao then switched to economic policy, and urged the local
soviets to improve the living of the masses, and not just concen-
o
trate on expanding the Red Army. ~ By feeding and clothing the 
masses, observed Mao, the Red Army would thereby win their support, 
and encourage peasants to join. Mao spoke highly of the movement 
to expand the Red Army in Juichin, “under the direct leadership of 
the Gentral Bureau and the Central Revolutionary Military Committee11. ^ 
Mao completed his remarks by pointing out weaknesses in the soviet 
work of most of the soviet areas, and advising them to become like 
the model hsien of Hsingkuo (Kiangsi).4
•*" Ibid.
2 Ibid., p. 2. (This is the section appearing in Selected 
Works.)
Ibid. Omitted from the current editions of Selected Works.
4 Areas criticised were Ytlehkan, Minkan, Hsiangokan, Hsiangkan 
and Bukien. This is omitted from the Selected Works. (Rue, op.cit. * 
pp. 262-263 believes that this was an attack levied against the 
Returned Student leadership, saying that the places criticised by 
Mao wer:£ strongholds of their supporters, while those praised by 
him were pro-Mao.)
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Immediately following Mao^ speech, the Congress passed a 
resolution approving his Report.1 The resolution summarised and 
approved the main points of Maofs Report, and concentrated on 
the need to smash the Fifth Encirclement Campaign. Credit for 
victory over the Fourth Campaign was given to f,the correct 
leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP and the central 
government," as well as to the masses and the Red Army.^ The 
resolution stated that the soviets were now "situated in the pro­
tracted decisive struggle of, shattering.the Fifth Encirclement 
Campaign. We are at the crisis point in grasping the soviet road 
of victory over the whole country."3 The new CEC and CPC to be 
elected at the Congress would be expected to implement these 
tasks.4 To these ends, a one-million-strong Red Army was to be 
created, and local guerrilla forces were to act in a complementary
5
way to the main force of the Red Army. Mao was opposed to this 
placing of guerrilla warfare in a subordinate role.. He later 
referred to the "serious mistakes (of meeting) the vastly superior
^ "Kuan-ytt chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yitan-hui pao-kao ti 
chUeh-i", (Resolution on the Report of the CEO), in Chung-hua 
su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-t^u chtiian-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen- 
hsien, op.cit., pp. 140-143.
^ Ibid., p • 140•




Banking forces in positional warfare, at which the Red Army was 
neither technically nor spiritually at its best,"*1' The resolution 
concluded by saying that "the Second Rational Soviet Congress 
believes that by following the correct Bolshevik line of the 
Central Committee of the'CCP and the soviet central government... 
the- soviets...will overturn the rule of imperialism and the KMT 
so that the acute revolutionary situation which, exists in China 
will turn into a victorious revolution. Moreover... the leadership 
of the proletariat will be strengthened, so that the democratic 
revolution of the Chinese workers and peasants will become a
p
future socialist revolution.'1
On the following day, January 28, Chu Teh reported to the 
Congress on the progress in Red Army construction.2 Chu spoke on 
the intensification of the revolutionary situation in China, the 
successes of the Red Armies in the Central Soviet Area, Hsiangkan,
1 Snow, Red Star over China, p. 186. Wang Ming, however, 
opposed the conversion of regular Red Army units into "small 
partisan detachments" (Wang Ming & IC’ang Sheng, op.cit*, p. 64).
p
' Kuan-chung-yang chih-hsing wei-ydan-hui pao-kao ti chdeh- 
i? QP*cit«? pp. 142-143.
3
Hung Hsing, Ho. 27, p. 1. Hsiang Xing also spoke on the 
enlargement of the Red_Army and the "record-setting movement" (t'u- 
chi ydn~tung) Ibid._/ See also "Kuan-yd hung-chtln wen-t’i ti
chiieh-i", (Resolution on the Question of the Red Army), in Chung- 
hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-ta'u ch'dan-kuo tai-piao ta-liui
wen-hsien, op.cit. pp. 167-175 * The Report itself is not available.
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Minchekan, Hsiangokan, Oydwan and Shansi in their smashing of the 
fourth Encirclement campaign, and the need to crush the Pifth 
Campaign. He continued "by stressing the need to expand the Red Army 
into a one-million-strong force, to strengthen its political work, 
and ensure the absolute leadership of the Party in the Red Army.
His Report added details to Mao's CEO Report to the Congress, but
did not differ in principle. On the evening of the 28th., and the
morning of the 29th., several delegates such as Lo Mai (hi Wei-
han), Ho Ch'ang-kung and (Pang?) Wen-ping^ made speeches concerning 
the Report
The Report on Soviet Economic Construction was given by Lin 
Po-ch'd on the morning of January 29.^ Lin referred to the economic 
depression and the fall in industrial and agricultural production
1 Ituan-ytt hung-ch&n wen-t'i ti chdeh-i, op.cit.
 ^The first character is illegible, but Pang Wen-ping, as 
Secretary of the CCP Youth League, was one of the men responsible 
for recruitment into the Red Army. (See Hym Wales, Hew China,
pp. 87-88).
 ^ ”San-ko chung-yao pao-kao: tfao-lun yd chieh-ltua", (Three 
Important Reports: Discussion and Conclusions), n.d., HSCH, Special 
Edition Ho. 6, (Pebruary 1, 1934), p* 2.
This description is based on Kuan-yu su~wei~ai ching-chi 
chien-she ti chdeh-i” (Resolution on Soviet Economic Construction), 
printed in Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-ex'h-tg'u ch1 Ran-kuo 
tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., pp. 176-187. summary can
be found in Chinese Workers Correspondence, Ho. 26, (July 12, 1934), 
pp. 2-4. The Report itself is not available, although it is 
summarised in HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 6, p. 2.^/
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(combined with rising unemployment) in the KMT areas of China.1 
Lin then contrasted this picture with his own estimate of the 
rising production of the soviet areas, the development of external 
trade, and of a flourishing internal market.*2 Rice production 
was reported to have been greatly increased (by more than 200$ 
in the Minchekan area), more than 200,000 picul worth of swamp 
land had been reclaimed, and such industries as iron, lime, 
paper, coal and tungsten had been revived.^ The cooperative 
movement was also reported to be developing widely, with over 
500,000 members, and 50$ of the population joining in some areas.4 
In general, said Idn, a planned economy was now initiated in the 
soviet areas following the inauguration of a Commissariat for 
National Economy.^ However, said the Resolution, further increases 
in production were necessary, particularly in agriculture.6 
Peasant cooperatives were to be encouraged,^ and trade was to be 
developed.8 The solution to the grain problem was to be found 
by the establishment of a new Grain Commissariat, which would 
tackle the food shortages of 1933 by means of cooperatives.^ The
1 Ibid > P« 176.
2 Ibid PP . 176-178.
3 Ibid > P. 177.
4 Ibid
5 .Ibid y P* 178.
6 Ibid
7 Ibid y P. 179.
8 Ibid ? P* 181.
9 Ibid ? P. 183.
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Resolution called on the CPC, and the CEC Presidium to strengthen 
their leadership over the Rational Economy, Einance and G-rain 
Commissariats and the State Bank; to train new cadres so as to 
strengthen the leadership of the proletariat in economic con­
struction, and draw on labouring women to work on the economic 
front* However, the Resolution also stated that the economic 
difficulties of the soviet areas could only be overcome by 
military victory against the M l  and the occupation of key cities, 
and that economic construction therefore had to be subordinated, 
for the present, to the needs of the war.^
Overall, the Resolution painted far too rosy a picture of 
the soviet economy, which was being severely affected by the war 
and Chiang Kai-shek’s use of blockhouses in his economic blockade* 
Many essential goods, including salt, were in very short supply* 
Wang Ming, speaking in Moscow to the ECCI’s Thirteenth Plenum, 
admitted that soviet economic policy had encountered difficulties 
because of the scattering and backwardness of the soviet di-stricts, 
and because of the continuous and lengthy war*^ The measures 
that Lin advocated became soviet economic policy as carried out 
in the communist-controlled areas during 1934*
j P • 186.
 ^Ibid *, p. 187•
 ^Wang Ming and IC'ang Sheng, op * cit *, p. 45 passim* Also see 
Yakhontoff, The Chinese Soviets, pp* 148, 156-157; and Isaacs, The 
Tragedy of the Ghinese Revolution, p. 302.
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Lin Po-ch’tt's Report was discussed by the delegates on the
afternoon of the 29th*, and in general, they completely agreed
1with his analysis and recommendations. Time ran out on the 29th*, 
and discussion was continued on the 30th., after which Lin Po-ch’il 
summed up, ’’bringing out to all the comrades who had spoken, 
points on which they were not clear,...and certain errors by 
delegates in their speeches.”2
At this stage during the proceedings however, it was known 
that the Congress was about to come to an abrupt end. Lin Po-ch’it’s 
Report had been cut short by the Congress Presidium the previous 
afternoon (January 29), so that Mao could make an emergency 
announcement*3 Mao reported that news had been received from the 
front that Chiang Kai-shek had defeated the Fukien People’s Govern­
ment, and was now preparing to attack the soviet areas in force, 
from three directions.^ Mao urged immediate mobilisation, the 
suppression of counter-revolutionary landlords and rich peasants 
who might take advantage of the enemy’s attack, and the implementa­
tion of measures to ensure the supply of grain to the Red Army,
By opposing the errors of ’’left” and ’’right” opportunism said Mao,
■^ HSCH, Special Edition No. 6, p. 2,
2Ibid.
"Kuam-ytt chin-chi tung-ytlan ti pao-kao”, (Report Concerning 





the enemy's three-pronged attack could be defeated. After 
Mao's speech was concluded, it was proposed that the Congress 
finish five days earlier than planned, so as to close on 
February 1st. The work of the Congress would be intensified so 
as to complete it within a shorter space of time, and this would 
allow the delegates to return to their districts a little sooner
p
to mobilise the masses against the expected attack. This 
proposal was accepted unanimously by the delegates.5
On the afternoon of January 30th., following Lin Po-ch'd's 
Report on Economic Construction, Wu Liang - p'ing delivered his 
Report on Soviet Construction.^ The Report initially dwelt on 
the successful development of soviet organisation since the time 
of the First Congress, and quoted examples of the increased 
number of "worker and peasant activist elements" being drawn in to 
participate in soviet work.^ Wu claimed that basic soviet work at
1 Ibid.
2 "Ta-hui t'i-ch'ien pi-mu", (Congress Closure Brought Forward), 
HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 6, (February 1, 1934), p. 1.
 ^Ibid.
4 »
The summary in the text is based on Su-wei-ai chien-she chu&h-
i-an, (Resolution on Soviet Construction), printed in Chung-hua su- 
wei-ai kung-ho-kuo ti-erh-tz'u ch'&an-kuo tai-piao ta~hui wen-hs'ien, 
op.cit. / pp. T88-r98." '/^Also in HSCH,' Ho . 132, (February 20, 1934), 
pp. 5-6. A summary in English is in Chinese Workers Correspondence, 
Vol. 4, Ho. 25, (July 5? 1934), pp. 1-2. The Report itself is not 
available: however it is clear from a comparison between the summary 
of the Report contained in HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 6, p. 2 and the 
above Resolution, that the Report and the Resolution were essentially 
the same. This point also applies_to the Resolutions on the Red Army 
and Soviet Economic Construction._/
5 Upper and Lower Ts'ai-hsi hsiang, for example, had each added 
110 participants to committee work under the hsiang soviet. Ibid.,
p. 188.
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the hsiang and sliih levels had greatly improved, and that the field 
investigation movement had produced many new cadres who had been 
raised to leadership positions in soviet organs. It was also 
claimed that on the average, more than 75fo of the electorate 
"participated in the elections", and In some places this reached 
9 5 However, Wu went on to say, in spite of these successes, 
a large number of defects and shortcomings still existed, and he 
spent far more time discussing these than he did discussing the 
good points.
First of all, said the Resolution, the work was progressing 
unevenly. In Hsingkuo, Juichin, Shengli and other hsien in the 
Central Soviet area, and in parts of some hsien in Minchekan and 
Hsiangkan, great progress had been made, while in the majority of 
places in YUehkan, Minkan, and Hsiangokan and other provinces, 
little success had been achieved in drawing the population into 
political life, few wornen participated, the right of recall of 
representatives was seldom invoked, and bureaucratism existed in 
the soviet organs.^
Wu then outlined several measures necessary for carrying out 
the central task of winning the war. Firstly, to improve the work 
of the central government, the division of responsibility between 
the CSC and the CPG had to be clearly demarcated.-^ Wu did not
1 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
 ^Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
5 Ibid., p * 191•
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elaborate on this, but it would seem to indicate that the CPC, 
although theoretically under the jurisdiction of the unwieldy 63- 
man CEO, had become in practice the dominant organ of the central 
government, because of its compact size. This situation was 
rectified at the Second Congress by the rreation of an inner 
Presidium of the CEC, The central government was also instructed 
to increase its supervision of the provincial soviets, especially 
the hey levels of the provincial soviets, especially the key levels 
of the provincial soviet1s Executive Committees, which with their 
Presidia were responsible for all the work of the hsien soviets.
The Resolution specifically singled out Minchekan, Hsiangokan and 
Hsiangkan as provinces over which the central government should 
intensify its leadership, and instructed the central government to 
make connection with Oyiiwan, Hsiangosi, and Szechuan-Shensi 
provinces.'*'
Prom the province and hsien level, the Resolution moved down 
to discuss hsiang and shih level work. It was pointed out that 
these were the basic level organs of the soviet regime, through 
which all laws and directives were transmitted to the people.
They were therefore to draw in as many "worker and peasant activist 
elements" as possible to participate in soviet work.^
** Ibid.
 ^Xbid*> P• 192.
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Turning to the work of the new and border areas, Wu urged 
that strong Revolutionary Committees should be established to 
intensify the arming of the workers and peasants, organise guerrilla 
forces, and set up “strong committees to liquidate the counter­
revolutionaries so as to eliminate any kind of counter-revolutionary 
behaviour11. He added that in the new and border areas, the land 
problem should be quickly solved and that the property of the land­
lords and “counter-revolutionary cliques'* should be confiscated, 
the larger part of it to be distributed among the “local masses".1 
However, the “indiscriminate beating" of the local gentry by 
guerrilla troops had to be stopped, as this tended to alienate 
many of the local populace, Finally, in order to assist work in 
the new and border areas, and to help themmake the transition to 
formal soviets, the central government was instructed to send them 
experienced cadres.^
In order to strengthen the mass base of the soviets, the 
Resolution urged an increase in voter participation in elections, 
and more use of the right of recall to remove unsuitable soviet 
delegates. Soviet organs were instructed to awake the masses to 
take part in political life, and it was directed that more frequent 
work reports should be made to the electorate, that criticism by 
the electorate was to be encouraged, and that soviet personnel
1 Ibid., p. 1 9 3 .
2 £bid.*j P* 194.
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should pay close attention to the criticism, opinions and problems 
of the people, so as to enlist their support*^
According to the Resolution, it appeared that the main 
shortcoming in soviet organisation was the existence of bureau­
cratism, which was directly linked to the non-involvement of the 
people in the political affairs of the soviets* This non­
involvement caused a separation of the soviets from the people, 
and an ignorance on the part of , soviet personnel about the living 
conditions of the people, and their problems. These problems, 
which the Resolution concluded were largely the result of "class 
alien elements" infiltrating into the soviet organs, and using 
"groundless talk and hollow cries" and getting orders obeyed by 
force, were to be controlled by using the Workers and Peasants
n
Inspectorate to weed out these bad influences. The soviet organs 
were also instructed to develop closer relations with the mass 
organisations, particularly the trade unions, from which many 
cadres were recruited.
The Resolution concluded with a general statement on the 
relationship between the Party and the soviets, and the future 
form of the soviet regime. It was made clear that "proletarian 
leadership" - Party control over the soviets - was essential.
The soviets therefore must "resolutely support the leadership
1 ISid.
2 £bid., pp. 195-196. 
 ^Ibid., p. 197.
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of the proletarian political party, the Communist Party, guarantee 
Party control over soviet elections, for only in this way could 
the soviets complete the democratic revolution and prepare for the
tt -i
transformation to a socialist revolution.
After the Report was concluded, the delegates discussed it that
2
evening, and again the following morning. Wu Liang-p’ing then 
summed up.^
On the afternoon of January 51st., Hsiang Ying reported on 
the Constitution.^ After, his Report, the Constitution was agreed 
to by the delegates, who then passed it over to the CEC for dis­
cussion and promulgation.5 The Constitution^ as passed by the 
Second Congress? differed only in a few minor respects® from that
1 Ibid., pp. 197-198.
 ^HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 6, p. 2.
3 Ibid.
 ^’’Hsiang Ying t'ung-chih kuan-yd hsien-fa ti pao-kao", (The 
Report of Comrade Hsiang Ying on the Constitution'), HSCH, Special 
Edition. Ho. 7, (Eebruary 3, 1934), p. 3.
® Ibid.
 ^To be precise, it was in fact only a "constitutional outline".
"Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo hsien-fa ta-kang", (Consti­
tutional Outline of the Ghinese Soviet Republic), HSCH, Ho. 149, 
(February 14, 1934), p. 2.
8 For a listing of the actual textual discrepancies, see 
Hsian Tso-liang, I, op.cit., pp. 274-275*
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passed by the First Congress in 1931.1 In his Report, Hsiang 
Ying said that "the experience of two years of soviet work has 
proved that the simple constitution of the First Rational Soviet 
Congress is basically correct11.2 Hsiang went on to say that never­
theless it was not felt to be 100% appropriate, and therefore the 
Central Committee of the CCP had prepared another constitution, 
which however, had not been received owing to "reasons of communi­
cation".^ The actual report given by Hsiang was, according to the 
precis of his speech in Red China/  nothing but a summary of the 
provisions of the old Constitution.
During its final session on the morning of February 1st., 
the Congress elected a new government.5 The Congress also passed 
a Manifesto addressed to all the people of China, which pointed 
out that there were only two roads for the Chinese people to choose 
from - the soviet road or the colonial road.^ The Manifesto devoted
^ Hung Ch1i Ghou-pao, No. 25, (December 1931 )> pp. 2-7.




 ^ This will be dealt with in detail later.
"Ti-erh-tz’u ch’Han-kuo su-wei-ai tai-piao ta-hui hsHan- 
yen", (Manifesto of the Second Rational Soviet Congress), dated 
February 1, 1934; HSCH, Special Edition Ro. 7, (February 3? 1934),
p. 2.
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itself to contrasting the advantages of the soviet road to that of 
the KMT imperialist path, and stated that the soviets were pre­
pared to sign an alliance with any armed force which would stop 
attacking the soviet areas, and give its people the rights of 
speech, assembly, strike, and the right to bear arms. Then the
soviets and all who cared to join them could drive Japanese
1imperialism out of China.
Before the elections, Chu Ch'i proposed that the Congress send
a telegram "opposing the KMT fascist white terror", and calling
upon the people of China to demand that the KMT government
o
immediately release the Houlens and Wang Teh Li Hui. Hsiang Ying 
proposed that a telegram of congratulations be sent to the Seven­
teenth Congress of the Bussian Communist Party, which was in 
session in Moscow at the time.^ These proposals were passed 
unanimously, and given to the Presidium for drafting and publica­
tion. 4 Another source refers to a third telegram demanding 
"opposition to the German fascists" and "the release of the German 
workers1 leader, Comrade Thalmann".^ The delegates then approved
1 ™‘Ibid. The Manifesto was originally proposed by the Congress 
after Mao's speech on urgent mobilisation of January 29* (See
HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 6, p. 1. )_/
2 "Wei-ta ti pi-mu shih", (Great Closing Ceremony), HSCH,
Special Edition Ho. 7, (February 3, 1954), p. 1. £_ The Houlens
were an Austrian couple arrested in Shanghai in 1932, and later 
convicted of being Comintern agents. (See Snow, Red Star over China,
p. 415.) It is not known who Comrade "Wang Teh Li Hui" was
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
 ^Hung Hsing, Ho. 27, p. 1.
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designs for a national emblem, a national flag and a military 
flag,1
After the election of the new government, Mao made a closing 
speech, in which he declared that the Congress had been completely 
s u c c e s s f u l .  ^ jje announced that the Congress had decided the 
policies and plans for the victory of the revolution over the 
whole country, and that the task was now to go and put these 
policies and plans into effect.^ Mao concluded by painting for 
the delegates a vision not only of the proletarian dictatorship 
towards which he said China was moving, but of China’s future 
communist society,4 The assembled delegates then sang the 
’’Internationale u amid the sound of firecrackers. ^
On February 2nd., the day after the formal close of the Con­
gress, the remaining delegates held an unveiling ceremony for 
the "Martyrs Memorial Tower", dedicated to those who fell in the
1 "Ti-erh-tz’u ch’Han-su ta-hui kuan-yii kuo-hui kuo-ch'i chi 
chdn-ch’i ti chileh-ting", (Decisions of the Second National Soviet 
Congress on the National Emblem, the National Flag and the Military 
Flag), HSCH, Special Edition No. 7, (February 3, 1934), p. 3.
2 "Ta-hui pi-mu tz’u", (Closing Speech of the Congress), HSCH, 
Special Edition No. 7, p. 1.
 ^IbicU
HSQH, Special Edition Ho. 7, p. 1.
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Red Army. Other delegates went and did manual labour to help the 
dependents of Red Army men.'*'
In summary, It is clear that Mao played a very conspicuous 
role at the Second Congress, and was, in terms of speeches made 
to the delegates, the dominant individual present. He was also 
conspicuous for voicing agreement with the line adopted by the 
Returned Student leadership and the Fifth Plenum. Ihis can be 
explained on the assumption that Mao, in return for a leading role 
in the soviet government, agreed not to cppose the Party leader­
ship publicly. An analysis of the new government shows however that
his real power was considerably diminished compared with the 
situation immediately following the First Congress at the end 
of 1931.
On February 1, 1934, the last day of the Second Congress, at 
9 o'clock in the morning, lo Mai proposed that the delegates 
consider the last item on their agenda, which was the election of 
a new Central Executive Committee (CEC), to replace the CEC 
elected by the First Congress over two years earlier. According 
to the Central Soviet Organisation law,^ which was enacted in
-i
Hung Hsing, Ho. 27, p. 1.
 ^ HSQH, Special Edition Ho. 7> p. 1*.
J Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang su-wei-ai tsu-chih
fa‘J (Organisation Law of the Central Soviet of- the Chinese Soviet Re­
public), dated February 17, 1934; printed in Ghung-hua su-wei~ai kung- 
ho-kuo ti-erh-tg'u ch'tlan-kuo tai-piao ta-hui wen-hsien, op.cit., 
pp. 152-165.(Henceforth referred to as Tsu-chih Fa.)
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accordance with the principles of the Constitution,-*- the national 
Congress was the highest organ of the soviet regime,2 and had the 
power to elect the CEC.-^
The organising of the new CEC membership had been under way 
for several months, under the guidance of a committee set up in 
August 1935 by the CPC. The Committee had fifteen members: Wang 
Chia-ch’iang, Liu Po-ch'eng, Lo Pu, P !an Han-nien, Mao Tse-tung,
Hu Hai, Wu Liang-p'ing, Sha KPo-fu, Liu Shao-ch’i, Ch’en Ydn, Ho 
K !o-chTtlan, Liang Po-t’ai (who headed the Committee), Teng Pa, Kao 
Tzu-li and Lin Po-cHPd.^ The Returned Students almost certainly 
controlled this Committee as six of its members were definitely 
associated with them,^ another three possibly supported them,^ 
while Mao had only one certain supporter.?
The Congress Presidium proposed the list of candidates up for
election to the CEC, the list having been previously handed in by
each of the delegations. There were 175 formal members on the list,
8and the names of 35 alternate, or candidate, members. Lo Mai then
1 Ibid., article 1.
2
Ibid., article 2.
3 Ibid., article 6.
^ HSCH, Ho. 106, (August 31, 1933), p. 5-
 ^Wang Chia-ch!iang, Lo Pu, Wu Liang-p'ing, GbPen Ydn, Ho K ’o- 
ch'dan, Liang Po-t'ai,
 ^Liu P0"Chfeng, Liu Shao-ch'i, Teng Pa.
 ^Liu Po-chPd. The factional loyalties of P'an Han-nien, Hu 
Hai, Sha KPo-fu and Kao Tzu-li are uncertain.
® HSCH Special Edition Ho. 7, p. 1.
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announced the name of each candidate up for election, plus his 
place of residence, social origin (ch*eng-fen), sex, Party Corps 
organisation, nationality and present occupation*-1- Five of the 
candidates put forward underwent examination by the delegates,
p
one of whom was rejected "because his work history was not clear"*
The vacancs*- was filled and the Congress unanimously passed the
list of the 1 7 5  full members of the C E C . 5  The number of names put 
forward for alternate membership was raised from 55 to 36 (possibly 
to accommodate the delegate who was refused full membership), 
and these were passed by the Congress one by one/ The Congress 
then elected a 35-man Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.5
The new CEC held its first plenary session on Pebruary 3? 1934*^ 
According to the Organisation Law, the CEC was the highest organ of 
the soviet regime when the National Congress was not in session,? its
1 Ibid.
Ibid. (His name was not disclosed.)
Ibid. A full list will be found in Table X*
^ Ibid * A full list will be found in Table X*
Ibid* A full list will be found in Table XI./ One source
refers to a Presidium of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, 
although no names were mentioned. See "TL-erh-chieh chung-yang chih- 
hsing wei-yiian-hui ti-i-tz’u hui-i chi-sheng", (Record of the Eirst _ 
Meeting of the Second CEC), HSCH, No. 146, (February 6, 1934), p. 1_/
/ "Chung-hua su-wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei- 
yHan-hui pu-kao, ti-i-hao", (Announcement No* 1 of the Central 
Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic), reprinted in 
HSCH, No. 148, (February 12, 1934), p. 1.
7
Tsu-chih Fa, article 7.
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T A B L E  X
Alphabetical List of all Full and Alternate Members 
of the CEC elected at the Second national Soviet 
Congress, February, 1934
79 Chan Yi-chin 131 Chou Shao-wen
Chang Ai-p'ing (18) 106 Chou Yi-k’ai
21 Chang Chi-chih 9 Chou Ytteh-lin
130 Chang Chin-1ou 78 Chu Ch’i
69 Chang Ch’in-ch’iu 66 Chu Jui
74 Chang Jan-ho Chu Jung-sheng (l3i)
86 Chang ICuan-yi 29 Chu Teh
59 Chang Kuo-t!ao 165 Chu Ti-ytian
175 Chang Ch'un-ch'ing 94 Chu Chao-hsiang
121 Chang Ta-ho 93 Chu Wei-yilan
92 Chang Teh-san 8 Ch’ii Ch’iu-pai
123 Chang Ting-ch'eng 23 Chung Ch'ang-t1ao
117 Chang Wen-t'ien 25 Chung Hsiin-jen
120 Chang Yttn-hsien 108 Chung Kuei-hsin
170 Chao Ytin 19 Chung Pao-yiian
61 Ch’en A-chin 105 Chung Shih-pin
58 Ch’en Ch’ang-hao Chung Yi-chin (26)
109 Ch'en Hsing-sheng 112 Fan Lo-ch’un
55 Ch’en Hung-shih Fang Chen-hua (28)
49 Ch’en Kuang . 161 Fang Chih-min
2 Ch’en Shao^yil Fang Ching-ho (24)
135 Ch’en Shou-ch1ang Feng HsHeh-feng (l5)
128 Ch’en T ’an-ch’iu .96 Fu Ts’ai-hsiu
151 Ch’en Tzu-ch’ien 34 Ho Ch'ang
54 Ch'en Yi 35 Ho Ch’ahg-kung
126 Ch * en Ytln 132 Ho Chen-wu
87 Cheng Chen-fen 3 Ho K'o-ch’ftan
89 Cheng Wei-sail 60 Ho Lung
90 Ch’eng Fang-wu 157 Ho Shu-heng
Chia YUan (l4) 148 Ho Wei
76 Chiang A-san 71 Hsia Hsi
10 Chin Wei-ying 6 Hsiang Ying
116 Ch’iu Hsien-ying 65 Hsiao K'o
Ch’iu Shih-feng (3) 15 Hsiao Shih-pang
51 Chou Chien-p’ing Hsieh Chen-fu (2)
30 Chou En-lai 28 Hsieh Hsien-ssu
140 Chou Ituang-k’un 14 Hsieh Ming-jen
Chou Kuei-hsiang (33) Hsieh Ping-huang (25)
52 Chou K ’un 12 Hsieh YAl-ch’in
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T A B L E  X (coirtd.)
107 Hsiung Hsien-pi




21 Hsil Pa-chih 
168 Hsil-'P^ h-li 
67 Hsil Yen-kang 
40 Hsttn Huai-chou 
111 Hu Hai
Hua Hsin-hsiang (32)
17 Huang Ch,ang-chiao 
129 Huang Ghia-kao 
11 Huang Fa-kuei 
Huang Pu-wu (27)
141 Iiuang Kuang-pao 
37 Huang Su
103 Huang Pao
162 Huang Wan-sheng 
122 Huang Yi-chang 
'.82 Hung.jShui
145 Jen Pi-shih 
159 Juan Hsiao-hsien
K 1 ang IC1 o-ch1 ing (36) 
88 Kao Chitn-t1 ing 
167 Kao Pzu-li 
77 Ku Pa-ts1un 
101 Ku Pso-lin 
164 Kuan Ch'un-hsiang 
70 Kuan Hsiang-ying
163 Kuan Ying
K 1uang Chu-ch’Han (34) 
144 K ’uarig Piao 
56 K'ung Ho-ch'ung
104 K'ung Shu-an 
91 Kuo Shu-shen
174 Lai Mei-yil 
150 Li Ch'eng-chia 
124 Li Chien-chen 
26 Li Cho-jan 
13 Li Pu~ch *un 
139 Li Hsien-nien 








44 Lin Piao 
100 Lin Po-ch'H
24 Liu Ch'i-yao 
57 Liu Ch'ou-hai 
110 Liu Ch’Hn-hsien 
95 Liu Hsiao 
27 Liu Kuang-ch'en
98 Liu Kuo-chu 
97 Liu Ming-hui 
33 Liu Po-ch1eng 
46 Liu Po-chien




50 Lo Jui-ch*ing 
Lo Jung-huan (19)
99 Lo Mai
81 Lo Ping~hui 
172 Lo Pzu-ming 
20 Lou Meng-hsia
Lung Ch'un-shan (31)
5 Mao Pse-tung 
38 Hi eh Hung-ch'iln
45 Hieh Jung-chen 
119 P ’an Han-nien
85 P 1 an Shih-chung 
135 P ’eng Jen-ch*ang 
42 P !eng Peh-huai 
64 Pi Shih-t’i
1 Po Ku 
102 Shao Shih-p’ing 
72 Sung Pai-min 
142 P*an YH-pao 
166 Peng Chen-hsHn 
118 Peng Pa
Peng P !ing (35)
Peng Pzu-hui (12) 
Peng Yao-sheng (4) 
169 Peng Ying-ch'ao 
41 P*eng Pai-ytlan 
18 Ps1ai Ch1ang 
83 Ps'ai Kan
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T A B Ii B X (contd.)
47 Ts'ai Shu-fan 
113 Tseng Hung-yi 
149 Tseng Kuang-lan
22 Tseng Shan
Tsou Chung-ts’ai (8) 
Tsou Tun-hou (29)
Tung Ch' ang-slieng (5) 
36 Tung Chen-t’ang 
160 Tung Pi~wu 
39 Wan Yung-ch’eng 
134 Wang Chen 
32 Wang Chia-ch'iang 
153 Wang Chin-hsiang 
80 Wang Peng-ming 
171 Wang Hsien-hsilan 
146 Wang Hsiu-chang
48 Wang Ju-ch'ih 
127 Wang Sheng-jung
75 Wang Shih-t’ai 
73 Wang Wei-chou
115 Wu Lan-fu
7 Wu Liang-p’ing 
125 Wu Pi-hsien 
136 Wu Teh-Peng 
114 Wu Tzu-yRan
155 Wu YR-chang
156 Yang Ch’i-hsin 
Yang Ping-lung (l)
43 Yang Shang-k ’ uii 
173 Yang Shih-chu 
63 Yeh Chien-ying 
Yell Teh-kuei (ll) 
Yen Li-chi (2l)
Yin Jen-kuei (22) 
152 YR Han-chao 
154 Yii Chen-nung 
84 Yti Hung-wen 
147 Ytt Hung-ytlan 
62 Yttan Kuo-p’ing 
53 Yileh Sliao-hua
This list is taken from an original copy of the Chung-diua .su- 
Wei-ai kung-ho-kuo chung-yang chih-hsing wei-yHan-hui pu-kao, ti- 
i-hao”, (Announcement HoT 1 of the Central Executive Committee of 
the Chinese Soviet Republic), dated February 5, 1934, SSC 16. Also 
printed in HSCH, Ho. 148, (Pebruary 1?, 1934),py.l dated Pebruary 3, 
1934. The two copies also list the members in a slightly different 
order. ^he numbers in Table X represent the order of listing of 
CEC members as on the original Proclamation. The numbering of 
full members is on the left, from 1-175; alternate members are 
numbered on the right, in brackets, from 1-36.
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T.,A R L E XI
Members of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate Elected 
at the Second Rational Soviet Congress
1
Hung Hsi 


































^ HSCH, Special Edition Ho. 7? (Pebruary 3, 1934), p. 1.
2
Chiao is a different character to that of the CEC list. 
But as Huang was elected to the Kiangsi Inspectorate, they are 
probably the same•
 ^? indicates obscure character on microfilm.
* means CEC member.
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numbers were not to exceed 585, and under normal circumstances,
plenary sessions were to be convened by the CEC Presidium every 
2
six months. The CEO was responsible to the National Soviet
Congress,^ but while that National Congress was not in session,
the CEC could itself promulgate a wide variety of laws and
decrees,^- including decisions on major issues of domestic or
foreign policy, enacting legislation for the soviet regime,
organising the judicial system, demarcating administrative areas,
and creating or dissolving subordinate organs of local government.-^
At the first meeting of the new -CEO only 79 full and alternate
members were present, out of a possible total of 211. This was
no doubt due to the military situation having called a substantial
number of delegates back to the front or to their home areas as
soon as the Congress concluded. The meeting went ahead however,
because “according to the power given to them by the Second
Congress, when over one-third of the committee members attend,
7then there is a quorum.”





^ Ibid., article 12.
5
Ibid., article 24.
6 HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.
Ibid. (There is however no such provision in either the 
Constitution or the Tsu-chih Ea.)
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The members first of all elected a provisional Presidium
1of three - Mao Tse-tung, Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao. They 
must have been chosen because they were the Chairman and Vice- 
Chairmen, respectively, of the soviet government. Chang Kuo-t'ao 
was in Szechuan at the time, and was never actually present for 
any of the deliberations of the Second Congress. The meeting 
then proceeded according to the agenda, and Mao Tse-tung reported 
that the first item was the ratification of the central government 
Organisation Law.^ Liang Po-t!ai spoke of the important principles 
of the Law, with which the meeting agreed in general, and the 
detailed clauses were handed over to the CEC Presidium for editing.5 
The CEC then unanimously elected the following 17-man Presidium of 
the CEC:-4
Mao Tse-tung (Chairman)
Hsiang Ying (Vice-Chairman) 


















Ibid.■ (Also see CRBRD, p. 654.)
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Mao was elected as Chairman of the new Presidium, with Hsiang
Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao as his two Vice-Chairmen, This was in
accordance with the Organisation Lav/, which stated that the CSC
was to elect a Presidium of not more than 35 members, including a
1Chairman and 2-4 Vice-Chairmen, The Presidium was the most 
important of all governmental organs, for it took charge of 
affairs when the CEC itself was not in session,2 Since the 
majority of CEC members were rarely, if ever, able to get together 
in one place at one time, the Presidium, or those members of it 
present in Juichin, was the de facto government, even though in 
theory the Presidium was responsible to the CEC,^ which had the 
right to veto and amend its decisions.^ The tasks of the Presidium 
included the supervision of the Constitution, and of the execution 
of the laws and decrees of the National Congress and the CEC,^ It 
also had the right to promulgate various laws and decrees of its 
own,6 Having decided on a Presidium, the CEC then elected a 
Council of People's Commissars (CPC),^ composed of the following 
commissariats
1 Tsu-chih Ea, article 15,
 ^IMA,, article 17.
 ^Lbih., article 23.
4
Ibid,, article 14.
 ^ Ibid,, article 18,
 ^Ibid., article 21.
7 HSCH, No. 146, p. 1.
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Wang Ohia-ch'iang Foreign Affairs
Chu Teh Military Affairs
Teng Chen-hsdn Labour Affairs
Kao Tau-li Land
Lin Po-ch'H Financ e
Wu Liang-p’ing National Economy-1'
Ch’en T ’an-ch'iu Food2
Liang Po-t’ai Judicial Affairs^
Tseng Shan Internal Affairs
Ch’tt Ch’iu-pai Education^
Chang Y/en-t’ien was elected Chairman of the CPC.5 The GPC
was the highest administrative organ of the regime,^ and its 
membership included the members of the various commissariats 
under its command, plus its Chairman, and the Chairman of the
1The Commissariat for National Economy was first mooted in 
March 1933, F HSCH, No. 5.8, (March 6, 1933), p. b j  and eventually 
set up in April 1933. / See HSCH, No. 77, (May 8, 1933), p. 5.
Also Inprecor, No. 65, (December 29,_1934), p. 1753_^/ Wu had been 
Deputy Commissar since July 1933. /See PSCH, No. 95, (July 17,
1933), p. X . J
O
This was a new Commissariat set up at the time of the Second 
Congress.
 ^Liang had been appointed Deputy Commissar for Judicial. Affairs 
in April 1933. / See HSCH, No. 74, (April 29, 1933), p. 1
Mao was not therefore made Minister of Education at the Fifth 
Plenum, as Chang Kuo-t’ao reported. (North interview, op.cit.)
5 HSCH, Ho. 146, p. 1.
Tsu-chih Pa, article 25.
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Workers and Peasants Inspectorate,1 who was Hsiang Ying at that 
time.2 The major task of the CPO was that ,rwithin the scope 
laid down by the CEO, it should promulgate all laws and decrees..., 
and must adopt appropriate administrative measures to guarantee 
their speedy and orderly execution.,!^
Decisions of the CPO on major policies however, had to be 
given to the OEG or its Presidium for examination and approval, 
although the CPO could decide on emergency matters, and report 
later.^ In general, the CPO was responsible to the GEO (or its 
Presidium),^ and the CEO had the power to elect to, or dismiss 
from office the personnel and the Chairman of the CPC,^ and to co­
opt new men onto its membership.? The Organisation Law required 
all those elected to membership of the CPO to be members of the
o
CEC, though it is not clear whether this applied to co-opted 
members. Certainly all the heads of the various Commissariats 
were on the CEC. Furthermore, the CEC had the power to veto or
1 Tsu-chih Fa, article 26•
p
He was so elected at the first session of the new CEC.
See HSCH, Ho. 146, p. 1.
^ Tsu-chih P a , article 28.





Ibid., article 26, note.l.
8 Ibid., article 16.
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amend the decisions of the CPC,-*- and its constituent commissariats.^ 
In addition, under the CPC, there was elected a Central Revolutionary 
Military Committee,^ with Chu Teh as Chairman, and Chou En-lai and 
Wang Chia-ch'iang as Vice-Chairmen.^ Also, there was elected a 
Central Auditing (shen-chi) Committee, with Juan Hsiao-hsien as 
its head. The responsibilities of this body were to investigate 
the state's annual income and expenditure, and to supervise the 
implementation of the Rational Budget.^ The Auditing Committee 
apparently consisted of a total of 5-9 men.? Pinally, Tung Pi-wu 
was made temporary Chairman of the Supreme Court,® the job of 
which was to guarantee the "revolutionary law of the Chinese 
Soviet Republic."9 it had the power to investigate all violations 
of the law by members of the highest organs of the regime, except 
in the case of CEC members, which were to be "settled separately 
by the CEC or by its Presidium".*10 The first plenary session of
1 Ibid., article 14.
2 Ibid., article 19*
 ^Ibid., article 50.
4
HSCH, Ho. 148, p. 1 . Chou En-lai was also elected chairman 
of the Central Military Council, a Party organ. See Issues and 




? Ibid., article 42.
8 HSCH, No. 148, p. 1.
9 Tsu-chih Ea, article 34.
10 / sIbid., article 37 (iiij.
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i
the new CEC was then adjourned.
Analysis of the Few Government
As compared with the CEC elected at the First Congress in 1931, 
which had 63 members, the new CEC numbered 211, of whom 175 were 
full members and 36 were alternates, The creation of alternate or 
candidate members, was an innovation of the Second Congress. Of 
the original 63-man CEC, only 32 were re-elected in 1934*2 Of those 
who were not re-elected, five are known to have died before the 
Second Congress - Bo Teng-hsien,^ P'eng ICuei,^ Shen Tse-min,^ Tuan 
Teh-ch’ang,^ and Wei Pa-ch'Un.^ A further three, HsU Hsi-ken, Hu 
Chiln-ho and Huang P'ing, were condemned as traitors in 1933.8 T ’an 
Chen-lin was also not re-elected. He became linked with Bo Ming in 
1933, when the Party leadership was attacking the nLo Ming line"
1 The Tsu-chih Ea, article 27, also provided for the establish­
ment of a State Political Security Bureau under the CPC, "with the 
object of suppressing counter-revolution". Such a Bureau was set 
up at the time of the First Congress, headed by Teng Ea, but no 
mention was made of it at the time of the Second Congress.
2
This figure does not include Teng Tzu-hui, who was only re­
elected to alternate membership in 1934.
 ^Obituary;- in HSCH, No. 207, (dune 26, 1934), p. 4.
^ China Quarterly, No. 9, (January-March 1962), pp. 179-180. 
 ^Hung Hsing, No. 26, (January 28, 1934), p. 1.
 ^Nym Wales, Red Bust, p. 95.
1934),
9
8 At the 31st. Meetings of the CPC, HSCH, No. 51, (February 10,
, p. 1.
Hsiao Tso-liang, II, op.cit., p. 669.
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Teng Tzu-hui also became identified with the "Lo Ming line", and 
was demoted from full to alternate membership.'*- Lu Teh-kuang 
absconded to Hong Kong with Party funds.2 Of the remaining 20 
members of the 1931 CEC who did not re-appear on the 1934 listing, 
little is known. The names of the majority of them do not occur 
again in the history of the Chinese communist movement, and the 
probability is that most of them lost their lives in battle against 
one or other of Cniang Kai-shek’s "Bandit Encirclement1 campaigns.
Of the 175 full members of Jthe new CEO, 143 had not been elected 
in 1931* Of the 36 candidate members, none had been seated on the 
1931 body, with the exception of Teng Tzu-hui. Among the group of 
newcomers to full membership of the CEC were several important 
members of the Returned Student leadership, and their supporters, 
including Chang Wen-tTien, Ch’en Ch’ang-hao, Ghu Jui, Po Ku, and 
Wu Liang-p’ing. Reflecting the impact of the Returned Student 
leadership, there was also an increase in the incidence of men who 
had been in the Soviet Union, either for educational or political 
purposes (or a combination of both), before going to the soviet 
areas. Whereas it can be estimated that of the original 1931 CEC,
18 had some experience of the Soviet Union, a further 26 of the 
new full members of the 1934 CEC qualified in this way.
1 Appointed Einance Commissar at the Eirst Congress, he was 
reduced to Deputy Commissar in 1933* / HSCH, No. 105, (August 25,
1933), p. 1*7 Lin Po-ch’tl became the new Einance Commissar, (ibid.)
2
Issues and Studies, Yol. Ill, No. 10, (July 1967), p. 45.
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The great expansion of the GEO in terms of numbers reflected 
the growth of the administrative infrastructure since 1931, and 
the increased scope of government activities, particuarly in the 
most secure area around the capital. Taking the GEG newcomers as 
a whole, (including the alternate members), it can be estimated 
that at least 20% came from the area of the Central Soviet 
District»
In order to analyse the changes in political power that occurred 
since the Eirst Congress, it is necessary to examine, not the 
entire CEC, but rather the smaller and more powerful organs of 
the Presidium of the CEC, and the CPC. Uo Presidium of the CEC 
was set up in 1931, But obviously with the great expansion of 
membership, most of which could not be present for meetings, there 
was a need for a smaller body to. take control, and the 17-man 
Presidium was formally established at the Second Congress. There 
is evidence that such a bedy had been functioning, at least in­
formally, prior to the Congress. In his Report to the Congress,
Mao referred to the need nto perfect the organisation and work 
of the CEC Presidium".^
All the members of the Presidium, with the exception of 
Chang ICuo-t 'ao, were present at the Second Congress, and were
** CEC Report, p. 115.
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probably able to attend meetings following the Congress.1 In 
addition to Mao himself, three members of the Presidium can be 
counted as Maoists - Chu Teh, Idn Po-chftl, and Pang Chih-min.
Lin Po-ch'ii1 (Lin Tsu-han) had been a member of Mao's first 
communist group in Hunan in 1921, and had worked with him during 
the period of cooperation with the KMT. However he cooperated 
with the Returned Students to some extent by joining the CC Party 
Affairs Committee at the Pifth Plenum. Pang Chih-min was a veteran 
guerrilla fighter in the north-east Kiangsi area, whose policies 
were identified with those of Mao. On the other hand, four 
men can definitely- be identified as members of supporters of the 
Returned.Student group. These were Hsiang Ying, Chang Wen-t'ien,
Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien) and Chou En-lai. In addition, Teng Pa and 
Lo Mai (Li Wei-han) may well have supported this faction. Teng 
Pa had been a supporter of Mao at least up to 1931, when he was 
made chief of the new Political Security Bureau. By 1934 however, 
it was this Bureau which reportedly guarded Mao if and when he was 
under house arrest at Ytt-tu.^ Purthermore, when Mao replaced
1 Presence at the Congress is assumed from the fact of the indi­
vidual in question having spoken at the Congress, or because he was
a member of'the Congress Presidium. Examination of the data available 
on this body points to the fact that its members were present to 
carry out the functions of a Steering Committee. There is no evidence 
that any one of the members was not present.Ability to attend 
meetings is assumed because all CEC Presidium members came from the 
Juichin, Kiangsi, Pukien area.
2 Rue, on.ci_t_.. pp. 205, 240, 269#
Rue* op.cit., p. 267; also see Schram, Mao Tse-tung. p. 177. 
Teng Pa was elected a member of the CC Party Affairs Committee at 
the Pifth Plenum; see Issues & Studies. Vol. IV, Ho. 1, p. 38.
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Chou En-lai as Chairman of the BMC at the time of- the Tsunyi Con­
ference in January 1935, Teng Ea was dropped from membership of 
the BMC* Nor was. he re-elected to the CCP Central Committee in 
1945» ho Mai also seems to have allied himself with the.Returned 
Student leadership by joining in their attack on lo Ming and the 
”Lo Ming line*’. Also, after having been removed from the CCP 
Politburo at the fourth Plenum, he was re-elected to CG membership 
by the Pifth Plenum, Ch!en Ydn can be classified with the 
Returned Student group, as he delivered a major report to the Pifth 
Plenum of the CC in January 1934, and was elected as a Politburo 
Standing Committee member.^ It is not known which faction, if 
any, was backed by Ch!tl Ch’iu-pai or Liu Shao-ch’i. Ch'il Chfiu-pai 
cannot definitely be identified as a Maoist, nor can he be classed 
as a supporter of the Party leadership, since they had removed him, 
with Lo Mai and others, from the Politburo or GC at the Fourth Plenum. 
In any case, he had only been in the soviet areas for a month,^ Liu 
Shao-ch!i seems to have steered clear of becoming involved in the
1 Bue> ibid., p. 270, quoting Nym Wales, Red Lust, p. 67. As 
Rue notes (p. 338), the list of members of the Revolutionary Military 
Council cited in Red Dust, from which Teng is missing, is referred to 
only as containing the chief members, so it cannot be certain that 
Teng was deprived of his position.




Issues and Studies, loc.cit.
 ^Hung GbRi P^ao-p^ao, Ho. 5, (December 15, 1957), p. 101.
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factional disputes, although he became a member of the CC Party 
Affairs Committee at the Pifth Plenum, Of the remaining three 
members, Teng Chen-hslln, Chou Yueh-lin and Chu Ti-yllan, nothing 
is known. The Maoists therefore commanded only four men, as 
opposed to a probable seven for the Returned Students.
On examination therefore, the conclusion is that the Returned 
Student leadership gained control of the CEC Presidium, and there­
fore of the government apparatus, furthermore, Mao's Chairmanship 
of the Presidium stood him in little stead, for the Returned 
Students could always vote him out if necessary. Although their 
supporters out-numbered those of Mao however, there were so many 
unknown personalities present who could have tipped the balance 
one way or the other that this fact cannot be as conclusively 
substantiated as in the case of Mao's control of the soviet 
government in November 1931• Even so, it is clear that, com­
pared with the first Congress, Mao's power had suffered a 
substantial decline.
The Council of People's Commissars originally set up at the 
time of the first Congress, then had a membership of ten, made 
up of eight Commissariats, plus the Chairman, and the head of 
the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate. This was enlarged to 12 
at the Second Congress, by the addition of two new Commissariats 
for food and National Economy. Only four members of the original 
body remained in 1934. Wang Chia-ch'iang retained foreign Affairs, 
Chu Teh Military Affairs and Ch'll Chlu-pai Education. (A post
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which he was now able to take over actively since his arrival, in 
the soviet areas in December 1935)* Hsiang Ying retained his 
place on the CPC, but he was transferred from Labour to the head 
of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate.
Mao Tse-tung, the Chairman of the CPC in 1931, was dropped 
from the Chairmanship, and from membership of the CPC in 1934.
His place was taken by a member of the Returned Student leadership, 
Chang Wen-tfien. Like Mao in 1931, Chang had no Commissariat, but 
unlike Mao, he did not have two Vice-Chairmen under him.
In addition to Mao, five others lost their places - Teng Tzu- 
hui, Chang Ting-ch^eng, Chou Yi-li, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ho Shu-heng. 
Teng Tzu-hui had become identified with the ,fLo Ming line11 and was 
not even a full member of the CEC any longer.-*- Chang Ting-ch*eng 
had been criticised for ,fright opportunism11 in November 1933.^
Chang Kuo-t^o was no doubt replaced because he showed no sign of 
ever coming to the Central Soviet District. He was in Oyiiwan at 
the time of the First Congress, and had moved to Szechuan by the 
time the Second Congress was held. Chou Yi-li, who had been 
appointed Chief Editor of Red China in 1931, lost the post of
Tehg was initially scheduled to be head of the new Commissariat 
for National Economy. /  See HSCH, No. 58, (March 6, 1933), p. 5 . J
^ HSCH, No. 125, (November 14, 1933), P* 4.
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Internal Affairs Commissar, and his place on the CEO*1 Ho Shu- 
heng ceased to be head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, 
but did retain a seat on the CEC* The operation of both these 
Commissariats (and Education) had been criticised in an article
i f
by Chang Wen-tfien (lo Pu) written in August 1 9 3 3 * ^  There were 
eight newcomers to the CPC - Teng chen-hstln, £ao Tzu-li, lin Po~ 
ch'ii, Wu Liang-p*ing, Ch*en T!an-ch*iu, Liang Po-t!ai, Chang 
Wen-t!ien .and Tseng shan - all of whom, with the single exception 
of Tseng Shan, were elected to the CEC for the firsttime. As far 
as is known, all the CPC members were present at the Second Con­
gress, ^ and all were drawn from the Juichin, Kiangsi, Eukien area.
In looking at the total membership of the CPC from the point 
of view of factional divisions, five men can be identified as
^ ue (o p •cit., p. 2 4 9  ft.) says that "he disappeared before 
the Second- All-China Soviet Congress in January 1 9 3 4 " .  But according 
to Nym Wales, he remained behind in Kiangsi at the time of the 
Long March, and was captured and killed at the same time as Ch!il 
Ch;*iu-pai, in 1 9 3 5 .  (Red Bust, p. 1 7 2 ) .
Tou-cheng, Ho. 2 1 ,  (August 1 2 ,  1 9 3 3 ) ,  p. 1 2 .  In addition,
Ho had been criticised for "bureaucratism and political vacillation" 
as head of the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate, ^fsee HSCH,
Ho. 1 0 7 ,  (September 3 ,  1 9 3 3 ) ,  p* 5.J7 
3 This is established in the same way as for the CEC 
Presidium. The only person about whom some uncertainty remains 
is Ch!en T*an-ch,iu.
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supporters of the Returned Student leadership, and four as 
supporters of Mao Tse-tung. Into the former category fall Wu 
Liang-p*ing, Chang Wen-t*ien, Wang Chia-chHang, Hsiang Ying and 
Liang Po-t^i,**' and into the latter category fall Idn Po-ch!d, 
Ch!en T*an-ch,iu,^ Tseng Shan,^ and Chu Teh. As before, the 
loyalties of Ch!fi Ch'iu-pai remain uncertain, and those of Teng 
Chen-hslln and Kao Tzu-li are unknown.
With the balance of forces about equally divided (at least} 
among the known personalities), it cannot be clearly ascertained 
who had final control over the affairs of the CPC. It should be 
noted however, that compared-with the 1931 CPC, the power of the 
Maoists had diminished considerably. In 1931 the Maoists had an 
overwhelming majority in the CPC, with only two Returned Student 
members, Wang Chia-chfiang and Hsiang Ying present. Furthermore,
^ There is evidence that Liang was probably a member of the 
Returned Student group. As acting head of the Internal Affairs 
Commissariat he was in charge of electoral proceedings for the 
Second Congress, and he had replaced two of Maofs supporters, Chou 
Yi-li and Ho Shu-heng who had had the position before him. ee 
HSCH, No. 46, (January 7, 1933)* p* 4; also Hsttan-chtL Yiln-tung Chou- 
pao, No. 2, (September 10, 1933), pp. 6-8. J  Furthermore, he Was 
made Secretary General of the Second Congress. Rue (who refers to 
him as Liang Pai-t *ai) claims that he has definitely identified Liang 
as a member of the Returned Student group, but cites no evidence.
(Op.cit♦, p. 7 ft., and p. 270 ft.).
c Ch!en, like Teng Tzu-hui and others, was atthbked for 
supporting the uLo Ming11 line. Just prior to the Congress the CC 
had recommended that Chfen be dismissed from his position as 
Secretary of the Fukien Provincial Party Committee. See Tou-oheng, 
No. 43) (January 19, 1934), p. 2.
 ^Tseng had been an associate of Mao*s in Kiangsi for some 
years, was Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Soviet Government, 
and helped Mao put down the Fut*ien rebellion.
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all the CPC members who lost their positions in 1934 were Maoists*-*- 
(With the exception of Chang Kuo-t'ao, who played no role in the 
proceedings). Even if the CPC were in the hands of Mao's supporters, 
the provisions of the Organisation Law required that all major policies 
be referred to the CEC or its Presidium, which, as has been shown, 
were probably in the hands of the official Party leadership.
On the basis of the available evidence, it would appear that 
Mao, having lost control over the Party in the soviet areas prior 
to the Pirst Congress, then lost command of the government apparatus 
in 1933, and that one of the reasons for convening a Second Congress 
was to enable the Returned Student group to formalise their control 
over the soviet government. Although no precise date can be set 
for Maofs loss of control over the government, many of his
t*
supporters found themselves dismissed or criticised in mid-1933.
In June, T'an Chen-lin was linked with the "Lo Ming line", and was 
not re-elected to the CEC in 1934. Teng Tzu-hui was demoted from 
Commissar to Deputy Commissar, and criticised for “right opportunism" 
in August, and Chang Ting-ch'eng, Commissar for Land, was similarly 
attacked in November. Another Maoist, Ho Shu-heng, was accused of 
bureaucratism in the summer of 1933, and Chou Yi-li*s place as 
Commissar for Internal Affairs was found to b*e taken by a probable 
member of the Returned Student group, Liang Po-t'ai, who was placed 
in charge of the soviet elections. That some of Mao's supporters
Teng Tzu-hui, Chang Ting-ch'eng, Ho Shu-heng, Chou Yi-li, 
and Mao himself.
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turned up in positions of prominence at the Second Congress was 
no doubt due to the same reasons that Mao Was there - they 
agreed to "toe the Party line”, and, since trained and experienced 
men were at a premium in the soviet areas, they were allowed 
positions of responsibility.
Summary
Once the soviet government was formally established in 
Juichin at the close of 1931, it successfully extended its authority 
over the other soviet areas, including those not contiguous to the 
Central Soviet Area;;. After the First Congress, the Party started 
to play a greater role in organising a formal governmental and 
administrative structure that would bring the soviet leadership 
into closer contact with the soviet population, so that the 
Central Soviet Area began to take on more of the characteristics 
of a formal state, and appear less like a guerrilla encampment.
With this change, the process of social mobilisation continued, with 
only marginal success at first in 1932, but showing improvement, 
as measured by the degree of participation by the people in soviet 
work and elections, during 1933* This improvement however, seems 
to have been largely confined to the Central Soviet Area. The 
administrative apparatus of the soviet government expanded with 
the creation of two new Commissariats and an enlarged CEC, which 
can be seen as a response by the government to the demands of the
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population - demands which were themselves engendered by the pro­
paganda of the communists*
In 1933? the control by the Returned Students over the soviet 
administrative apparatus and the machinery for soviet elections, 
plus the activities of the Party Corps placed in each delegation 
to the Second Congress by the Party leadership guaranteed that the 
Programme of the Congress would be as laid down by the Central 
Committee of the CCP and the Twelfth Plenum of the ECCI* There 
was no reliance however on the parallel, or "double track*1 system 
of Party and government committees common to the USSR and post- 
1 9 4 9  China* Rather, control was exercised over the governmental 
structure through the electoral committees and the Internal Affairs 
Department of the CPC*
At the Second Congress, far greater emphasis was placed on 
Party leadership over the soviet government and its policies than 
was the case in 1 9 3 1 *  This was also noticeable in the attendance 
at the Second Congress: of the 1 5 7 9  observers and delegates, 
nearly 50$ were Party or Youth league members.
1 9 3 3  had witnessed the progressive loss of control by Mao and 
his supporters over the organs of the soviet government* The new 
soviet government elected at the Second Congress substantiated 
this, and formalised the control over the government apparatus of 
the Returned Student leadership, who now commanded all three power 
structures - Party, military and governmental - in the soviet areas.
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At the Second Congress, there was a marked turnover' of personnel; 
Maoists such as T*an Chen-lin and Teng Tzu-hui were removed from 
full membership of the CEC, while many of the Returned Students 
obtained places for the first time. In addition, a new Presidium 
of the CEC was created as the supreme governmental organ of the 
soviet regime, on which the Maoists were outnumbered. Mao was 
dropped from his Chairmanship of the highest administrative organ 
of the state, the Council of People!s Commissars, and did not 
even remain as a member. Many of his supporters were also removed 
from the CPC and replaced by others loyal to the Returned Student 
leadership. Although the balance of forces on the new CPC appeared 
roughly equal (as compared with the overwhelming dominance of the 
Maoists in 1931), it was under the control of the newly-established 
Presidium of the CEC, which was controlled by the Returned Students, 
who therefore asserted their authority over the soviet government. 
Mao and his supporters, in return for public acquiescence to the 
official Party line, were allowed a substantial role at the Congress 
and in the new government.
The Second Congress vindicated the claim of the soviet 
government to be a government of all the soviet territories. Many 
soviet areas were represented on the official steering committee 
(Presidium) in charge of the arrangements of the Congress, and on
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the new CEC. However, the claim of the Congress to be a national 
,,A11-China,, event was not as well substantiated* Out of a total 
of 693 delegates, only 17 came from the White areas* In addition, 
de facto control over the government was in the hands of the CEC 
Presidium, the vast majority of whose members came from the Kiangsi- 
Pukien area, as was also the case with the steering committee of 
the Congress.
The Second Congress manifested the heady optimism of most of 
the Returned Student leadership, which saw the struggle against 
the Kuomintang entering a new stage, and who wished to sum up and 
capitalise on the experiences of running the revolutionary base 
areas for two years, so as to improve the economic situation, co­
ordinate military action to crush the Pifth “Bandit Encirclement11 
campaign, and, ideally, to capture towns and link up the Central 
Soviet District with the outlying soviet areas. Although their 
optimism proved unjustified, the much-publicised Second Congress 
did continue their claim, however briefly, that “in the Chinese 
Soviet Republic all conditions and elements of a modern state, 
worthy of being called a civilised peoplefs republic, already 
exist.
1 Wang Ming and K'ang Sheng, op.cit., p. 20 (emphasis in original).
CONCLUSION
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The major significance of the two National Soviet Congresses 
is that using them as a focal point for analysis sheds light on 
an extremely obscure period in the history of the COP, with parti­
cular reference to the analysis of the two inter-related themes 
of power relations and political processes.
Also, since the Kiangsi experience was basically one of failure, 
ending with the flight of the communists on the Long March, it is 
especially important to test some of the assumptions of the retro­
spective survey of the period made after the end of the Long March, 
which purport to define Mao Tse-tung*s role at the time.
The first efforts towards establishing a soviet government 
were made in 1930 by the Chinese Communist Party under the leader­
ship of Li Li-san. It was believed that such a government would 
centralise and consolidate the opposition to the Kuomintang, 
particularly in the military sphere. Furthermore, the CCP believed 
that the government would be able to win the support of the people 
by giving them political rights, and depriving the landlords and 
other "exploiting" groups of their political and economic power.
Li also wanted to enforce his own policies on the soviet area 
leaders, and in so doing, extend his authority over the revolutionary 
base areas.
Preparations for a Congress to create a central government 
reached an advanced stage, but were halted by the political demise 
of Li Li-san in November 1930. The ensuing struggle for supremacy
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within the Party, in conjunction with the poor military situation 
with which the communists were faced, pre-empted the policy of 
constructing a government.
The policy of the OOP and Li Li-san was based on directives 
from the Comintern in Moscow. In spite of allegations to the con­
trary from the Comintern, there was basic agreement on strategy 
between the two. Li however, was caught in a tactical "error" 
when he continued to insist that the soviet government should be 
formed in a city, after the Comintern had decided that the country­
side was a safer place. Li was accused at the Fourth Plenum of the 
CC of having neglected the task of establishing a strong central 
soviet government. Although he had in fact put a great deal of 
effort into preparations for creating a government, he had delayed 
its actual establishment while he attempted to take a key city with 
the Red Army.
The year 1931 saw a switch in emphasis of CCP operations from 
the city to the countryside. Mao was pre-eminent in the Central 
Soviet Area, and successfully employed guerrilla tactics against 
the KMT. In the field of civil administration however, he also 
tended to employ military organisations, and did little to create 
an efficient governmental and administrative apparatus which would 
have drawn the people into political activity, while probably hindering 
attempts at reform.
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The Returned Student leadership went ahead with preparations 
for the Pirst Rational Soviet Congress, which was eventually con- 
vened in November 1931 at the soviet capital of Juichin, Kiangsi, 
in the rural hinterland of China* The main aim of the Returned 
Student leaders in calling the Congress was to use it as a vehicle 
for extending their own authority over Mao Tse-tung in the soviet 
areas* But despite the fact that many of the Returned Students 
moved from their headquarters in Shanghai to Juichin so as to attend 
the Congress, Mao and his supporters because of their entrenched 
influence in the soviet administrative and electoral machinery, 
won control of the government created by the Congress* The Returned 
Students, however, clearly won command of the Party apparatus in 
the Central Soviet Area*
Unlike the re sortitions passed by the Congress of the Party 
in the Soviet Areas which contained attacks on Mao’s views, the 
laws and resolutions passed by the Pirst Congress that same month 
(November 1931) were basically favourable to the Maoist view point, 
indicating that the Returned Students, although they had successfully 
exerted their authority over the Party apparatus in the soviet 
areas, had not had a similar success with the government machinery* 
The Chinese Soviet Republic, formally inaugurated by the Pirst 
Congress, was of tremendous propaganda value to the communists in 
support of their claim to be an ’’alternative road” for the Chinese 
people to that offered by the Kuomintang* In addition, it
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institutionalised the shift in the operations of the Party from
the city to the countryside of China, and set about the task of
centralising the previously fragmented administration of the widely 
scattered rural soviet areas. After the close of the Congress, 
and going into 1932, the authority of the government in Juichin
was extended over the other soviet districts.
The Returned Students became dominant in military affairs 
by the spring of 1933 at the latest, and were able to abandon 
Mao's techniques of guerrilla warfare in their fight against the 
KMT's fourth campaign. At the same time as Mao had lost power 
in the Party and military structure, his predominance in the govern 
ment structure was under attack, and many of his supporters were 
criticised or dismissed in mid-1933. It is significant that the 
call for a Second Congress was issued by the government in June 
1933, indicating that the Returned Student leadership was able to 
enforce its will on the governmental apparatus by that time. By 
putting their own followers in charge of the electoral machinery, 
they reversed the situation of 1931, and ensured the production of 
a Congress which, this time, would be responsive to their wishes. 
This was done, not by means of Party control exercised by parallel 
Party and government organs, the system familiar to both the USSR 
and post-1949 China, but rather by Party control over the Council 
of People's Commissars, and particularly its Internal Affairs 
Department, and by influencing the composition of the electoral
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committees. In this way, Party factions were inserted in each 
delegation to the Second Congress.
The Congress was preceded by a massive propaganda barrage 
directed against the inhabitants of the soviet areas, designed 
to show off the record ofthe soviet government and win support 
for the Red Army in its struggle to defeat the military campaigns 
of Chiang Kai-shek. By mid-1933, a primitive state apparatus 
had been created, which in spite of its imperfections was neverthe­
less able to function as a two-way transmission belt between people 
and government, implementing Party policy and listening to the 
reactions of the population, as well as encouraging a few to play 
an active political role. The 1933 election campaign for the 
Second Congress was therefore far more successful in drawing the 
masses into political participation than its predecessor had been.
The Congress was also designed to formalise th.e victory of 
the Returned Students over the Maoist government in the soviet 
areas. The laws and resolutions approved by the Congress were an 
enumeration of the policies passed by the CCP*s Pifth Plenum in 
January 1934, (based on the line laid down by the ECCI's Twelfth 
Plenum), and disclosed the over-optimistic view of the situation 
characteristic of the Returned Student leaders. When the Second 
Congress actually convened the same month, the Returned Students 
emerged in control of the new government elected by the assembled
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delegates, though not to the same overwhelming extent that marked 
the victory of the Maoists in 1931* Mao and his followers publicly 
echoed the line of the Pifth Plenum, and in return for their 
acquiescence in the policies of the Returned Students, they were 
permitted to retain a substantial role in soviet affairs. Mao - 
himself was the dominant personality at the Congress*
The composition of the delegates to the Second Congress, 
and the composition of the Central Executive Committee, attested 
to the claim of the CCP that the soviet government was representa­
tive of all "soviet China11* However, its representation and 
authority extended only in the smallest degree outside the terri­
torial enclaves controlled by the CCP and the Red Army. It there­
fore existed only as a potential national government.
To a large extent, the evidence offered by an analysis of the 
two Soviet Congresses tends to corroborate the statements made by 
Mao!s machine in 1945 concerning power relations during the Kiangsi 
soviet period, although there are numerous discrepancies between 
Mao*s later statements and his public remarks at the time. Mao is 
correct in stating that the Returned Student leadership usurped 
his Party and military leadership. They controlled the leading 
positions of the Party in the soviet areas by November 1931, and 
won control over the Red Army during the period from the Ningtu 
Conference of August 1932 to the appointment of Chou En-lai as Red
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Army Political Commissar in May 1933* (Mao now claims that his 
military tactics, which were not employed, were responsible for 
victory against the fourth "bandit encirclement11 campaign of the 
KM3? in 1933.)
Mao never explicitly refers to his loss of control over the 
soviet government, no doubt because he was its formal head through­
out the entire period of the dominance of the Tlthird Left line'1.
By mid-1933 however-', he had lost effective control over the 
government, a situation which was formalised by the Second Congress* 
It is significant that the CCP*s Pifth Plenum, held just prior to 
the Second Congress, is described by Mao as marking "the peak of 
the development of the third ^eft1 line". The Pirst and Second 
Congresses therefore, far from being stepping-stones on Mao!s 
road to power, were in reality evidence of his tempprary decline.
APPEiJMX
THE HEADERS OP THE KIAHGSI SOVIET
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The Central Executive Committee (CEC) of the Chinese Soviet 
Republic, and its supreme governmental organ,comprised a total 
of 241 people elected either at the Eirst National Soviet Congress 
in November 1933., or at the Second Congress of January-Eebruary 
1934, or both. At one time or another the CEC numbered among its 
membership virtually all the Chinese communist leaders of the time,2 
including Chou En-lai, Ch'en Shao-ytt (Wang Ming), Ch!in Pang-hsien 
(BdKu ), Chang Wen-t*ien (Lo Eu ), Shen Tse-min, Hsiang Ting, Jen Pi- 
shih, Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, Tseng Shan, Eang Chih- 
min, Chang Kuo-t!ao, Ch*tt Ch*iu-pai and others.^
An inspection of the characteristics of only the men forming 
the Politburo and Central Committee would provide too small a 
sample for an analysis of communists active during the Kiangsi 
soviet period, even omitting the difficulties of determining such 
membership* Eurthermore, the histories and careers of many of
A 17-man Presidium was eLected from the CEC membership at 
the Second Congress. The CEC however retained de .jure control 
over its Presidium.
p
Defined primarily by membership of the Central Committee 
or Politburo.
3 Ch'tt Chfiu-pai was not a Central Committee member, as he 
was removed from this office at the time of its Eourth Plenum in
January 1931* One probable Central Committee member not elected
to the CEC, Teng Chung-hsia, was criticised for “opportunism11 in
1931.
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these Party leaders hare been documented as well as possible else­
where. Widening the group to include all CEO members (not one 
of whom is known to have been a non-communist) makes for a more 
comprehensive analysis of the communist movement of the time, 
by providing some idea as to the kind of people the leaders were, 
and the careers they followed.
This analysis also furnishes clues as to the nature of 
the present-day Chihese communist leadership, so many of whose 
members first grew to prominence in the Party during this period.
It is unfortunate that, despite intensive investigation, in 
many cases nothing is known about some GEC personnel except their 
names and their election in 1931 or 1934. On average, for any 
given characteristic, there is information on about 30$ of the 
total.-* Many of the "unknowns" were probably military figures who 
were killed in action during the Kiangsi period, who did not survive 
the Long March,, or who were only elected to alternate membership 
at the Second Congress, and never fulfilled .their earlier promise. 
Although 30$ is not a large sample, much of the information, 
particularly that from the Ch*en Ch'eng Collection of documents, 
has not hitherto been brought to light, and it is believed that 
this biographical analysis, together with the description and
Ihe tendency is for the majority of characteristics to be 
identified for the same 30$ of CEC members, although there are in­
dividuals on whom isolated bits of information are available* All 
the tables (i - VIII) therefore analyse approximately the same 
sample group *
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analysis of the two Soviet Congresses, provides new knowledge of 
the political processes and political power during this period in 
the history of the Chinese communist movement, which still remains 
in many respects as one leading scholar has described it - "largely 
a myth, if not a blank, in our knowledge of the history of the CCP 
to date1'.'**
It is not assumed that the CEC as an institution wielded a 
great deal of power in soviet China. In fact, it was too large 
a body, its membership was scattered over a wide area, and its 
functions were usually performed by the Council of Peopled 
Commissars (CPC) or the Presidium of the CEC. Rather, CEC member­
ship is taken as being indicative of holding a position of some
2
standing in the soviet areas.
The CEC was an overwhelmingly male group, as might be expected 
of a revolutionary elite functioning under wartime conditions. Of 
the. known females in the group, many were the wives of prominent 
communists who were themselves elected to the CEC. These wives 
included Chang Cb^in-ch^iu (who had been married to Ch’en Ch!ang-hao 
and to Shen Tse-min), E^ang K'o-ch'ing (wife of Chu Teh), Liu Cfc^ ttn- 
hsien (married to Po Ku), Teng Ying-ehfao (married to Chou En-lai),
** Hsiao Tso-ling, X, op.cit., p. 302.
2
This analysis is therefore of CEC membership, and not of 
the CEC as an institution. It is impossible to footnote all the 
sources in this appendix, especially when making statistical generali 
sations. Major sources of information are listed in the bibliography
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and Ts*ai Chfang (wife of Li Eu-chTun). It is not clear to what 
extent nepotism played a role in their selection.
As far as is known, the vast majority of the CEC were Han 
Chinese* The only known exceptions were Kuan Hsiang-ying who 
was a Manchu, and Wei Pa-chtftn who was one of the Chuang national 
minority.
In the case of province of origin, the provinces of Hunan, 
Szechuan and Hupeh were the most heavily represented - indeed 
they account for over half the sample. SText come Kiangsi, Kwang- 
tung, Chekiang and Kiangsu* Taken together, these seven provinces 
of the South and Central Coast, and Central Interior of China pro­
vided the birthplaces of approximately 86$ of all CEC members whose 
birthplaces are k n o w n T h e  figures are particularly striking 
when the percentage of CEC members from a given province is con­
trasted with the percentage of the total population of China (in 
1926) from the same province. Hunan is grossly over-represented 
in terms of communists coming from that province, as is Hupeh, and 
also Szechuan (though to a lesser extent). The six northern 
provinces are very under-represented, reflecting the southern
^ See Table I.
i
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T A B L E  I
GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN Off OEC MEMBERS
Birthplace Humber Percentage^ % of China!s Total^
Population in 1926
South & Central 
Coast
Kwangtung 7 8.5 7.6
Fukien 2 2.4 3.0
Chekiang 6 7.3 5.0
Kiangsu 6 7.3 7.1
Central Interior
Hunan 22 26.8 8.4
Saechuan 12 14.6 10.7
Hupeh 11 13.4 5.9
Anhwei 3 3.7 4.2
Kiangsi 7 8.5 5.7
South Interior
Kwangsi 1 1.2 2.5
Kweichow 0 0 2.3
Yunnan 1 1.2 2.3
North
Shantung 0 0 7.1
Hopeh 0 0 8.0
Honan 1 1.2 7.3
Shansi 1 1.2 2.5
Shensi 1 1.2 3.6
Kansu 0 0 1.5
Tibet 0 0 1.3
Sinkiang 0 0 0.5








Percentage of the 82 members of the CEC whose provinces of 
origin can be identified•
2
Post Office estimate, from The China Year- Book, 1931; p. 2, 
quoted in North and Pool, op.cit., p. 403.
 ^Hot 1(50$ owing to rounding percentages to one decimal place.
Figure for Mongolia not included in the Post Office Estimate.
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n
orientation of the COP in its early years. As North notes: "an 
examination of Chinese upheavals since 1850 reveals South China
as a revolutionary incubator, while the North has been more
1 ’ oconservative.
Information is available on the social origins of CEC members 
for slightly less than one-quarter {23%) of the total.^ This is 
probably due to a reticence to reveal a background other than 
proletarian, and to a desire on the part of the leadership to
The figures for the 1945 Central Committee show a very 
similar distribution, with only a slight percentage decrease in 
personnel coming from the favoured areas of Szechuan and Hupeh 
(there was actually a slight increase in the percentage from 
Hunan in 1945), and a slight increase from the northern provinces 
of Shantung, Shansi and Shensi/ See /Robert 0. North with 
Ithiel de Sola Pool, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites* in 
Harold D. lasswell and Daniel Lerher (Eds.), World"Revolutionary 
Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements,(Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press, 1966), p. 403*3^ By 1955 however, the fact that 
Shensi was the base of the CCP after the long March had made itself 
felt in terms of numbers of men in the CCP leadership. ee 
Harold C. Hinton, leaders of Communist China» (Santa Monica, 
California: RAND Corporation, RM-1845, 1956). p. 194._J7
2
North and Pool, op.cit♦» p. 402.
5
There is insufficient data on family antecedents to draw 
any distinctions between fathers* occupation and family status, 
which could well be different in the period of economic and 
social flux during Which the personnel under discussion grew to 
maturity.
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minimise the essentially rural-peasant nature of the Party as 
a whole. One of the most striking points about Table XX is 
that two of the predominant categories are gentry and scholar- 
off i.cials (12), and landlords (7)* As might be expected, a 
peasant background is predominant (18), while only six men can 
trace their origins to any kind of proletarian form.^
Of the 74 men whose date of birth is known, (although the 
sources conflict or are imprecise in the cases of some in­
dividuals), the majority - almost 80% - were born between 1895 
and 1909, making them aged 22-36 years old in 1931.^ This is 
a remarkably young revolutionary elite, which joined the Party 
during the 1920*s when nationalist fervour was running high.^
1 See Table IX.
2
A slightly larger number were found to have had working- 
class . occupations prior to joining the OOP* See Table VII.
See Table III. '
4
The aging, and the continuity of this elite is demonstrated 
by the Table in the HAND study (op.cit., p. 192), which reveals 
an almost identical distribution, that is, an overwhelming pre­
ponderance of Chinese communist leaders in 1955 born in the 
1895-1909 period. In 1955, they made up almost 78% of the 94 
leaders whose date of birth is known.
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T A B L E  II






Poor gentry, officials 























1 Expressed as a percentage of the total number of CEC 
personnel whose backgrounds are known.
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I A B 1 E  III 
AGE OP CEO MEMBERS1











By year of birth.
2
Expressed as a percentage of all CEC members whose year 
of birth is known.
3 This figure does not total 100$ owing to the statistical 
error caused by rounding to the first decimal place.
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The date of joining the CCP is known for 67 individuals.*** The
initial 1921-1923 period covers the interval between the founding of
the CCP and the inauguration of its alliance with the KMT, The 1924-
1927 period covers the period of the first KMT-CCP united front, until
its collapse in 1927* Most of the CEC members referred to therefore,
(60$), joined the CCP during its alliance with the KMT It is probable
«
that many of the "unknowns" were locally recruited from the revolu­
tionary base areas in the early 1930's, as membership statistics 
indicate a considerable growth rate from 1928-1933.2
The exceptionally well-educated nature of the Chinese soviet 
leadership is evidenced by Table V showing the educational stage 
attained by the 74 men on whom data exists with regard to this, 
characteristic.3 of these-74? an extremely large number, 57 (or 77$), 
received some kind of advanced education, which was h university 
education in the case of 42 of them. In the majority of such cases, 
this meant an education in one of the establishments in the Soviet 
Union such as the University for the Toilers of the East, or the 
Sun Yat-sen University.^
1 See Table IY. In some cases, the individual was associated 
with the Party, or a member of the Youth Corps prior to full member­
ship of the Party.
John Wilson Lewis, Leadership in Communist China, (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 110.
x
 ^An individual is classified only according to the highest stage 
reached, i.e. if a man had primary and secondary school experience, 
plus advanced training, he is classified only as "advanced". Also, 
the fact of a university training does not necessarily imply a 
secondary education*
4 See Table VI.
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1 Expressed as a percentage of all CEC personnel whose dates 
of joining the Party can be identified.
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Total 7 4 100.0
i
Expressed as a percentage of all CEC members whose educational 
level can be ascertained.
p
Eor example: Peasant Movement Training Institute, 
engineering school etc*
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As education is a prestige characteristic in China, it is pro­
bable that a large proportion of those making up the "unknowns” 
received only a minimum of education, or perhaps up to the secondary 
stage* Since they had achieved some prominence in the soviet areas, 
it is unlikely that they were completely illiterate.
The Table on "foreign experience"*^ covers 51 men, and indicates 
that in most cases, this meant a period of study in the Soviet Union. 
Then, in descending order, came Frap.ce, Japan, another European 
country, and the USA. In the case of visits abroad which did not 
involve study, the USSR was again the most popular place, followed by 
a European country - usually visited while based in France. It is 
clear that education abroad, combined with a stay in Russia, was a 
big factor in the revolutionary experience of communist leaders, as 
also was experience of the work-study programme in France, under 
which many first came into contact with the CCP.^
In the case of the occupations of communist leaders prior to 
joining the Party, few careers are identifiable* In many cases, 
none of their background is known, and even in the case of those 
whose history is available, a good number had no career. They 
joined the CCP in their student days, or in other ways became pro­
fessional revolutionaries before settling into an occupation. 
Careerists must have been more attracted into the KMT, as those
1 Table VI.
2
Individuals may be classified in Table VI under moie than one 
heading, if they studied in or visited mol's than one country.
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Other European country 6 5
USA 1 0
Total 63  ^ 17^
1 Of the total of 241 CEC members, 51 are known to have been
abroad at least once by the time of the Second National Soviet
Congress of 1954*
p
"Other11 includes, for example, political visits, or visits 
to other countries while studying abroad,
*3 An individual is countsd more than once if he has visited,
more than one country, but not if he has visited the same country
more than once* (Regardless of the purpose of the-'Visit*)
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seeking a career were unlikely to be tempted by the rather bleak 
prospects of political power offered by the CCP - especially_after 
1927.
Of the 40 individuals whose careers are known, the largest 
group (35$) were in education, showing perhaps the desire to 
improve society which led them to join the CCP. A further 15$ 
were in journalism, 22$ already had a military career before join- 
ing the Red Army, and 27$ were workers, a category which includes 
not only ’’true proletarians" such as miners, but also carpenters, 
cooks, and apprentice silk-workers.
Once in the CCP and operative in the soviet areas, not all 
those who were teachers in "civilian life" remained in the field 
of education and training. The majority, in fact, became full-time 
Party workers, organisers and administrators, which offered a. better 
chance for advancement by using their talents.2 Journalists tended 
to put their skills to use in Party propaganda work. Without ex­
ception, those who were following military careers continued to 
pursue their calling in the ranks of the Red Army, fhere are 99 
(41$) CEC members on whom there is data about their main occupation 
while in the soviet areas. Of these, the largest single group (33$ 
of them) was made up of military and police personnel, as might be
1 See Table VII.
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1 Expressed as a percentage of the sample of CEC members whose 
occupation can be identified, and omitting those known to have had 
no occupation*
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T A B L E  VIII 
GEO PERSONNEL BY TYPE OP WORK IN SOVIET AREAS
Classification Number Percentage-1-
Political 25 25*2
Political work in Army 19 19.2
Military or police 33 33*4
Trade union, peasant
organisation work 9 9.1
Education, training,
youth work 13 13.1
Total 99 100*0
Expressed as a percentage of the total number of GEO 
personnel whose main occupation in the soviet areas can be 
identified.
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expected in a situation of almost constant warfare that was the 
lot of the Chinese Soviet Republic, In addition, a further 19% 
were engaged in political work connected with the Red Army, either 
as members of the General Political Department, or as political 
commissars. The military therefore absorbed over 50% of the 
sample. Of the remainder, 25% were full-time Party workers within 
the CCP apparatus, 9% were engaged in organising labour unions 
or peasant associations, and 13% devoted their time to education 
and youth work.
In summary and conclusion, it can be said, on the basis of 
the sample of CEC members on whom data exists, that communist 
leaders at this time were predominantly male, Han Chinese, youthful, 
(their average was 34 in 1934), the majority of whom came from 
provinces in the central interior of China, particularly Hunan, 
Szechuan and Hupeh. In terms of the percentage of the total 
population, these provinces, and others along the south and central 
coastal regions are heavily over-represented among the communists, 
while the north and outlying regions of the country, such as Tibet 
and Sinkiang are grossly under-represented. Given the stress laid 
by traditional Marxism on poor, urban, proletarian origins, it is 
surprising that so many of the sample originate from landlord and 
gentry families, or from rural peasant backgrounds. In terms of 
education, they are a remarkably well-educated elite, much of the
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■training having been provided abroad, particularly at Russian 
universities. The majority of the sample tended to join the OOP 
when they were in their middle twenties, from 1924-1927, prior 
to the split between the CCP and the KMT. Most of them had no 
career outside the communist movement. Once in the revolutionary 
base areas, they tended to work in the Red Army, either as military 
specialists, or frequently as political commissars attached to the 
communist troops. Those not in the Red Army were primarily full­
time Party functionaries.
The importance of Kiangsi soviet period can hardly be over- • 
rated. One study has shown that of the 97 members elected to the 
Eighth Central Committee in 1936, no less than 82 (or 84.5$) 
participated in guerrilla warfare during all or part of the period, 
and also that of the total membership of the Eighth Central 
Committee, no less than 53*6$ came from the provinces of Hunan, 
Szechuan, Hupeh, Kiangsi and Anhwei, reflecting recruitment in the 
Chinese Soviet Republic prior to the Long March.2 Many of the Chinese 
communist leaders therefore, first became significant during the 
time of the Kiangsi soviet, and an understanding of_the nature of 
the political elite functioning during this period is essential to 
an understanding of later developments.
*- Pranklin W. Houn, 11 The Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party. A Study of an Elite*1, American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 51, (June 1957), p. 400.
2 Ibid.. p. 395.
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